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During the struggle for democracy in France, political thinkers across the spectrum 
pressed into service an unusual image of violence. Rather than a source of anarchy and 
disorder, this violence generated social cohesion. Instead of fragmentation, it promised 
to retie the bonds of democratic society. This dissertation studies how a variety of 
writers and intellectuals weaponized this image of violence in the political culture of 
nineteenth century France. What could this violence accomplish that other languages 
of democratic agency could not? What were the sources of its appeal?  
To answer these questions, I consider four episodes where French thinkers 
believed social disintegration threatened the nation: the regicide of Louis XVI, early 
French colonization of Algeria, the Paris Commune, and the eve of World War I. In 
each episode, political thinkers warned of social breakdown spurred by 
democratization. In each case, they also claimed that violence by the people could 
repair the cohesion of the French social body. Studying these episodes underscores 
how no single intellectual tradition held a monopoly over regenerative violence in 
France, because the problem it hoped to answer was fundamental: how can the 
 cohesion of the social body be repaired in the age of democracy? It was a problem that 
could not be remedied by simple appeal to constitutionalism or natural law theory. 
Thus, to repair the moral foundations of “the social,” French thinkers on both the left 
and right pushed towards a vision of democratic violence as social regeneration. To 
form a democratic society in history rather than in theory, French thinkers did not 
repudiate violence as anti-social or pre-political. Instead, they reached for it in the 
form of democratic terror. 
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Introduction 
Democratic Terror in Times of Social Disintegration 
The way we think about violence is bound up with our understanding of society and 
the bonds connecting individuals. When we consider different shapes that violence can 
take, our accounts of social interdependence shift, as do the patterns of agency and 
vulnerability that we perceive.  
In the case of the social contract tradition, its vision of society has been shaped 
by an image of political violence as anarchy. Since Thomas Hobbes, to talk about 
violence is to talk about disorder and the ways the social bond snaps from injury or 
death. For John Locke, he who commits violence “declares himself to live by another 
Rule, than that of reason and of common Equity, which is that measure God has set to 
the actions of Men, for their mutual security.”1 The person who transgresses nature’s 
law becomes a criminal, a threat to society’s commodious living. For Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, violence against a fellow citizen expels a person from the social body as an 
anarchic pathogen: “Every evil-doer who attacks social right becomes a rebel and a 
traitor to the fatherland…he ceases to be a member of it, and even enters into war with 
it.” Thus Rousseau concluded, “he must be cut off from [society] either by exile as a 
violator of the treaty, or by death as a public enemy; for such an enemy is not a moral 
person, but a man.”2 In this tradition, violating the social compact designates oneself 
as an hostis humani generis or an hors-la-loi, an outlaw.3 It invites the violence of 
                                                
1 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1960), 272. 
2 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Later Politics Writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 64-5. 
3 Dan Edelstein, The Terror of Natural Right: Republicanism, the Cult of Nature, and the French 
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organized society upon oneself, not as a type of counter-violence, but as justice. 
Within the revolutionary and republican political culture of modern France, a 
different, less familiar image of violence came to prominence. French thinkers 
invoked it alongside its contractualist counterpart. But in this alternative image, 
violence was not identified with anarchy. Instead, it was its solution. Rather than 
something sublimated as men escaped nature into society, thinkers portrayed violence 
as constitutive of the social bond. This was especially true when the agent of that 
violence was “the people,” whose world making powers this violence expressed and 
vindicated. Maximilien Robespierre captured this image of violence in a 1793 speech 
when he argued that terror “has nothing in common with anarchy or disorder.” On the 
contrary, its violence instituted society, for it was “not [guided] by individual passions, 
but by the public interest.”4 That link to the public interest made the people’s violence 
unifying rather than anarchic. “Woe betide us,” Robespierre warned, if through 
violence they were to “break the bundle apart, instead of binding it.”5 
This alternative image of violence reappeared in the century following the 
Revolution by thinkers both right and left. General Thomas Robert Bugeaud invoked it 
to characterize the French conquest of Algeria in the 1840s. “It is a cruel extremity” to 
wage total war against native Arabs, “but a horrifying example was necessary to strike 
terror” into their hearts.6 The anarchist Pierre Joseph Proudhon appealed to it in his 
                                                                                                                                       
Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 18-20. 
4 Maximilien Robespierre, “On the Principles of Revolutionary Government” (25 December 1793), in 
Maximilien Robespierre, Virtue and Terror, trans. John Howe (New York: Verso, 2007), 98-107, at 
100. 
5 Robespierre, “On the Principles of Revolutionary Government,” 102. 
6 Benjamin Claude Brower, A Desert Named Peace: The Violence of France's Empire in the Algerian 
Sahara, 1844-1902 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 23. 
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1861 La Guerre et la Paix: “War is divine, that is to say, it is primordial, essential to 
life and to the production of men and society.” That was because a man only emerged 
from “the primeval slime which served him as a womb” once “he stood over the body 
of an enemy he had slain.”7 Upon the formation of the Paris Commune in March 1871, 
communards like Jules Vallès found in the blood shed against Versailles the seeds of a 
regenerated society: “Trumpets! Blow in the wind!... We have bled and wept for you. 
You shall harvest our heritage. Son of despairing men, you shall be free!”8 This image 
of violence saturated French political culture on the eve of the first World War. Right 
wing intellectuals like Georges Valois promised in a 1912 manifesto to restore 
freedom “in the forms appropriate to the modern world, and which allow [the French] 
to live by working with the same satisfaction of honor as when they die in combat.”9 
On the left, Georges Sorel made a similar point in his 1908 Reflections on Violence: 
“It is to violence that socialism owes those high ethical ideals by means of which it 
brings salvation to the modern world.”10 
This dissertation tells the story of how a variety of writers and intellectuals 
weaponized this image of violence in the struggle for democracy in nineteenth century 
France. Its ubiquity raises important questions for the history of political thought. 
What did this violence offer that alternative vocabularies of democratic agency could 
                                                
7 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, “War and Peace,” in Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Selected Writings of Pierre-
Joseph Proudhon, ed. Stewart Edwards, trans. Elizabeth Fraser (New York: Doubleday & Company, 
1969), 202-3. 
8 Jules Vallès, The Insurrectionist, trans. Sandy Petrey (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1971; first 
published 1886), 167. 
9 Cahiers du Cercle Proudhon, “Déclaration,” Cahiers du Cercle Proudhon 1 (1912), 1-2, at 2. 
10 Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, ed. Jeremy Jennings (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999; first published 1908), 251. 
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not? What were the sources of its appeal? To answer these questions, this dissertation 
considers why French thinkers represented violence as regenerating the social bond 
and how such representations assuaged wider anxieties over social disintegration. It is 
not my aim to test the coherence of these conceptualizations, nor to offer a normative 
evaluation of them. I have instead tried to understand their polemical appeal, and to 
explain how they grew out of the conflictual experience of creating modern republican 
democracy in France. 
Of course, this image of violence was neither unique to the nineteenth century 
nor to France. Much has been written on the idea of violence as something 
foundational, regenerative, even purifying.11 Its roots can be traced as far back as the 
Wars of Religion and medieval penal justice, and it marked political thought into the 
twentieth century in France and elsewhere.12 Within conservative and counter-
revolutionary traditions, it is associated with writers like Joseph de Maistre, for whom 
                                                
11 Arno J. Mayer, The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000); Lucien Jaume, Le religieux et la politique dans la Révolution 
française: L’idée de régénération (Paris: PUF, 2015); Jesse Goldhammer, The Headless Republic: 
Sacrificial Violence in Modern French Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Richard 
Bernstein, Violence: Thinking Without Banisters (New York: Polity, 2013); Dominick LaCapra, History 
and its Limits: Human, Animal, Violence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); Gareth Stedman 
Jones, “The Redemptive Power of Violence? Carlyle, Marx and Dickens,” History Workshop Journal 
65, no. 1 (2008): 1-22; Emilio Gentile, “Fascism As Political Religion,” Journal of Contemporary 
History 25, no. 2/3 (1990): 229-51.  
12 Paul Friedland, Seeing Justice Done: The Age of Spectacular Capital Punishment in France (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012); Isaiah Berlin, “Joseph de Maistre and the Origins of Fascism,” in The 
Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2013; first published 1991); David William Bates, States of War: Enlightenment 
Origins of the Political (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); Marjorie Perloff, The Futurist 
Moment: Avant-Garde, Avant-Guerre, and the Language of Rupture (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1986); Zeev Sternhell, Neither Right Nor Left: Fascist Ideology in France, trans. David Maisel 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996; first published 1983); Daniel Lee, Petain's Jewish 
Children: French Jewish Youth and the Vichy Regime, 1940-1942 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014); Enzo Traverso, The Origins of Nazi Violence, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: The New Press, 
2003). 
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the executioner’s axe was “both the horror and the bond of human association.”13 
Themes of regenerative violence can be found in American history, especially in the 
context of frontier expansion.14 This violence has also been connected to 
revolutionaries of all stripes, from futurists like Filippo Marinetti (“We believe that 
only a love of danger and heroism can purify and regenerate our nation”) to 
anticolonial nationalists like Frantz Fanon (“violence… binds them together as a 
whole…a part of the great organism of violence which has surged upward in 
reaction”).15 It was a promiscuous image of violence, one that Dominick LaCapra has 
usefully described as redemptive violence. Redemptive violence, LaCapra argues, 
aims to interrupt “a deadly compulsive cycle of repetition” or to introduce “a radical, 
even total, rupture with the past” through “purification, regeneration, or 
redemption.”16 It brings together a normative sociology of the human bond with a 
moral commitment to forging those bonds anew in an act of violence. 
This dissertation builds on this previous work, but what is unique about it is its 
theoretical focus on cases in which thinkers connected redemptive violence to 
democratization. It specifically looks to the historical theater of nineteenth century 
France, for nowhere else was that connection drawn in such clear terms or developed 
                                                
13 Joseph de Maistre, St Petersburg Dialogues: Or Conversations On the Temporal Government of 
Providence, trans. Richard A. Lebrun (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993; first 
published 1821), 30. 
14 Edmund Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1975); Aziz Rana, The Two Faces of American Freedom (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2010); Jackson Lears, Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877-
1920 (New York: Harper, 2009). 
15 Filippo Marinetti, “The Necessity and Beauty of Violence” (1915) in Critical Writings, ed. Gunter 
Berghaus, trans. Doug Thompson (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux), 60-74, at 62; Frantz Fanon, The 
Wretched of the Earth, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1963), 93. 
16 LaCapra, History and its Limits, 92. 
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in such sustained ways. Premodern thinkers often conceived redemptive violence as an 
act of providential agency. But during and after the Revolution, French theorists 
explicitly conceptualized redemptive violence in the context of an emerging 
autonomous society—that is, a democratic society. It suggested a society capable of 
ruling itself without the intercession of a superior, extra-social power. The sources of 
social cohesion were to be drawn, not from God or tradition, but from the activity of 
the people themselves. Immortalized in the Jacobin Terror, this image of violence 
nevertheless proliferated throughout the long nineteenth century at key moments in 
which the integrity of the national community entered into crisis and where political 
thinkers despaired over the fate of the social bond. It is this historical pattern, where 
redemptive violence emerged as a vocabulary of popular agency in France, that I call 
“democratic terror.”17 
* * * 
To understand democratic terror, the following chapters examine four episodes 
where political thinkers and actors appealed to the people’s violence to rescue a 
French nation on the brink of social disintegration. In chapter one, disintegration was 
raised by the prospect of executing Louis XVI. Because royalist ideology identified 
the king’s mystical body as a transcendental guarantee of social cohesion, regicide 
threatened to dissolve the French social body. Jacobins found a solution, I argue, by 
redefining regicide as redemptive violence. They modeled the lethal agency of the 
                                                
17 On “terror” as a specifically democratic vocabulary of violence, see George Armstrong Kelly, 
“Conceptual Sources of the Terror,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 14, no. 1 (1980): 18-36; Dan Edelstein, 
“Do We Want a Revolution Without Revolution? Reflections on Political Authority,” French Historical 
Studies 35, no. 2 (2012): 269-89. 
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people after the theories of natural disaster and ecological self-regulation which 
saturated the scientific culture of the late eighteenth century.  
In chapter two, the threat of social disintegration was posed by the rise of 
commercial society and economic utilitarianism. According to Alexis de Tocqueville, 
this culture of “egoism” led to psychological withdrawal among the nation’s citizens, 
thereby isolating them from one another. Such an individualistic bourgeois society 
could not enjoy modern liberty because it had forfeit its taste for monumental 
collective action. Tocqueville’s desire to save democracy from its own atomization, I 
argue, motivated his apologies for colonial terror in Algeria. 
In chapter three, French thinkers considered social disintegration through the 
social question. Like Tocqueville, French utopian socialists bemoaned a “political” 
republic which privileged the individual rights of man at the expense of social 
solidarity and spiritual renewal. As a consequence, for Communards waging civil war 
against the French national government in 1871, the creation of a “social” republic 
was better served by exchanging the atomized idea of the electorate for the unifying 
assertion of the people in arms. Only by moving beyond the ballot to the barricade 
could a regenerated society be achieved. 
In chapter four, anxieties over disintegration were blamed on the Cartesian 
intellectual culture of the Third Republic and the secular parliamentary democracy that 
grew out of it. In unmooring French citizens from la France profonde, parliamentary 
republicanism fostered what Maurice Barrès called a nation of uprooted (déracinées). 
The chapter turns to Georges Sorel and his circle to show how an irrationalist, class 
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violence promised to counteract that moral decadence—a promise that fed into the 
mass, republican war mobilization in the lead up to world war in 1914. 
In each of these episodes, writers warned of a nation threatened by entropic 
forces unleashed by modern democratization. In each case, they sought to repair the 
social bond by reawakening the people’s agency through violence. Whatever their 
ideological persuasion, these thinkers came to believe that the path leading from an 
anarchic multitude to an organized democratic society required, not violence’s 
prohibition or normative regulation, but its opposite: the deployment of violence as 
productive of sociality itself. 
By analyzing the recurring role of redemptive violence in France, these 
chapters build an argument for rooting its appeal in French republicanism’s ubiquitous 
demand for a concrete social body. By French republicanism, I mean the political 
culture that grew out of the historical experience of the Revolution rather than any 
specific set of ideological prescriptions.18 Anglo-American political theorists have 
grown accustomed to speaking of republicanism as a paradigm of normative 
reasoning, extractable from its historical context, and whose purpose is to develop and 
defend the Roman ideal of libertas as non-domination.19 But in France, republicanism 
was never primarily a paradigm for normative reasoning. It was a kind of intellectual 
                                                
18 For French republicanism as a political culture, see Keith Michael Baker, Inventing the French 
Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1900) and Pierre Rosanvallon, Le modèle politiques français: La société civile contre 
le jacobinisme de 1789 à nos jours (Paris: Seuil, 2004). 
19 The classic statement is Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), which formalized in normative language the historical insights of J. G. 
A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican 
Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975) and Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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gravitational field consisting in a set of common motifs, symbols, scripts for collection 
action, and shared historical memory centered on the legacy of the Revolution. And 
far from being normatively in competition with liberalism or socialism, French 
republicanism was the crucible within which liberalism and socialism developed in 
France: they named alternative paths to realizing the French republican ideals of 
liberty, equality, and fraternity.20  
To explain redemptive violence’s appeal by pointing to a specifically French 
republican demand for a concrete social body may nevertheless seem counterintuitive. 
After all, however heterogeneous and internally contested nineteenth century French 
republicanism turned out to be, virtually all of its critics agreed that it was essentially a 
modern language of abstraction. Ever since Edmund Burke developed this 
interpretation, scholars have denounced French republicanism’s “metaphysical 
abstractions” as a source of violence. De Maistre attributed the Revolution’s “satanic 
quality” to its “artificial” universalism, which was “a pure abstraction, an academic 
exercise made according to some hypothetical ideal.”21 What characterized French 
republicanism, he believed, was its absurd belief in an abstract citizen bereft of any 
social particularity: “I have seen Frenchmen, Italians, Russians, etc.,” but “as for man, 
I declare that I have never in my life met him; if he exists, he is unknown to me.”22 
                                                
20 Andrew Jainchill, Reimagining Politics After the Terror: The Republican Origins of French 
Liberalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); K. Steven Vincent, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and 
the Rise of French Republican Socialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Naomi J. Andrews, 
Socialism’s Muse: Gender in the Intellectual Landscape of French Romantic Socialism (Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2006); Jeremy Jennings, Revolution and the Republic: A History of Political Thought 
in France Since the Eighteenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
21 Joseph de Maistre, Considerations on France, trans. Richard A. Lebrun (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994; first published 1797), 41, 53. 
22 Maistre, Considerations on France, 53. 
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Jules Michelet, otherwise sympathetic to the revolution, would lament of its leaders, 
“Being logicians without metaphysics and jurists without law and history… these 
dreadful abstractors of ultimate essences armed themselves with five or six formulas 
which they used like so many guillotines to abstract men.”23 More recently, François 
Furet and Pierre Rosanvallon have reprised these explanations by arguing that French 
republicanism conceives the people as a “political proposition before a sociological 
fact,” a “promise” rather than a “sociological principle,” and in possession only of an 
“illusion of politics.”24 
According to this familiar interpretation, French republicanism’s emphasis on 
abstraction distinguishes it from its classical antecedents.25 It inherited the traditional 
                                                
23 Jules Michelet, The People, trans. John P. McKay (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1973; first 
published 1846), 198. 
24 Pierre Rosanvallon, “Revolutionary Democracy,” in Pierre Rosanvallon, Democracy Past and 
Future, ed. Sam Moyn (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 79-97, at 82-3; François Furet, 
Interpreting the French Revolution, trans. Elborg Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981; first published 1978); Lucien Jaume, Tocqueville: The Aristocratic Sources of Liberty, trans. 
Arthur Goldhammer (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2013; first published 2008), 8-
11. 
25 The relationship between “French” and “Classical” republicanism continues to befuddle. Philip Pettit 
has recently glossed it as the distinction between a Rousseau-inspired, “continental” republicanism and 
an Italian-Atlantic “classical” republicanism. Whereas the former emphasizes popular sovereignty, 
universalism, and political rationalism, the latter emphasizes mixed constitutionalism and political 
contestation. Keith Baker has drawn it in opposite ways. For him, the French/Rousseauian 
republicanism is closer to the classical tradition, whereas the constitutionalism of Condorcet points to a 
“republicanism of the moderns.” See Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and 
Model of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 11-18; Keith Michael Baker, 
“Transformations of Classical Republicanism in Eighteenth-Century France,” The Journal of Modern 
History 73, no. 1 (2001): 32-53. My own position is closer to that of Cécile Laborde’s since one of the 
distinctive features of French republicanism I identify is its antipathy to constitutionalism and its 
emphasis on the social. In both these features, republicanism in modern France is at odds with its civic 
Roman variety; see Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political 
Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) and Joan Scott, Parité! Sexual Equality and the 
Crisis of French Universalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). For other statements on 
the matter, see Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment; Gregory Claeys and Christine Lattek, “Radicalism, 
Republicanism and Revolution: From the Principles of '89 to the Origins of Modern Terrorism,” in The 
Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Political Thought, eds. Gareth Stedman Jones and Gregory 
Claeys (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 200-54, at 212-15; Edelstein, The Terror of 
Natural Right; Jennings, Revolution and the Republic. 
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valorization of martial glory and civic virtue associated with the republics of antiquity. 
But the influence of the Enlightenment and the vicissitudes of national history also 
oriented French republicanism towards political rationalism and moral universalism, 
which became its cudgel against the inherited stratifications of the ancien régime. If 
peoplehood for Cicero or Machiavelli expresses our membership in a particular polity, 
peoplehood in French republicanism expresses our membership in a common but 
abstract body—“the people”—which we enter into by leaving behind our markers of 
social differentiation. In so doing, we ascend to become rights-bearing citizens who 
stand free and equal to one another. The Count of Clermont-Tonnerre described this 
procedure of abstraction best when discussing Jewish emancipation in 1789: “we must 
refuse everything to the Jews as a nation and accord everything to them as 
individuals.” And it was this republican model that Karl Marx critiqued in “On the 
Jewish Question,” because it emancipated individuals by reducing the citizen to an 
“abstract, artificial man, man as an allegorical, moral person” in false opposition to 
his concrete or “sensual” existence as a particular member of civil society.26 
Undeniably, there is a great deal of truth in this tradition of interpreting French 
republicanism as a culture enthralled with abstract universalism. Its history consists in 
a sequence of abstractions—the People, the Nation, and especially after 1946, the 
Empire—negotiating the realities of political exclusion.27 However, reading the 
                                                
26 Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” in Early Political Writings, ed. Joseph O’Malley (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 28-56, at 49.  
27 Gary Wilder, The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude & Colonial Humanism Between the Two 
World Wars (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 15; Joan Wallach Scott, Only Paradoxes to 
Offer: French Feminists and the Rights of Man (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Todd 
Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2006); Judith Surkis, Sexing the Citizen: Morality and Masculinity in France, 
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struggle for democracy in France through the prism of redemptive violence shows this 
interpretation to be one-sided: from the Revolution onwards, French republicanism’s 
inclinations towards abstraction were coordinated with a commitment to forging a 
concrete social body. We see this commitment most prominently in the ways 
republicans of all stripes insisted that the people cannot be reduced to an aggregate of 
individuals living together under common laws. In terms more familiar to 
contemporary political theorists, “the people” were emphatically not adhered by what 
John Rawls called a modus vivendi, a “social consensus [which is] founded on self- or 
group interests, or on the outcome of political bargaining.” In a modus vivendi, “social 
unity is only apparent,” because “its stability is contingent on circumstances remaining 
such as not to upset the fortunate convergence of interests.”28 In contrast, 
republicanism in France defined “the people” in terms of a qualitatively distinct form 
of social interdependence that pointed beyond the convergence of self-interest. As 
Rousseau had argued, what is decisive for a people to become a people is the 
transmutation of natural individual freedom into a civil, moral freedom whose 
enjoyment is dependent on all others. This type of peoplehood is not the product of an 
equilibrium or aggregation, but of moral reincarnation. 
Indeed, as these chapters will argue, the moral reincarnation of the people 
                                                                                                                                       
1870-1920 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); Camille Robcis, The Law of Kinship: 
Anthropology, Psychoanalysis, and the Family in France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013); 
Carolyn Dean, The Frail Social Body: Pornography, Homosexuality, and Other Fantasies in Interwar 
France (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). 
28 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005; 
first published 1993), 147; see also his comparison of a modus vivendi with an overlapping consensus 
in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 
192-5. 
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became paramount for French thinkers in the nineteenth century. The experience of 
the Revolution compelled thinkers everywhere to identify a constitutive link between 
moral improvement and social cohesion. It was morality that made social cohesion 
something thicker than the fortuitous convergence of interests or the quantitative 
accumulation of preferences. In short, reasserting the moral foundations of the social 
was required to lift a disorganized multitude into a sovereign people. Historically, 
French thinkers articulated that requirement through calls for a regenerated social 
body. Produced in tandem through fantasies of unity and anxieties over le corps 
morcelé, conceptions of the social body were “central to the internal coherence of 
French ideas about who did and who did not qualify as ‘French.’”29 Social cohesion in 
French republican culture was therefore never reducible to abstract or representational 
notions of peoplehood. Democratic terror always sought to convey the presence of a 
concrete and moral people rather than the people as abstract principle; that conceit was 
what its critics held against it. 
As may be apparent, my argument invokes “the social” in ways that diverge 
from its common use among contemporary political theorists. For scholars writing 
under Hannah Arendt’s influence, the social specifies the domain of domestic need, 
economic necessity, and the biological reproduction of life. It is the sphere of our 
natural needs, especially as they are satisfied in household governance: the oikos.30 It 
                                                
29 Dean, The Frail Social Body, 14; Michael C. Behrent, “The Mystical Body of Society: Religion and 
Association in Nineteenth-Century French Political Thought,” Journal of the History of Ideas 69, no. 2 
(2008): 219-43.  
30 For representative studies, see Hannah Fenichel Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob: Hannah Arendt’s 
Concept of the Social (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Kirstie McClure, “The Social 
Question, Again,” in Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 28, no. 1 (2007), 85-113; and most recently, 
Patricia Owens, Economy of Force: Counterinsurgency and the Historical Rise of the Social 
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is thereby contrasted with “the political,” which names the realm of speech, action, 
and publicity and which presupposes our emancipation from immediate necessity.  
As useful as Arendt’s framing can be, I have chosen to return to the ways 
French writers thought about the social historically, not only as “le social” but in 
debates over “la question sociale,” “le lien social,” “la société en poussière,” and “la 
Republique sociale et démocratique.” When these writers worried about the social, 
they did not have in mind the oikos, but sociality itself. This was especially true 
among republicans, and it will be one of my objectives in the following chapters to 
suggest that, in addition to political rationalism and moral universalism, a commitment 
to the social became a salient feature distinguishing French from Classical 
republicanism. Explaining the prominence of violence as a language of repair and 
regeneration demands foregrounding this newfound republican interest in the nature of 
the social bond. 
We might say that the dissertation draws its methodological orientation from 
Emile Durkheim rather than Arendt. The leading social theorist of the Third Republic, 
Durkheim formalized in theoretical language what was often left tacit in the various 
traditions of French republicanism. In his 1893 The Division of Labor in Society, 
Durkheim critiqued the economic and contractualist conception of society promoted 
by English social theorists like Henry Maine and Herbert Spencer. In Durkheim’s 
eyes, their science of society as a spontaneous, self-organizing product of free 
exchange (“contractual solidarity”) could not account for the objective forces of social 
                                                                                                                                       
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
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causation that bound together modern societies (“organic solidarity”). Spencer 
believed societies were held together by a solidarity reducible to “the industrial type,” 
which capitalism universalized.31 In this view, societies must be seen as processual, 
transient conjunctions of independent social interaction. “Social solidarity” amounts to 
“nothing else than the spontaneous accord of individual interests, an accord of which 
contracts are the natural expression.”32 
In contrast to Spencer’s vision of society as a “vast system of particular 
contracts,” Durkheim claimed that modern society’s division of labor gave rise to 
objective forms of interdependence that pointed beyond contractual solidarity. Society 
was an organism that transcended the individuals that constituted it. After all, “If 
interest relates men” and nothing else, “it is never for more than some few moments.” 
In such a conception of society, “there is only an external link” connecting men, and 
“Consciences are only superficially in contact; they neither penetrate each other, nor 
do they adhere.” Indeed, the contractual theory of society is not even really social. It is 
virtually identical to Hobbes’s anarchic war of all against all: “For where interest is 
the only ruling force, each individual finds himself in a state of war with every other 
since nothing comes to mollify the egos, and any truce in this eternal antagonism 
would not be of long duration.”33 
Durkheim’s critique of British liberalism shapes his famous sociological 
realism, or what Judith Surkis has called his commitment “to explain the social by the 
                                                
31 Emile Durkheim, “Organic Solidarity and Contractual Solidarity,” in On Morality and Society: 
Selected Writings, ed. Robert N. Bellah (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), 86-113, at 87. 
32 Durkheim, “Organic Solidarity and Contractual Solidarity,” 89. 
33 Durkheim, “Organic Solidarity and Contractual Solidarity,” 89. 
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social.”34 “It is quite true that contractual relations…multiply as social labor is 
divided,” Durkheim conceded. The contract has become the form of sociality in 
modern democracies. “But,” Durkheim argued, “what Spencer seems to have failed to 
see is that non-contractual relations develop at the same time.”35 As society’s 
increasing complexity normalizes the exchange relation as sociality’s generic form, it 
generates superior mediating social structures that regulate, without ever being 
reduced to, those contractual relations. These social structures may arise from 
individual choices, but they grow into quasi-objective forces with their own standing 
and mechanisms of reproduction which, as individuals, we confront as demands of 
social necessity. The law is the most obvious example of such a regulatory social 
structure. The laws governing marriage and conjugality—that is, the laws of kinship—
are the most fundamental instances.36  
Thus, unlike in Arendt’s parlance, these laws of society do not concern the 
private realm, but exist to articulate private individuals into public order. Taking direct 
aim at contractual solidarity’s explanatory sufficiency, Durkheim concluded that “We 
cooperate because we wish to, but our voluntary co-operation creates duties for us that 
we did not desire” because “a contract is not sufficient unto itself, but is possible only 
thanks to a regulation of the contract which is originally social.”37 
Men cannot live together without acknowledging, and, consequently, making 
mutual sacrifices, without tying themselves to one another with strong, durable 
                                                
34 Surkis, Sexing the Citizen, 131; Dominick LaCapra, Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972). 
35 Durkheim, “Organic Solidarity and Contractual Solidarity,” 92. 
36 Durkheim, “Organic Solidarity and Contractual Solidarity,” 92-3, 95-6; Surkis, Sexing the Citizen, 
125-84; Robcis, The Law of Kinship. 
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bonds. Every society is a moral society... Because the individual is not 
sufficient unto himself, it is from society that he receives everything necessary 
to him, as it is for society that he works.38 
“Every society is a moral society”—the claim could just as well serve as a credo, not 
only for Durkheim, but also for republican political culture in nineteenth century 
France. It is why I have taken my cue from Durkheim, despite well-known problems 
with historical self-reflexivity in his work.39 In identifying morality as the concrete 
element of the social bond irreducible to abstract contractual solidarity, Durkheim 
helps us understand why creating a democratic society in times of disintegration so 
often invited claims of moralizing, redemptive violence.  
By foregrounding “the social” in the struggle for democracy in France, I hope 
to provide a more complex account of both republicanism and redemptive violence. 
Republicanism in France was never simply an attack on monarchy on behalf of 
abstract equality. It was, and continues to be, shaped as much by its hatred of 
hierarchical society as by its anxieties over social disintegration. Without a cohesive 
social body, one whose bonds transcended a modus vivendi, it was not possible to have 
a society sufficiently united to legislate over itself. It was not possible to have a 
democratic society. 
* * * 
In developing this argument, this dissertation aims to create space within 
contemporary democratic theory to study the role of political violence’s expressivist 
and non-instrumental dimensions in democratic politics. Traditionally, political 
                                                
38 Durkheim, “Organic Solidarity and Contractual Solidarity,” 112. 
39 Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, “Emile Durkheim and the Science of Corporatism,” Political Theory 
14, no. 4 (1986): 638-59, at 645-6. 
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theorists have avoided studying redemptive violence for normative and 
methodological reasons. Claims of redemptive violence have long been associated 
with twentieth-century fascism or totalitarian ideology. Fanon is often the exception, 
and even then, critics have questioned whether he counts as a straightforward 
proponent of redemptive violence.40 
In practice, the phenomenon is studied almost exclusively by twentieth century 
intellectual historians. Among its chroniclers from Zeev Sternhell to Mark Antliff, 
redemptive or “palingenetic” violence finds its sources in late nineteenth century 
French thought and its fullest articulation in the anti-democratic, organicist aesthetics 
and politics of twentieth century fascist political theory.41 I have leaned on this 
historiography for my own arguments, but the teleological association it draws 
between redemptive violence and fascism has encouraged political theorists to dismiss 
that violence as beyond rational analysis or so contemptible that it requires no detailed 
examination. The only appropriate response is moral repudiation. As Tracy Strong has 
complained, since 1945 “much of the political thought in the West has been devoted to 
developing theory that would keep ‘it’ from happening again.” Postwar academic 
political theory is governed by “a tacit question: ‘What is the relation of this thought to 
                                                
40 Although I am not persuaded by those critics, readers can consult David Macey, Frantz Fanon: A Life 
(New York: Verso, 2012; first published 2000), 460-1; George Ciccariello-Maher, “To Lose Oneself in 
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the Nazis?’42 As a result, redemptive violence has typically occasioned, not theoretical 
understanding, but indignation. 
 Redemptive violence’s neglect has been exacerbated by an enduring tendency 
to view it as the exclusive possession of a single ideological tendency, which is then 
disavowed as a deviation or “parenthesis” within an otherwise progressive national 
republican history.43 It has been argued, for example, that redemptive violence is the 
special weapon of the Counter-Enlightenment,44 anti-modernism,45 reactionary 
modernists,46 conservatives,47 fascist blackshirts and communist revolutionaries48—
virtually anyone but contemporary liberals,49 whose violence is typically realist, a 
matter of “dirty hands,” and checked by either a skepticism of moral perfectionism or 
a commitment to constitutionalism.50 In situating redemptive violence in these habitual 
                                                
42 Tracy Strong, Politics Without Vision: Thinking Without a Banister in the Twentieth Century 
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explanatory paradigms, scholars have quarantined the phenomenon and exaggerated 
its ideological specificity. What is important is to bring back into view the surprising 
ways redemptive violence connected thinkers otherwise shaped by diverging traditions 
and contexts. The thinkers studied here hailed from different corners of French 
politics, and they disagreed, often profoundly, on the requirements of authentic 
democratic rule. Yet those differences did not prevent their voices from shading into 
one another on the question of violence. Tocqueville’s remarks on French decadence 
and war’s vivifying moral effects sound as if they were lifted from Sorel, a thinker 
often considered the intellectual father of fascism. Parisian communards who dreamed 
of a federated horizontal society could be found invoking, often literally, the same 
image of violence as a statist Robespierre or St Just. To study these thinkers in 
isolation from one another, as is typically done, conceals the surprising patterns that 
connect them. But to group them together into a single “illiberal” or “exceptional” 
tradition tending towards totalitarianism simply repeats an ahistorical platitude.51 
Rather than grounding these resonances in a hidden ideological filiation, this 
dissertation focuses on the way these thinkers confronted a common dilemma first 
raised by the Revolution and its dream of republican democracy: from what was the 
social bond to be forged in the age of democracy? If the elemental unit of democracy 
was the emancipated individual, then what was society? Despite everything that 
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separated them, French thinkers during and after the Revolution found themselves 
called to answer this question. It was the unavoidable urgency of rethinking the social 
in an age of democracy that invited so many thinkers to appeal to redemptive violence. 
That is what this study hopes to reveal in clear, dramatic terms. 
This dissertation therefore hopes to make a two-fold contribution to existing 
scholarship. First, it asks us to reconsider our longstanding belief that violence—
especially terror—is driven by political abstraction. We ought to account for the fact 
that in virtually every modern justification of redemptive violence, its proponents 
critiqued political abstraction. They critiqued it because the Revolution, and the 
republican political culture which grew out of it, had taught them that democratic self-
rule depended on regenerating the moral fiber of the social body. If the Republic were 
to limit itself to achieving abstract political citizenship, it would win the sovereignty 
of the people at the cost of dissolving them back into a haphazard multitude of 
atomized individuals. The French thinkers considered here therefore sought to mitigate 
the disintegrating effects of the abstraction procedures so required. The formation of a 
democratic society in France could not be separated from attempts to reforge the social 
body, to supplant the severed social bonds of the ancien régime with superior 
republican fraternity.  
 Second, this dissertation invites scholars to rethink the conventional ways we 
narrate the role of violence in the history of political thought. It is simply not true that 
redemptive violence was the exclusive possession of any single ideological faction, 
and its inevitable telos was not fascism. Instead, it was a flexible vocabulary that 
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answered a genuine, even intractable dilemma inherited from the attempt to create a 
modern republic through democratic revolution. If fascists also appealed to redemptive 
violence, that was because they, too, found themselves compelled to reimagine the 
social bond in an era in which democracy had called its nature into question. This is 
not an apology or an excuse for redemptive violence, but the necessary starting point 
for understanding its widespread appeal. Redemptive violence promised to repair the 
fraying social bond. That promise held a powerful appeal to French thinkers as they 
struggled to construct a republic amid the ruins of the past. 
The contractualist identification of violence with anarchy has long helped 
political theorists define the principles of a legitimate democratic society. But when it 
came to creating that democratic society in history rather than in theory, of incarnating 
a people rather than philosophically describing one, political thinkers weaponized an 
altogether different image of violence: violence as productive of sociality itself. Terror 
took away life, but it did so while rebinding the social tie. It authorized murder, but 
not before transforming it into something more than death. If we are to understand 
democracy as an ongoing historical achievement rather than a normative theory of 
popular sovereignty, we ought to bring this alternative image of violence into focus. 
Doing so reminds us that democracy was, and is, a battle cry against alternative 
prescriptions for social order and political authority. In France, that cry invited its 
political thinkers to reassert republican peoplehood against the disintegrating forces 
which beset it from within and without. Time and again in the long nineteenth century, 
that also meant turning to democratic terror. 
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Chapter I 
Regicide and Redemptive Violence in the French Revolution 
On 30 May 1791, Maximilien Robespierre took to the podium of the National 
Assembly to declaim against the death penalty. Although lethal justice was defensible 
in a state of nature, he argued, it surrendered its rationale in society. “In society, when 
the force of all is armed against a single man, what principle of justice can authorize 
society to mete out death to him?” There could be none, Robespierre answered, for “A 
victor who kills his captive enemies is barbaric!” Moreover, given the chance of 
erring, societies ruled by justice cannot commit an act as irrevocable as execution 
against a “vanquished and powerless” prisoner, no matter how criminal. Indeed, “these 
scenes of death ordered with such aplomb are nothing but cowardly assassinations, 
solemn crimes, committed not by individuals but by whole nations with legal forms.” 
Robespierre’s conclusion was unequivocal: in societies where the death penalty is both 
acceptable and a national act, “the legislator is nothing but a master who commands 
slaves and, following his whim, punishes without pity.” Robespierre’s speech solicited 
a warm burst of applause.1 
Thomas Paine would later refer to this speech “with infinite satisfaction” 
during the trial of Louis XVI to try to save the deposed king’s life.2 But he now 
brandished it against Robespierre himself, whom Paine believed had reversed course 
                                                
1 Maximilien Robespierre, Speech to the Assembly, 30 May 1791, in Archives parlementaires de 1789 
à 1860, première série (1787 à 1799), edited by M. J. Mavidal and M. E. Laurent, 82 vols. (Paris: 
Librairie administrative de P. Dupont, 1862-1913), vol. 26, pp. 622-3. Archives parlementaires 
henceforth cited by volume and page number. 
2 Thomas Paine, Speech to the Convention, 7 January 1793; printed in Michael Walzer, ed. Regicide 
and Revolution: Speeches at the Trial of Louis XVI, trans. Marian Rothstein (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1992), 208-14, at 213.  
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in the intervening months. By the late autumn of 1792, Louis was a captive of the 
Assembly, imprisoned in an old stone tower called the Temple, and forced to eat 
without a knife to prevent him from taking his own life before the nation could. The 
king now cut the figure of a vanquished prisoner facing execution by society’s justice. 
And yet, taking the podium once again on 3 December 1792, Robespierre not only 
called for Louis’s death, but denied him the law’s protection: “Louis must die because 
the nation must live.”3  
If Robespierre’s horror of the death penalty conceded to extralegal violence 
because of “the force of circumstance,” his arguments did not suggest it.4 
Undoubtedly, the everyday demands of revolutionary politics often forced his 
optimism to cede to sober strategic maneuvering. Between abolishing the monarchy, 
founding the first French Republic amid continental war, drafting a constitution, and 
containing social conflicts, these months testified to the force of historical constraint. 
However, in the face of the practical matter of Louis XVI’s fate, Robespierre did not 
appeal to tactical prerogatives to deny Louis a trial and endorse capital punishment. 
Instead, he reached for a special language of violence, one that identified the 
monarch’s swift, extralegal death with popular redemption: “the salvation of the 
people, the right to punish the tyrant,” he argued, “are all the same thing.”5 In this 
view, “the salutary terror of the justice of the people” possessed a higher moral 
purpose. As he remarked at the Jacobin club in February 1793, “the people must rise 
                                                
3 Maximilien Robespierre, Speech to the Convention, 3 December 1792; printed in Walzer, Regicide 
and Revolution, 130-8, at 138. 
4 John Laurence Carr, Robespierre: The Force of Circumstance (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973). 
5 Robespierre, Speech to the Convention, 3 December 1792, 133.   
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up, not to collect sugar, but to bring down the tyrants.”6 
Robespierre was not alone in reaching for this language of violence. Warning 
fellow deputies that “the spirit in which the king is judged is also the spirit in which 
the Republic will be established,” Louis-Antoine de Saint-Just followed his older 
colleague’s lead: “I can see no mean: this man must reign or die.”7 The young deputy 
from Aisne had also once advocated for the death penalty’s abolition. The language 
infused the Parisian popular sections, at times becoming synonymous with their civic 
agency. “The holiest duty, the most cherished law / Is to forget the law, to save the 
patrie,” the Mauconseil section announced to the Legislative Assembly on 4 August 
1792.8 The Jacobins of Auxerre put it more starkly three months later: “Nations are 
awaiting the judgment you have rendered for Louis XVI’s crimes: that [this judgment] 
is terrible, that it is prompt, that it makes tyrants of the earth tremble, and that the 
blood of the most wicked conspirators expiate his crimes without delay.”9 Far from a 
capitulation to lethal justice’s necessity, revolutionaries everywhere were laying claim 
to its moral and redemptive power outside the law. 
Why would revolutionaries claim redemptive violence as a vocabulary for the 
popular will? What did this violence provide that competing languages of agency 
could not? Contemporary scholars have often observed that this language during the 
trial signaled a new, heightened importance for violence in the revolution. Arno 
                                                
6 Robespierre, Speech to the Convention, 3 December 1792, 138; Peter McPhee, Robespierre: A 
Revolutionary Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 146. 
7 Louis-Antoine de Saint-Just, Speech to the Assembly, 13 November 1792; printed in Walzer, Regicide 
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Mayer, for example, has claimed that it is here in the trial that we see Robespierre 
“shift from a ‘negative’ to a ‘positive’ construction of revolutionary terror,” while Dan 
Edelstein has suggested that Robespierre’s gradual acceptance of capital punishment 
“may well be read as a synecdoche of the French Revolution.”10 At the same time, 
understanding the appeal of this language of violence remains difficult.11 The 
challenge lies partly in what Mayer has described as “the ethical and epistemic 
difficulty of conceptualizing and theorizing violence without justifying, absolving, or 
condemning it.”12 Faced with such a dilemma, some scholars have focused on 
describing this violence at the cost of explaining it, as Patrice Gueniffey does when 
concluding that, because of their “obsessional hatred” of kings, “republican discourse 
contains an element of irrationality that defies analysis.”13 Susan Dunn similarly 
wonders how the revolutionaries could not have realized its senselessness: “Strangely 
they seemed to ignore that revolutionary violence hardly produced ‘revelations’ or 
‘eternal truths,’ but only drowned the king, the Revolution, and the Revolution’s 
leaders in a sea of blood.”14 Jonathan Israel simply brackets the problem by 
denouncing it as “an interruption” in the true trajectory of the revolution.15 
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It is telling, for instance, that the only study of the trial and execution of Louis 
XVI by a political theorist—Michael Walzer’s 1974 Regicide and Revolution—is a 
study in the impotence of the Jacobin language of violence and, in turn, a defense of 
proceduralism. In that text, Walzer honed in on the former’s shortcomings: “Jacobin 
theory may serve to justify revolutionary action against the king,” he argued, “But 
when a helpless man is dragged to the scaffold and placed into the hands of the 
executioner, more arguments are required than the Jacobins provide.” That is because 
“it is not enough to say…that the people and the king fought, the king lost, and 
therefore he is a traitor.” Denying him a trial and killing him outright “leaves open the 
question of right.”16 And without settling the question of right, the Jacobin language of 
violence could not destroy its object. In the absence of a legal trial, revolutionary 
violence forfeited the only instrument capable of reaching the deeper “mysteries of 
kingship” which lay behind the person of Louis Capet: 
Given the mysteries of kingship, the only way to bring Louis to justice was 
through adversary proceedings in which the whole court was in effect the 
adversary of the king or at least of kingship. For such a court, legality is no 
doubt only a form of self-restraint, but it is important nonetheless because that 
restraint suggests as nothing else can do that the principles being established 
are at least potentially principles of justice… revolutionary justice is defensible 
whenever it points the way to everyday justice. That is the maxim that marks 
off morally legitimate trials from proscription and terror.17 
Walzer’s argument stands as the most devastating critique of the Jacobin language of 
violence. It acknowledges that unless regicide was grounded in right, unless it was an 
act of justice, kingship would outlive Louis XVI’s death. And justice, in the end, was 
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precisely what Jacobin violence could not provide. At the same time, emphasizing the 
impotence of Jacobin violence on matters of right does not point the way towards 
understanding why the language was so compelling. Indeed, it only makes it more 
puzzling why political actors and thinkers believed the prospect of regicide demanded 
a moralizing conception of extralegal violence at all.  
Thus, this chapter returns to the trial and execution of Louis XVI to reconsider 
the purpose and meaning of revolutionary redemptive violence. It argues that 
Robespierre and others reached for this violence to answer a different question from 
that of right, one they believed was arguably more fundamental to founding a republic: 
how could the social body be reconstituted after its revolutionary disintegration and 
the execution of its unifying principle, the person of the king? References to violence 
as expiation, salvation and regeneration provided a means for asking after the quality 
of the social bond in democracy, its specific vision of cohesion. Indeed, if the 
legalistic arguments of the Gironde more satisfyingly answered questions of right, 
they almost completely ignored this latter problem. It was a problem that took on 
urgency as the development of the revolution made regicide increasingly plausible. 
Regicide raises, in ways few other political acts can do, the need to discover a new 
principle of national belonging, a vision of society that can explain why democratic 
citizens, and not royal subjects, ought to live together. We do not have to endorse 
Jacobin violence to concede that, more than any others during the trial, Robespierre 
and his allies acknowledged this fact. It was why they joined their revolutionary 
realism to a democratic language of redemptive violence. 
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The chapter begins by analyzing Girondin interpretations of the philosophical 
problems raised in judging an inviolable king. It shows how beneath their 
disagreements over the proper judicial procedures for the occasion lay a common 
interpretation of the problem at hand, namely, locating the source of right. 
Emphasizing how the Gironde remained enthralled with the origins of right brings into 
focus the contrasting Jacobin interpretation of the trial and the problems it posed. For 
Robespierre and St Just, the trial and anticipated execution of Louis XVI raised the 
urgent need to supplant the ancient corporatist vision of society with a new, republican 
alternative. The chapter then describes one of the solutions the Jacobins developed to 
found that new republican social body: the language of redemptive violence. By lifting 
regicide out of classical theories of tyrannicide and re-embedding it in Enlightenment 
discourses of nature, this ideology imbued “the people” with nature’s own 
regenerative agency while casting regicide as a site for reconstituting society’s moral 
fabric. Moreover, in groping for a new interpretation of how violence could produce 
social cohesion, Robespierre and his allies figured popular sovereignty as 
spontaneous, unmediated by legal forms, natural and moral—that is, as lightning. 
Popular agency appeared as an extension of nature’s own activity, and regicide was to 
become a means of realigning the orders of nature and society, morality and law.  
Although Robespierre’s political and moral prescriptions would not carry the 
day—the king was tried and guillotined under the sign of the law—the theoretical 
force of the Jacobin argument outlasted the trial. Without understanding the problems 
which motivated their violence, either by dismissing it as defying analysis or judging 
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it impotent, we lose the opportunity to understand redemptive violence’s enduring 
appeal. Walzer may be right that “Proscription is final only with regard to its victim, 
but not with regard to the political community itself which still waits upon some 
determination of what is just and what is unjust.”18 But at issue in founding republican 
democracy is not only the determination of justice, but of peoplehood and the 
specifically democratic language of violence that can found it. Grasping why this is so 
recasts the regicide as an episode in a longer debate over the place of violence within 
French democratic political culture. It brings into view enduring problems at the heart 
of democratic theory in France, a fact Jean Jaurès acknowledged at the end of the 
nineteenth century with his conclusion that with Louis XVI’s death, “Kings might 
briefly return, but they would henceforth be nothing but ghosts. France, their France, 
is eternally regicide.”19  
 
The Argument Over Inviolability 
 As the members of the National Convention debated whether to put Louis on 
trial in the autumn of 1792, revolution had already been reshaping France for three 
years. A slew of decrees had already destroyed feudalism and its society of orders. In 
an emotional legislative session on the night of 4 August 1789, deputies redefined 
property in individualist terms, abolished tithes and venal offices, and suppressed 
seigniorial privileges. In November, they nationalized church property and auctioned 
it off to support France’s first fiat currency, the assignat. In the following summer of 
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1790, the Assembly adopted the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, a measure that 
subordinated the church to civil authority and compelled priests to swear an oath of 
loyalty to the state. The privileges of the nobility were abolished that same summer. 
Jews were emancipated in September 1791. Civil marriage and divorce were instituted 
in November. The corporate guild system, too, was broken with the adoption of the Le 
Chapelier Law of 14 June 1791. 
These reforms rendered much of the old regime obsolete within the span of 
months. In place was now the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen and, 
thanks to Jacques-Pierre Brissot and the revolutionary Gironde during the spring of 
1792, continental war on its behalf. Among the features of the old regime under 
pressure, however, the figure of the king remained a confusing and stubborn problem. 
Many political leaders were reluctant to confront the question of the king directly, a 
fact notoriously dramatized in the wake of the king’s flight to Varennes on 20 June 
1791. In one of the revolution’s first major crises, Louis fled Paris with his family 
towards the border with the hope of rallying the court and royalism from afar. Upon 
leaving Paris, he also left a written statement repudiating the revolution. The statement 
was discovered as he and the royal family were caught at Varennes and escorted back 
to Paris. Radicals and republicans interpreted the flight as overt abdication by the 
monarchy. Larger segments of the population, too, increasingly questioned the 
viability of a constitutional monarchy.20 And yet political leaders chose to defer the 
problem: to explain the king’s flight, the legislature fabricated the fiction that Louis 
was kidnapped under an émigré’s plot. Louis, in turn, accepted the new constitution 
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and, with it, earned inviolability and a suspensive veto.  
Many radical democrats found this course of action bewildering. Paine, for 
one, could not understand why Louis was allowed to remain king, and an inviolable 
one at that. As one petition circulated afterwards put it, “A great crime is committed. 
Louis XVI flees. He shamefully abandons his post; the empire is on the verge of 
anarchy.” And yet, the petitioners complained, “you have decided in advance that he is 
innocent and inviolable… Legislators! This was not the wish of the people.”21 Why, 
republicans wondered, should Louis be rewarded for betraying the nation with the new 
office of constitutional monarch? 
Undoubtedly, part of the reason lay in institutional inertia and the vertigo of 
abandoning the monarchy. Louis also remained popular until as late as 1791, and 
many critics of the old regime continued to aspire for a constitutional monarchy rather 
than a republic. Nevertheless, by the summer of 1792, the Parisian popular sections 
were prepared to take action into their own hands. “Representatives of the people, 
listen again to their cries of sorrow,” a deputation of fédérés pleaded to the legislative 
assembly in July.  
Weeks have passed since you declared the patrie in danger, and you indicate to 
us no means of saving it. Can it be that you still do not know the cause of our 
ills, or the remedies? Well then, legislators, we citizens of the 83 
departments…we shall show you the remedy. We say to you that the source of 
our ills is in the abuse that the head of the executive power makes of his 
authority… Spare your country a universal upheaval, use all the power 
confided to you, and save the patrie yourselves.22 
 
The deputation warned that if legislators did not depose Louis, “There would only  
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[fig 1: Jacques Bertaux, Prise du palais des Tuileries, 10 août 1792.] 
 
remain one recourse for the nation, that of deploying all of its force to crush all its 
tyrants.”23 The sections of Paris made good on that promise in the next month. 
Cumulative frustrations over food, the war situation, and Louis’s conspiracy against 
the revolution reached its climax on the morning of 10 August 1792 [fig 1]. In what 
observers called the “second” Revolution, Paris’s armed sections attacked the 
Tuileries as the royal family fled to the nearby Legislative Assembly. Sheltered in the 
logographie room reserved for journalists, Louis was arrested by the Assembly and 
the municipal government, the Commune. As a result, the question of what to do with 
the king could no longer be deferred. Three years after the revolution began, leaders 
would finally have to put the king on trial and judge him. 
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* * * 
Political leaders and convention members immediately confronted two major 
obstacles in judging the king. First, no preexisting adversarial procedures existed for 
such a trial and, except for the English case of Charles I in 1649, few available scripts 
existed for regicide. As Jean-Paul Marat was compelled to remind his legalistic 
opponents, “It is not at all here a question of an ordinary trial.”24 Second, Louis was 
legally inviolable, and not by dint of divine right but positive law. He received his 
schedule of legal immunities by virtue of the 1791 Constitution, not royalist ideology, 
and no trial would be possible until a way around that fact could be found.  
As the convention members searched for ways to circumvent royal 
inviolability in the following months—from roughly October 1 to December 6, a 
period often called “The Instruction”—the popular sections continued to experiment 
with new idioms of collective agency. And without doubt, extralegal violence had 
emerged as the privileged medium for popular voice. As Jean-Marie Roland, Minister 
of the Interior, explained to Louis before the August 10 insurrection, the Parisian 
sections were already leaning towards extralegal violence as their preferred 
vocabulary for popular sovereignty: “The revolution is achieved in their minds; it will 
be completed at the cost of blood, and will be cemented by it, if wisdom does not 
prevent misfortunes that can still be avoided.” If Louis continued his obstruction 
tactics by blocking legislation with his suspensive veto, Roland warned, “the 
departments will be forced to substitute for it, as they do everywhere, with violent 
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measures,” while “the angered people will supplement [the law’s] absence with 
excesses.”25 Although the sans-culottes “never saw in their right to insurrection a 
theoretical or formal affirmation of their sovereignty,” Albert Soboul concedes, “they 
were naturally receptive to its exercise” after the August insurrection.26 The storming 
of the Bastille and the women’s march on Versailles had suggested popular agency 
and violence were linked. But it was the “September Massacres” that drove the point 
home. This journée saw Parisian crowds murder thousands of prisoners in fear that 
they would join the invading European armies as a fifth column. These septembriseurs 
placed the trial against the backdrop of bloody, extralegal popular violence. 
It was against this backdrop that Jacobins first discovered redemptive violence 
as a language of democratic agency. But before turning to the commitments which 
comprised that redemptive violence, it is important to understand that it was neither 
the only language of popular agency in the trial to be invoked nor the most persuasive. 
Some royal sympathizers, for example, took inviolability at face value and reasoned 
accordingly. After all, the law was not completely silent on Louis’s guilt. Inviolability 
was not invincibility. Because the king’s legal immunities were themselves the gift of 
constitutional law, even if Louis exercised royal discretion in his executive power, it 
was still the case that, as the 1791 Constitution put it, “only in the name of the law 
may he exact obedience.”27 To be beyond the law was not to be a law unto oneself, 
and Louis was acutely aware of this fact. In response to Bertrand Barère’s opening 
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prosecutorial statement on December 11 that “Louis, the French people accuse you of 
having committed a multitude of crimes, of establishing your tyranny by destroying 
their liberty,” Louis gave the careful reply: “There were no laws which stopped me.”28 
His was a condition of legal inviolability along with clear conditions for abdication: if 
Louis refused to take the oath to the constitution, if he led an army against the nation, 
or if refused to disavow foreign armies fighting against the nation in his name, then as 
the Constitution specified, he would be stripped of inviolability, reduced to a citizen, 
and made culpable for any future treasonous actions. 
This legal context guided Charles-François-Gabriel Morrison when he asked in 
a November 13 speech, “Can Louis XVI be judged?” A deputy from the Vendée with 
royalist sympathies, he drew the most straightforward conclusion: under a strict 
interpretation of the constitution, a trial was impossible and unnecessary. Although “a 
sovereign people have no other rule than its supreme will,” there are intrinsic 
limitations to that will. Ex post facto justice was one such limitation. “When a nation 
has promulgated a law,” Morrison explained, “although that nation have the right to 
change the law at will, nevertheless, that changed law cannot have a retroactive 
effect.” To insist otherwise was to commit “injury to the most basic principles of 
justice,” to forfeit principles “unknown only to tyrants.”29 Even if we must concede to 
“the plenitude of [the people’s] sovereignty,” Morrison concluded that to the question 
of what was to be done, there was nothing else to be done. Their duty as legislators 
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was to apply the penalty prescribed by the letter of the law without qualification. Since 
Louis had already been reduced to a citizen as prescribed by the constitution, neither 
trial nor further action was necessary. The revolution could “avoid a monstrous and 
interminable trial, perhaps with untoward results.”30  
Condorcet, for his part, also accepted Louis’s inviolability. It led him to erect a 
baroque argument to circumvent inviolability while maintaining fidelity to procedural 
justice. To the question, “Can the former king be judged?” he argued that there were 
two distinct questions at stake: does the constitution allow the king to be guilty? And 
does the constitution specify the means of judging that guilt? To the first question, 
Condorcet answered affirmatively. “The impunity of the king was not decreed by the 
Constitution” because it clearly specified conditions for abdication. But as to the 
second question, Condorcet had to concede that the Constitution did not provide the 
means for judging that guilt. Yet the silence of the law in this case ought not be a legal 
obstacle, because according to Condorcet, although justice demands that a previously 
promulgated law punish a crime, it did not demand the same for the procedures of 
determining guilt. Thus, although the Constitution remained silent on how to judge a 
king, that did not imply that no judgment could be made: “It is time to teach kings,” he 
proudly claimed, “that the silence of the laws about their crimes is the ill consequence 
of their power, and not the will or reason of equity.” And because France would 
benefit from knowing the extent of Louis’s betrayal, “even if one gives constitutional 
inviolability a force most contrary to reason and to justice, it remains true,” Condorcet 
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insisted, that “the nation has the right to judge him.”31 
Condorcet essentially decouples the determination of guilt from the 
prescription of punishment. Inviolability, he wants to say, protects Louis from 
punishment but not from guilt. He ought to be legally condemned for his actions, but 
he cannot be punished for them without committing ex post facto justice. Once guilt 
and punishment are uncoupled in this way, it is possible to draw the correct 
conclusions: Louis XVI can be judged guilty but not punished, whereas Louis Capet is 
both culpable and punishable. 
Both Morrison and Condorcet’s arguments were powerful examples of legal 
and constitutional reasoning. Neither bothered denying the king’s guilt. The king’s 
behavior had made that impossible. In particular, the discovery of incriminating 
documents in an iron safe in the Tuileries (the armoire de fer) revealed that Louis was 
collaborating with foreign powers to subvert the revolution. The documents, signed by 
Louis and compiled into a dossier for the Convention by Dufriche-Valazé, made the 
king’s guilt undeniable.32  
And yet Morrison and Condorcet’s arguments persuaded few deputies. The 
victorious position—one that was much more theoretically ambitious—was 
exemplified by that of Jean-Baptiste Mailhe, a lawyer from Toulouse and whose report 
on royal inviolability to the convention opened up the trial in earnest. In that report, he 
appealed to a new and revolutionary extralegal entity: the nation. For Mailhe, a 
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faithful application of the law led to counter-intuitive conclusions about the nature of 
royal guilt and popular sovereignty. He admitted that “in no case could the king be 
judged by the other constituted authorities, since he was their superior.” “It did not 
follow,” however, that the king “could not be judged by the nation, since to come to 
such a conclusion would be to claim that by virtue of the Constitution, the king was 
superior to the nation or independent of the nation.”33 Such an inviolability, Mailhe 
claimed, would have entailed the nation alienating its sovereignty. As everyone who 
read Rousseau knew, that was impossible. 
Mailhe’s appeal to “the nation” leaned on precedents in prerevolutionary 
France. By the late eighteenth century, the various parlements were already presenting 
themselves as the body of the nation. And in the lead up to the convocation of the 
Estates-General in 1789, the meeting was anticipated by French leaders as one 
between the nation and its executive authority. The nation, in other words, had already 
been invoked as a site of sovereignty distinguished from the executive branch of 
government. However, references to the nation prior to the revolution referred above 
all to a judicial entity. The parlements, after all, were courts, staffed by judges, and 
comprised of judicial and administrative instruments meant to represent the nation to 
the king on behalf of the people. They represented the nation qua legal subject. It was 
not this judicial subject that Mailhe had in mind when he claimed that, “No, the nation 
was not bound by royal inviolability, nor could it be,” because “There was no 
reciprocity between the people and the king.” Whereas Louis received his kingship 
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from the constitution, “the nation was sovereign regardless of constitution or king. Its 
inalienable sovereignty proceeds from nature alone.”34  
Mailhe’s appeal to nature here is remarkable given that he was neither a radical 
nor a Jacobin. Although a revolutionary, in the Convention he was associated with the 
moderate majority unaffiliated with any specific political club. Nevertheless, he 
invoked the revolution’s most radical claim: the nation named a preexisting repository 
of sovereignty that preceded all legal forms. In some respects, it aligned with Sieyès’s 
famous doctrine of constituent power. But unlike Sieyès’s category, which served 
largely as a formal presupposition for his theory of representation, Mailhe did not 
speak here of a legal fiction but a force of nature. In his speech, the people were 
asleep, but as they “awake” to their sovereignty and power, they recover their 
“instincts,” especially that of revenge and self-defense. As a natural existence, they are 
governed by laws which precede positive law and “are as old as society itself.” Indeed, 
“did not the nation itself have an undying right, rooted in nature, to call [tyrants] 
before its tribunals and to cause them to suffer the punishments due to oppressors or 
brigands?” As a pre-political entity, the nation did not depend on positive laws 
because it was not a positive existence. Before its agency, “all the difficulties 
disappear: royal inviolability might never have been.”35 Since the nation bestowed 
Louis his inviolability, it was within its powers to discard it and to judge Louis as an 
ordinary citizen on trial. And so, because the Convention was a “perfect” 
representation of that nation, Mailhe believed it was an adequate judge. To say 
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otherwise would be “to reject the nation” and “to attack the basis of society.”36 
These arguments of Morrison, Condorcet and Mailhe were grounded in 
different threads of revolutionary political culture. Although they arrived at different 
conclusions about how best to engage royal inviolability, they each accepted the 
principle of popular sovereignty. The point is important, because it suggests that 
regicide was not an intrinsic feature of revolutionary ideology nor entailed by the 
principle of popular sovereignty. Even as late as April 1792, Robespierre agreed. 
Writing in the opening editorial of his Le Défenseur de la Constitution, he skeptically 
asked, “It is in the words republic or monarchy that an answer resides to the great 
social problem?”37 If Robespierre and his Jacobin allies subsequently charted a 
different path by advocating for regicide outside the law, it was, I want to argue now, 
because the prospect of regicide led them to adopt a different perspective on what was 
fundamentally at stake in founding a republic. For despite all that divided Morrison, 
Mailhe and Condorcet, these leaders actually shared a common interpretation of the 
problem inviolability posed: the ultimate source of right. If Morrison denied there was 
a source of right higher than the constitution, Mailhe claimed to have found exactly 
that: “there is no Constitution which could prevent you from calling down upon [an 
enemy’s] head the censure of divine and human laws: rights and duties of nature are of 
an order higher than human institutions.”38 They both approached the question in 
terms of the final grounds of right and disagreed where that ground was located: the 
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Constitution or the Nation? It was also why Condorcet’s argument became so 
convoluted. He wanted a trial, but he refused to invoke a higher extralegal authority 
like the nation to sanction it. He was thus compelled to decouple guilt from 
punishment to remain philosophically consistent. Despite his revolutionary ambitions, 
Condorcet always believed that “you [France] owe to yourselves, you owe to 
mankind, the first example of the impartial trial of a king” where the legal proceedings 
approximated as closely as possible ordinary justice.39  
Jacobins found this debate tedious. “Those who attach any importance to the 
just punishment of a king will never found a Republic,” St Just argued in his first 
speech to the Convention.40 It all amounted to exasperating “constitutional logic-
chopping” as far as Robespierre was concerned.41 What frustrated these Jacobin 
leaders were not the details of their opponents’ legal reasoning. After all, like Mailhe, 
they too would appeal to the law of nations to circumvent inviolability.42 Instead, they 
were frustrated with the overriding presumption that, at bottom, the trial was about the 
final ground of legal right. It was as if monarchy was illegitimate merely because it 
placed those grounds in the wrong body. Indeed, if all it takes to found a republic is 
shifting the grounds of right from the court to the people, and if regicide is essentially 
supplanting a treasonous king with the rule of law, than we would have to concede to 
the Gironde leader Pierre-Victurnien Vergniaud’s claim that “the Constitution,” could 
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be, and was, the “basis of civil society,” or Condorcet’s belief that, suitably adjusted, 
positive law might be enough to bridge the revolutionary gap.43 That was a point even 
Marat conceded, and unlike the Jacobins, he advocated for a trial (although he was 
confident the outcome needed to be swift death).  
But Robespierre and his allies gradually discovered that affixing the source of 
law to “the people” was inadequate for founding a republic. Redefining the basis of 
right might curtail the arbitrary personal authority of the king. It might even place 
ordinary justice within the reach of the people. But the ideology of royalism in France 
was never primarily a doctrine about the nature of justice or the source of right. It was 
an entire ideology of “the social,” and to found a republic, a specifically republican 
vision of society had to take the place of the old regime. Without a persuasive 
democratic vision of society, France could achieve a republican regime in law, but not 
a republican people. And so when the Jacobins turned to the laws of nature to 
overcome inviolability, they did so for different reasons than their critics. Their appeal 
to the “terror of the justice of the people” sought to reframe regicide as an act of terror 
against an external enemy rather than the fulfillment of justice. If regicide could be 
construed as an expression of democratic terror, perhaps it could reassert the moral 
bases for social cohesion, enact “the people” as an agent capable of extralegal action, 
and pave the way for defining a new republican social body. 
* * * 
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We can observe the Jacobin critique of the legalistic interpretation of regicide 
in at least two places. The first is in their insistence that the trial did not present a 
judicial proceeding, but a scene of war. In his 13 November 1792 speech, St Just 
attacked Morrison and Mailhe’s opinions as “equally false.” Rather than respecting 
inviolability (Morrison) or judging Louis as a regular citizen (Mailhe), “the king ought 
to be judged according to principles foreign to both.” Applying old ideas to a new 
situation, the two misconstrued the task at hand. “The single aim of [Mailhe’s] 
committee was to persuade you that the king should be judged as an ordinary citizen,” 
St Just claimed. “And I say that the king should be judged as an enemy; that we must 
not so much judge him as combat him; that as he had no part in the contract which 
united the French people, the forms of judicial procedure here are not to be sought in 
positive law, but in the law of nations.”44 For St Just, appealing to the law of nations 
did not mean appealing to a higher law to judge an inviolable king. A legal judgment 
was not at stake. Instead, he appealed to the law of nations for the rules of combat. 
The king was an enemy in an international arena, a figure outside of the polity, a 
“brigand,” “the lowest class of humanity,” “outlaw,” and a “rebel.” 
Some men search for a law which would allow the punishment of the king. But 
in the form of government from which we come, he was indeed inviolable with 
respect to each citizen. Between the people as a whole and the king, I do not 
however recognize any natural bond… The social contract is between citizen 
and citizen, not between citizen and government. A contract affects only those 
whom it binds. As a consequence, Louis, who was not bound, cannot be 
judged in civil law… All these reasons should lead you to judge Louis, not as a 
citizen, but as a rebel.45 
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Condorcet, Mailhe and others had mistakenly applied domestic principles of law into a 
scene of war between a nation and its enemy. They sought to apply principles of 
justice to an enemy outside of the polity that sought to destroy that very justice. “To 
judge is to apply the law; law supposes a common share in justice; and what justice 
can be common to humanity and kings? What has Louis in common with the French 
people that they should treat him well after he betrayed them?” It was evidence of how 
poorly revolutionaries understood the nature of the revolutionary break, St Just 
suggested, that French leaders believed legal justice was the criterion for success.  
Robespierre agreed. In early December, he wrote, “Citizens, the Assembly has 
unwittingly been brought far from the true question. There is no trial to be conducted 
here.” That was because “Louis is not an accused man. You are not judges. You are, 
and you can only be, statesmen and representatives of the nation.” As representatives 
of the general will, “You do not have a verdict to give for or against a man, but a 
measure to take for the public safety.” And unfortunately, “the character of the 
deliberations hitherto goes directly against this latter aim.”46 Robespierre conceded 
that the confusion between a trial that “punishes a public official while keeping its 
form of government” with a revolution that “destroys the government itself” stemmed 
from the unprecedented nature of the historical break: “We apply ideas with which we 
are familiar to an extraordinary case dependent upon principles which we have never 
put in practice.”47 The difficulty of seeing the proper task at hand was further 
exacerbated by France’s long enslavement, which had so thoroughly distorted men’s 
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moral intuitions that regicide seemed to be illegal, even immoral. The correct path 
forward, nevertheless, was one in which “the National Convention declares him 
[Louis] from this moment a traitor to the French nation, a criminal towards humanity,” 
and if this seemed difficult to accept, that was evidence of how corrupt the moral 
compass of the social body had become.48 
Like St Just, Robespierre saw the situation to be one of war against an external 
enemy. He, too, concluded that Louis possessed no civil status whatever: “Those who 
make war on a people to arrest the progress of liberty and annihilate the rights of man 
should be pursued…as murderers and rebellious brigands,” he later wrote in his draft 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. Read aloud to the Jacobin Club on 21 
April 1793 in the lead up to the creation of France’s first republican constitution, that 
draft declaration condemned kings as “slaves in revolt against the Sovereign power of 
the Earth, which is the human race, and against the legislator of the universe, which is 
nature.”49 Robespierre repeated the point in a 5 December 1793 declaration, written in 
response to William Pitt’s announcement of the European alliance against the French 
Revolution’s “immorality.” There, he addressed the monarchs as a member of the 
Committee on Public Safety: “Slaves in revolt against the sovereignty of peoples, do 
you not know that this blasphemy [of calling republicans rebels] can only be justified 
by victory? See then the scaffold of the last of our tyrants… that is our answer.”50 
These Jacobin references to kings as rebels, slaves in revolt, and outlaws served the 
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rhetorical purpose of accepting monarchy’s own self-presentation as beyond the social 
contract while reversing its valuation. Both the slave in revolt and the king lacked civil 
status and were, from the standpoint of the revolution, analogous figures. And if kings 
were nothing but slaves in revolt, then it would indeed be a sort of legal promotion to 
grant them a trial before their execution, because it would readmit them back into the 
political community in the form of citizenship. In the eyes of St Just and Robespierre, 
that was nonsense. A democratic revolution is not a legal trial but a war to be won. 
The second place we see Jacobins object to the Gironde’s legalistic framing of 
the trial lay in their focus on repairing social cohesion. Unlike the citations to the law 
of nations, this argument reached into an alternative strand of French thought that was 
concerned with questions of “the social.” Before the Jacobins ever raised the question 
of the social body in the trial, eighteenth century French thinkers had already 
recognized social cohesion as an important problem that was distinct from the 
phenomenon of political cohesion. The latter concerned the bonds connecting royal 
subjects and, later, free and equal citizens united by common law and shared 
government. Long thought to be sustained by collective subjection to or participation 
in an undivided sovereign will, political unity became during the revolution a special 
type of relation achieved by disavowing the heterogeneous social bonds that 
coordinated men and women in relations of hierarchy and subordination. As Sieyès 
put it on the eve of the revolution, “All the relations between citizen and citizen are 
founded on the basis of freedom and equality,” which were superior to the “two great 
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principles of action in society…honour and emolument.”51  
In contrast to political unity, the cohesion of “the social” referred to customary 
relations of interdependence. Before the social theorists of the Third Republic 
formalized it, eighteenth century thinkers had already given shape (although not a 
name) to this phenomenon. As Daniel Gordon has argued, they did so as a response to 
absolutism. Within a context where court life in Versailles monopolized the domain of 
politics, ordinary French men and women were compelled to search for alternative, 
non-political modes of association that could possess their own autonomy. “The 
invention of the social as a distinctive field of human experience,” however, “required 
a demonstration that some meaningful activities are self-instituting; that in some 
situations human beings can hang together of their own accord; that humans, in short, 
are sociable creatures.”52 That demonstration, as Karuna Mantena has suggested in the 
British case, often came from anthropological histories of non-Western cultures (their 
systems of kinship and the customary bases of their institutions), and indeed French 
political thinkers made much of Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws (1748), Denis 
Diderot’s Supplement to the Voyage of Bougainville (1772), and new ethnographic and 
archaeological studies on “the golden age.”53 
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French thinkers also had other resources available for theorizing the social. 
They had, for example, the theme of natural sociabilité in Baron d’Holbach and 
Rousseau and which enthralled elite salon circles. Another was the ongoing invention 
of the science of society. Coined by Condorcet, the new “social science” promised to 
import the procedures of the natural sciences into the social field, and to render its 
distinctive features in the new authoritative language of scientific appraisal. For 
ordinary people, however, the most obvious source for understanding the social was 
prerevolutionary France’s corporatist society and which consisted in overlapping 
bodies such as the family, the city, and the guild. Far from being seen as arrangements 
of convenience, each body was understood to be an autonomous moral entity. Trade 
guilds, for example, had their own patron saints, holidays, mutual aid mechanisms, 
and rituals of moral improvement and economic cooperation.54 And just as every 
corps was cohered by its esprit de corps, société at large was bound together by la 
morale. As the Montesquieu enthusiast Louis de Jaucourt put it, la morale did not 
involve “knowing the essence of real substances.” Instead, it concerned the relations 
between men and their conduct with one another. To see la morale, Jaucourt 
explained, “it is only necessary to compare with care certain relations among human 
actions and a certain rule.” On this account, morality is about the collective activity of 
moral regulation as much as it is about maxims of conduct. It is what makes society 
more than a collection of individuals, and it is why “la Morale is the proper science of 
man; because it is a general knowledge proportioned to their natural capacity, and 
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from which depends their greatest interest.”55Although moral relations between men 
are fixed and unchanging, they are nevertheless relational rather than essential. They 
describe not natural, but social laws governing men of reason.  
And yet, part of the reason eighteenth century French thinkers discussed the 
social at all was because its cohesion was entering into crisis. Corporatism in 
particular came under attack from a series of reform movements in the years leading 
up to the revolution. Led by ministers and politicians allied with the philosophes and 
the physiocrats, these reformers sought to resolve the monarchy’s looming debt crisis 
by dismantling the corporate privileges which interfered with increasing taxation. As 
Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot had put it, “Public utility is the supreme law,” and in the 
face of that law, “particular corporate bodies do not exist of themselves, or for 
themselves; they have been formed for society, and they must cease to exist 
immediately after they cease to be useful.” Reduced to an instrumental arrangement, 
Turgot, a champion of the scientific reform of government and Condorcet’s idol, 
denied corporate bodies their moral standing in order to exalt the abstract individual 
and aggregate social utility: “Citizens have rights” which, he insisted, “exist 
independently of society.”56 It was a revolutionary stance that provoked outrage from 
the parlements, the nobility, and trade associations. After issuing a series of laissez-
faire reforms in 1776 known as Turgot’s Edict, his program finally lost the support of 
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fellow ministers and Louis dismissed him as Controller-General of Finances. 
Turgot’s Edict was a prelude to successive attempts at atomizing the corporate 
structure of the old regime’s social body. The revolutionary institution of civil 
marriage and divorce provided another attempt. Given the unique role families played 
in constituting the social—they bonded generations across time and lineages across 
space—tampering with the familial bond meant redefining the broader purpose of 
“association.”57 Sieyès remarks typified the new attitude. After proudly announcing 
that “those millions of men now piled together without any plan or order, have begun 
to allow themselves some feeling of hope…and can see at last that the moment is at 
hand when we can become a nation,” he added the qualification that the family had to 
be “set aside” to properly grasp the individual whose will constituted the elemental 
unit of the nation.58 The Third Estate’s bid for national representation, too, can be seen 
in this light. “Since it belongs only to the verified representatives to take part in 
forming the national will,” the Third Estate announced, “it is also indispensable to 
conclude that it belongs to it [the Third Estate], and it alone, to interpret and present 
the general will of the nation; there cannot exist between the throne and this assembly 
any veto, any negative power.”59 This was a statement that denied political voice to 
intermediary bodies between the nation and the king. It repudiated the schedule of 
privileges allotted by corps because those intermediary bodies foreclosed the 
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formation of a united body politic. After all, Sieyès wrote, if social ascriptions were 
not suppressed, the formation of a national representation would be futile: “They 
would still remain three types of heterogeneous matter [the three Estates] that it would 
be impossible to amalgamate.”60  
The aggressive means by which the revolution sought to atomize the social 
body came to a point with Le Chapelier’s Law. Proposed by Isaac-René-Guy Le 
Chapelier in response to strikes in Paris in the spring of 1791, the measure decreed 
“association” between workers to be “unconstitutional” and “in contempt of liberty 
and the Declaration of the Rights of Man.” Indeed, any associations that obstructed 
“the free exercise of industry and labor” were to be criminalized as “seditious 
assemblies.”61 Underwriting this law, which remained in effect until its repeal during 
the Third Republic, was the revolutionary ideology that disintegrating “the social” of 
the old regime was a prerequisite for founding a polity of free and equal citizens. 
Amid these successive attacks on prerevolutionary corporate order, the social 
came to be seen as an anthropological given, established from time out of mind, but 
now under threat. That anthropological pretension to naming a timeless dimension of 
human sociality was ideological, for it naturalized an historically specific way of 
conceptualizing human interdependence. Thinking about pre-political association in 
terms of the social was a recent development and rooted in the conflicts between the 
old regime’s institutional patterns and new political reforms. This is important because 
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it reminds us that “the political/social” is a distinction drawn from within 
Enlightenment and later revolutionary republican political thought. “The secular 
conceptions of the political and the social,” Dipesh Chakrabarty insists, is historically 
specific to modern European political thought and particular to “the idea of 
modernity” itself.62 Whereas many revolutionaries took the existence of société as a 
concrete given, and therefore believed they were “abstracting” from it to ground legal 
equality, in reality they were themselves instituting société as an independent 
existence by devising a set of rules and expectations for the process of political 
abstraction.63 What made one’s trade, sex or religion “concrete” and social rather than 
“abstract” or political was the rise of an idiom of abstraction, itself historically 
specific, that reified nature as concrete and société as a repository of given moral 
relations. As Gary Wilder argues, that is why taking republicanism “one-sidedly as 
universalism” obscures republican citizenship’s contradictory “dual universal-
particular character,” its structural need to depoliticize forms of interdependence as 
“concrete” or “social” to stabilize the contradictions of its political universalism.64  
As thinkers across the spectrum discovered “the social” as an object of 
theoretical concern, it came to define a pre-existing space where sociable humans 
(rather than abstract citizens) could be articulated into a non-political order. The 
concept implied that although free and equal citizens might constitute a polity, as 
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citizens they do not automatically constitute a society. As Montesquieu had taught, the 
latter requires concrete men and women, replete with their own customary means of 
affiliation and kinship, their own moral character shaped by the vicissitudes of 
geography, climate and history. Society was irreducible to the individuals who made it 
up because it pointed to this underlying layer of association, one which bound people 
together in common life not by prudential considerations or historical contingency but 
by the moral thickness of their social bond.65 
If the problem of social cohesion was emerging as an especially pressing 
problem in French thought, so, too, had the king presented a special type of solution to 
it, and for two reasons. Unlike the family or guild which presented an autonomous 
moral corps consisting in several persons, the king was a corps unto himself. And 
whereas the former mediated relations between the individual and the state, the corps 
of the latter was the state. (“L’état, c’est moi,” Louis XIV is to have famously 
proposed.) These attributes of royal embodiment partake in aspects of the well-known 
doctrine of “the king’s two bodies,” a key feature of royalism with origins in medieval 
jurisprudence and Christian thought (but with “a post-Christian appeal,” Walzer 
adds).66 Better known in the context of English political thought and exemplified by 
the cry, “The King is Dead, Long Live the King!” the doctrine portrayed the king as in 
possession of two bodies, one eternal and another temporal. When this ideology held 
its greatest sway in France during the days of absolutism, the king was thought to 
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incarnate in his person the eternal corpus mysticum of the nation, the essence of the 
real nation and from which the dispersed temporal instances of the body politic 
acquired a higher unity. Thanks to it, the king held in his person a transcendental 
guarantee of national unity, and the mere fact of his embodiment answered the 
problem of social cohesion. 
However, like corporatism generally, developments in French intellectual and 
political culture corroded this political theology by the time of the revolution. During 
Louis XVI’s reign, new theories of representation and decades of Enlightenment 
criticism had hallowed out the ideology of the king’s two bodies. The former was 
evident in what Paul Friedland has described as the shift from thinking about 
representation as making-present to representation as approximation or delegation in 
mid-eighteenth century France,67 and it was exemplified in the displacement of the 
royal corpus mysticum by the parlements of France, then the Estates-General, and 
finally the National Assembly as the incarnation of the nation’s body. Sieyès gave this 
transformation its canonical formulation in his pamphlet “What is the Third Estate?”: 
“a nation is made one by virtue of a common system of law and a common 
representation.”68 The breakdown of the strict separation between the sacred and 
profane wasn’t helped by the fact that Louis’s kingship began under the sign of 
procreative embarrassment. Years of failed attempts at consummating his marriage 
with Marie Antoinette meant that, until the birth of the their first daughter, popular 
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presses regularly caricatured Louis’s paternal power, undermining the ideology of the 
royal body with public amusement at his impotence.69  
Yet despite royalist ideology’s softening grip, most French subjects still 
described the king as the head of the body politic which otherwise consisted in the 
three estates. When the cahiers de doléances in the lead up to the Estates-General 
addressed Louis as the father of the French, it was both pious deference to 
paterfamilias and a reaffirmation of this vision of society wherein the father-king 
clinched together the “real” national body with its myriad temporal instances. Even 
after the revolution began, most subjects still held a deep seated belief that what 
formed a nation was the unity of its will, and that as a consequence, only the king 
could give to individuals the form of “the nation” by identifying the national will with 
his own. The king provided the transcendental organizing principle of society, a 
guarantee that society was not only real, but also more real and durable than the mortal 
individuals that made it up.70 So long as his royal body remained intact, France was in 
possession of its unity even if it altered its social organization and institutions.  
For that same reason, however, calling into question the royal body and its 
majesty described an unprecedented act of violence, for it was a direct attack on the 
idea of society itself. This explains why St Just and Robespierre returned, time and 
again, to the question of the moral basis of “society” during and after the trial of Louis 
XVI. In his 13 November 1792 speech, St Just attacked Mailhe’s report for 
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succumbing to an empty legalism: “The committee fell into forms without 
principles.”71 Robespierre echoed this exact point the next month: “We invoke forms 
because we lack principles.”72 By prioritizing procedural justice over concrete 
morality, St Just believed political leaders had forgotten that founding a republic 
entailed more than setting new standards of right. It also demanded “an example of 
virtue which would be a bond of public spirit and unity in the republic.”73 That “bond 
of public spirit” consisted not only in a common share of justice, but a common 
sentiment of vengeance, a collective participation in moral righteousness that 
authorized extralegal revolutionary justice to supersede the ordinary justice of the law. 
Indeed, it was moral order itself. As St Just put it later in December, “What do you 
call a Revolution? The fall of a throne, a few blows levied at a few abuses?” Although 
his Gironde critics carried on as if the answer was yes, for St Just, the revolution posed 
the more demanding task of reconstructing la morale. “The moral order is like the 
physical,” he insisted, and so even if “abuses disappear for an instant, as the dew dries 
in the morning, and as it falls again with the night, so the abuses will reappear.”74 
Moral order is something that must be concretely institutionalized and sustained. To 
have a modern revolution, it is not enough to create news laws. The revolution would 
fail unless the king’s trial was interpreted in light of that fact. That was why Mailhe’s 
argument was so mistaken. 
It is not sufficient to say that in the order of eternal justice, sovereignty is 
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independent of the existing form of government and thence to infer that the 
king should be tried. [i.e. Mailhe’s argument—KD]. Natural justice and the 
principle of sovereignty must be extended to the spirit in which the trial is 
conducted. We will have no Republic without these distinctions which permit 
all the parts of the social order their natural movement, just as nature creates 
life from a union of elements.75 
Again, Robespierre echoed this point. To reforge the republican social body, 
there would need to be active coordination between the principles of nature and those 
of society. And for that, existing constitutional law was inadequate. After all, having 
entered into war with the king, “It is too great a contradiction to suppose that the 
Constitution might preside over this new order of things. That would be to suppose 
that it could outlive itself. What laws replace it? those of nature, which is the basis of 
society.”76  
Robespierre drove the point home in a speech given on 2 December, just days 
before Louis was set to appear at the bar of the Convention for the first time. 
Convention members had just listened to a report on a subsistence crisis in the Eure-
et-Loir, where the people demanded fixed bread prices to respond to food shortages. In 
his response to the report, Robespierre took the opportunity to expound on “the social 
law” and its normative implications for the revolution. “What is the first object of 
society?” he asked. “It is to maintain the imprescriptible rights of man. What is the 
first of those rights? The right to life.” If the primary purpose of society is to maintain 
life, then “the first social law is therefore the one that guarantees all members of 
society the means to live; all the others are subordinate to that one.” From these agreed 
upon principles, however, Robespierre concluded that “it is not true that property can 
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ever be in opposition to human subsistence.” Viewing property as an economic 
commodity, something expressing value unto itself, amounts to defining property as 
the “right to despoil and assassinate [man’s] fellows.” Moreover, if property is 
subordinated to life’s maintenance, then by analogy, it ought to circulate in the social 
body as if it were the blood in the human body that preserves our biological life.77 
Circulation is that which puts the essential foodstuff within reach of all men, 
and carries abundance and life into humble cottages. Does blood circulate 
when it is congested in the brain or in the chest? It circulates when it flows 
freely through the body; subsistence is the blood of the people, and its free 
circulation is no less necessary to the social body than that of the blood to the 
life of the human body.78 
Hoarders, monopolists, merchants who withhold goods from circulation are not only 
economically malfeasant, then, but murderers of the social body, “assassins of the 
people.”79 Robespierre’s point was to use the notion of “circulation” to communicate a 
description of the social body as vitalized by the circulation of goods according to 
social and moral laws, not economic ones. Unlike Turgot and Condorcet, Robespierre 
and St Just’s vision of the revolutionary social body was not reducible to individual 
consent and aggregate utility. Rather, it called for the corporatism of the old regime to 
be displaced by a society modeled on the normative patterns of nature. “We will have 
no Republic,” the latter insisted, if the revolution did not also reconstitute society, if 
“the social order” was not returned its “natural movement,” just as nature produces life 
when it is left to its own devices. 
 These two objections to the Gironde interpretation of the trial—that it was an 
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act of war, not a judicial proceeding, and that it needed to produce not “a few blows 
levied at a few abuses” but “moral order”—amounted to a claim that if the revolution 
engaged Louis as a citizen rather than an enemy of mankind, there would only be a 
regime change rather than a revolution. “Citizens, did you want a revolution without a 
revolution?” Robespierre asked.80 “If you declare the king a citizen” as the Gironde 
advocated, “he will slip from your grasp,” St Just warned.81 The “he” in question did 
not refer only to the person of the king, but also to his mystical body and the 
corporatist vision of society which that body clinched together. It was why 
Robespierre and St Just demanded Convention leaders to go beyond redefining the 
ground of public authority. Jacobins hoped to strike Louis in both his person and as a 
representation. And executing that representative body required the revolution to posit 
a robust principle of social cohesion in place of the old corporate order. Leaving the 
moral bases for that republican cohesion unspecified was simply not an option. 
Citizens born into an established liberal political culture today might endorse legalistic 
or prudential considerations as the basis for the polity’s unity. They might even accept 
a type of “constitutional patriotism.”82 But such an orientation was simply unrealistic 
in 1792. Republican democracy was taking root among a people whose sense of 
collective belonging had never been construed as essentially political, and it would 
have been—and was—ahistorical to insist that it suddenly be otherwise.  
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The Jacobins, supposedly ensnared in “abstract” reasoning, were the ones who 
most appreciated this fact. Condorcet and Sieyès, on the other hand, vastly 
underestimated the importance of “the social” for republican democracy. (When 
Turgot was dismissed for attacking the corporate structure of the social in his edicts, 
Condorcet was shocked, evidently not understanding why Turgot’s edicts might have 
been so unpopular.) If the revolution was to yield a new vision of peoplehood, it 
would also need to produce a new vision of society with which to supplant the royal 
corpus mysticum. That is why, according to the Jacobin argument, regicide must do 
more than cancel the past. It is incumbent on it to produce a new social body cohered 
by moral principles which are not yet widely accepted. Therein lies the central 
challenge posed by the trial for revolutionary democracy. 
 
From Tyrannicide to Redemptive Violence 
This interpretation of the trial’s challenge was itself revolutionary. It was therefore 
unclear how regicide was supposed to answer it. After all, earlier regicides did not 
believe they were forming new societies with their violence. As Camus has observed, 
“Kings were put to death long before January 21, 1793, and before the regicides of the 
nineteenth century.” But all of those earlier regicides “were interested in attacking the 
person, not the principle, of the king. They wanted another king and that was all. It 
never occurred to them that the throne could remain empty forever.”83 As Robespierre 
himself reflected, 
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If we had not had a greater task to fulfill, if all that was at issue here were the 
interests of a faction or a new aristocracy, we might have been able to 
believe…that the plan for the French Revolution was clearly written in the 
works of Tacitus and Machiavelli, and looked for the duties of people’s 
representatives in the history of Augustus, Tiberius or Vespasian, or even that 
of some French legislators; for…all tyrants are alike.84 
There was, however, a “greater task” at hand on which the classical texts of political 
theory remained silent: democratic revolution. And Louis was not just a tyrant. Thanks 
to royalist ideology, he was also the transcendental guarantee of social cohesion. If the 
Jacobins believed that at stake was nothing less than killing kingship itself and 
founding a new society, then how was regicide supposed to fulfill this unprecedented 
historical task? 
As the legal trial proceeded in spite of Jacobin protests, Robespierre and his 
allies reshaped the meaning of regicide by transposing it from classical republican 
theories of tyrannicide into newer Enlightenment discourses of nature. Specifically, 
they employed two concurrent lines of argument: they sacralized the violence of the 
people, and they naturalized their democratic agency. 
Jacobins repeatedly described regicide in sacralized, expiatory, and redemptive 
terms. Regicide was not simply the removal of a king, but a “sacred cause” with a 
“sublime outcome.”85 It was analogized to biblical moments of absolution like the 
great flood.86 The blood shed by the revolution “is the expiation we offer the world,” 
the revolutionary “cause is holy,” and indeed in the case of regicide, “Honouring the 
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Divinity and punishing kings are the same thing.”87 Spurning atheism as anti-
republican, this language of redemptive violence affirmed the salvation of “the 
people” as “the holiest of all laws.”88 Indeed, it is worth recalling that the Jacobins 
were among the most consistent enemies to the revolution’s de-Christianization 
efforts. Atheism was just as immoral as royalism. As Robespierre quipped, “The 
scapular-wearing fanatic and the fanatic preaching atheism have many similarities… 
sometimes red bonnets are closer to red high heels than one might think.”89 Societies, 
even secular ones, needed their own sources of the sacred. 
It is possible to interpret this redemptive rhetoric as a return to the past. After 
all, its Edenic sentimentality and its allusions to “golden age” myths resembled 
prerevolutionary understandings of moral order, even a reactionary “deification of 
violence,” as Ferenc Fehèr has called it.90 But in the context of 1792-3, such 
invocations of redemption and restoration actually functioned as claims to historical 
rupture. As Mona Ozouf and Lucien Jaume have shown, revolutionary discourses of 
regeneration functioned in Janus-faced ways. Calls to redeem the corrupt and fallen 
state of man functioned as much to encourage revolutionaries to leap into the future as 
to return to the past.91 In this sense, what the Jacobins sought to do was not unlike 
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what the Puritans did before them. For both, the pursuit of moral redemption incited 
revolutionary political action.92 Redemption served as a weapon to sever the present 
from the past. 
It would also be a mistake to construe this sacralization of violence as a return 
to preceding cognates in prerevolutionary penal ideology. Since at least Michel 
Foucault’s study of modern punishment, scholars have been familiar with the idea of 
capital punishment as a productive, restorative ritual of wounded sovereignty. “The 
public execution,” Foucault argued, was “a ceremonial by which a momentarily 
injured sovereignty is reconstituted. It restores that sovereignty by manifesting it at its 
most spectacular.”93 But it is unlikely that revolutionaries had this image of violence 
in mind, because decades before 1789, spectacular capital punishment was publicly 
rejected as anachronistic by nearly all proponents of enlightened, reformed 
government—including the future leaders of the revolution. Especially after Cesare 
Beccaria published his 1764 On Crimes and Punishment and the Abbé Morellet 
translated it into French, the abolition of spectacular capital punishment was a cause 
célèbre of leaders from Thomas Jefferson and Catherine the Great to Marat, Brissot, 
Mably, and Robespierre. Reforming or abolishing capital punishment became a widely 
agreed upon tenet of pre-revolutionary political thought. That was why Robespierre 
entered the revolution as a proud advocate of capital punishment’s abolition. It seems 
unlikely that the execution of the king was arranged and understood in terms of an 
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ideology of violence that virtually all significant French political thinkers had 
repudiated for a generation.94 Robespierre, for his part, never recanted his arguments 
for the death penalty’s abolition. He insisted that its abolition was compatible with 
endorsing regicide, implying that the latter was an altogether different type of 
sacralized violence from the old regime’s ceremonial, spectacular executions. 
The Jacobin ambition to naturalize the agency responsible for regicide proved 
more challenging. It involved portraying the agent of regicide, “the people,” as an 
extension of nature’s agency rather than a lone assassin or a coup by a vanguard. We 
see this strategy at work in the images of natural catastrophe employed by Jacobins to 
communicate their interpretation of regicide. Those images connected regicide’s 
violence to the widely esteemed discourses of nature’s catastrophic agency and 
ecological self-regulation. 
For sure, a belief in “the unifying significance of nature” was not limited to 
France. That belief was already at work in the American revolutionary “romance of 
nature” as well.95 But in France, the Jacobins drew their cult of nature, not from 
Puritanism, but the latest scientific theories of nature as monist, dynamic, and self-
correcting. These naturalizing metaphors helped coordinate “the people” with the 
newly discovered immanent moral authority of nature, thereby granting them nature’s 
unity and agency beyond the law.96 By linking popular agency to the moral authority  
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[Fig 2: Engraved by Benjamin Duvivier. A medallion in memory of 10 August 1792 assault on the 
Tuileries and the fall of the monarchy. 
of nature, the violence of “the people” became more than a negative veto on the past. 
It was also an active agent of moral reconstitution consistent with new scientific 
theories of nature as generative and regenerative. 
In particular, Jacobins and fellow revolutionaries modeled redemptive violence 
and popular agency after natural disasters. “The majestic movements of a great people, 
 
the sublime force of virtue” was, according to Robespierre, “like the eruptions of a 
volcano.”97 Images of floods, earthquakes, and storms became pervasive metaphors of 
democratic agency. Especially common was the image of the people’s agency as 
lightning,98 something we can observe in the medallion commemorating the August 
10th uprising at the Tuileries [fig 2]. 
On the left is an image of Liberty crushing royalist symbols under her foot. In 
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her raised hand is a dagger spewing lightning bolts. This depiction of Liberty striking 
down royalism with lightning neatly visualizes Robespierre’s most important speech 
during the king’s trial. On 3 December 1792, Robespierre described the redemptive 
violence of the people as the antithesis of the law by arguing, “A people does not 
judge as does a court of law. It does not hand down sentences, it hurls down 
thunderbolts; it does not condemn kings, it plunges them into the abyss.”99 It was a 
point he reiterated in his famous speech on political morality on 5 February 1794: 
“The revolution’s government is the despotism of liberty over tyranny…And are not 
thunderbolts meant to strike vainglorious heads?”100 And again, he invoked lightning 
in his famous speech on the pedagogical purpose of republican festivals. 
The world has changed, it should change again… Man has conquered lightning 
and diverted lightning from heaven… Everything has changed in the physical 
order; everything should change in the moral and political order. Half the 
world’s revolution is already complete; the other half should be 
accomplished.101 
 
To appreciate the meaning of Robespierre’s claim, we have to read it in 
connection to the special significance lightning acquired in late eighteenth century 
French scientific culture: it made manifest nature’s capacity to destroy and purify 
simultaneously. This was the position that emerged, for example, among revolutionary 
scientists like Jean-Paul Marat. Marat was a journalist and one of the legendary 
leaders of the revolution. Although he is primarily known for his bloodthirsty 
endorsement of discretionary popular violence, before the revolution, he studied 
lightning in a 1782 study entitled Recherches physiques sur l’électricité. In that text, 
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Marat outlined the regenerative, purifying effects of lightning for the atmosphere. He 
built his analysis upon the work of popular naturalists like the Comte de Buffon, who 
portrayed lightning in the Histoire naturelle as a spontaneous manifestation of the 
earth’s universal heat and energy.102 
Marat’s scientific studies aimed to intervene in a fad sweeping Paris in the 
1780s: Mesmerism. Franz Mesmer, a wildly popular pseudo-scientist and spiritualist, 
had opened up clinics which were controversial for their healing practices. Besides 
hypnotism, he was especially known for his claims about the “refreshing” and 
purifying power of electricity. According to Mesmer, lightning struck whenever the 
composition of the atmosphere was out of balance. The heat from the lightning would 
spontaneously restore atmospheric equilibrium. Lightning was, in other words, part of 
nature’s self-regulation, its capacity for self-correction. Mesmer tried to draw from his 
studies on lightning an account of social harmony. Just as lightning manifested a 
spontaneous reaction in a chaotic atmosphere to restore equilibrium, social upheavals 
occurred spontaneously to restore social harmony.  
This connection between lightning’s “refreshing” power and social 
regeneration was shared many Jacobin deputies. It was immortalized by one of their 
most infamous deputies, the Marquis de Sade. In the conclusion of his 1791 libertine 
novel, Justine, lightning figures as a deux ex machina that strikes down the novel’s 
protagonist as an ironic act of Providential moral rectification.103 The mayor of Paris,  
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[fig 3: Allégorie sur la journée du 10 août 1792, unknown provenance. Bibliothèque nationale de 
France, département Estampes et photographie.] 
 
too, ascribed to lightning the power of atmospheric regeneration. In March 1792, a 
few months before the trial began, Jérôme Pétion observed that, 
There exists in the social order, as in the political order, laws whose imposing 
effect is felt only in memorable times. When the atmosphere that surrounds us  
is charged with wicked vapors, nature can only break free with a lightning bolt; 
in the same way, society can only purge itself from the excesses that trouble it 
with an impressive explosion; and after these great blows are struck, 
everything is reborn in hope and happiness.104 
The trope of the people as a natural disaster was explicitly connected to violence’s 
sacralization in an allegorical painting from 1792 [fig 3]. In its tableau, a thunderbolt 
dissipates the obfuscating clouds from the interior of “the Mountain.” A mechanical 
structure conducts the lightning downward while also drawing it towards frogs and 
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snakes, who represent “the Swamp”—that is, Girondin moderates. Atop the mountain 
stands Zeus, who it turns out is a Jacobin. He clutches in his hand a pike adorned with 
a Phrygian cap. 
The scientific pretensions of this image of democratic violence suggest that it 
would be a mistake to interpret the idea of “the people” as a natural disaster as merely 
figurative. Revolutionary leaders were searching for a new vocabulary of collective, 
democratic agency, and they found it in the esteemed discourses of nature which 
saturated French scientific culture. These depictions of nature’s catastrophic agency 
appeared to capture the felt experience of popular sovereignty. From the storming of 
the Bastille, to the women’s March on Versailles, to the attack on the Tuileries, 
popular agency truly did appear like lightning: a spontaneous flash of popular power 
that reasserted morality against social disequilibrium.  
It is worth lingering on the visual emphasis on lightning’s conduction. Below 
is a 1793 illustration of a Jacobin conducting lightning from the sky to strike frogs and 
snakes [fig 4]. On the right is Benjamin Franklin [fig 5]. Every revolutionary knew 
Franklin had taught men how to conduct lightning, including Robespierre: before the 
revolution, Robespierre made his name in the legal profession in a case involving a 
lightning conductor. As a young lawyer in Arras, Robespierre took on a widely 
watched legal case defending Charles Dominique de Vissery de Bois-Valé. Dominique 
had affixed a lightning rod to his home. Fellow townsmen believed the rod summoned 
lightning into the village rather than directing it safely to the ground, and they asked 
that it be removed. Robespierre defended Dominique with arguments for the progress  
  71 
    
[fig 4: “Sans Union Point de Force” (1793).]105 
[fig 5: Benjamin West, “Benjamin Franklin Drawing Lightning from the Sky,” (c. 1816)] 
of enlightenment, the eradication of superstition, and the cause of science. Most 
importantly, he viewed the lightning rod as a triumph for mankind because, with the 
lightning rod, man had learned to channel nature’s agency towards his own ends. What 
formerly struck arbitrarily could now serve human needs and ends. Upon winning the 
case, Robespierre wrote to Franklin on 1 October 1783, describing to him how the 
case “presented to me the occasion to plead…the cause of a sublime discovery, to 
which mankind is beholden to you.” Defending the lightning rod provided an 
opportunity for “the uprooting of prejudice” and promoting human progress.106 
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[fig 6: Gardens of Versailles, author’s photo.] 
Lingering on the Jacobin fascination with lightning conduction draws the 
contrast to absolutism’s approach to nature in the eighteenth century. The latter is 
famously visualized at Versailles’s outdoor gardens [fig 6]. Its horticultural style 
beautifully illustrates absolutism’s approach to nature in the eighteenth century. 
Absolutism viewed nature as raw material to be molded in conformity with rational 
patterns, like geometry. If nature needed to clipped, trimmed, and shoved into 
geometric shapes to prove it, then so be it. But this was a far cry from the Jacobin 
approach, which was less inclined to dominate nature through abstractions. Instead, 
Jacobins hoped democratic agency would become a conductor for nature’s agency. 
We should understand Jacobin attempts to ground social cohesion in a cult of 
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nature as part of their attack on absolutism. If absolutism approached nature as 
material to be molded into baroque, geometric shapes, the revolution would be more 
scientific. Instead of waging war on nature, it would wage war with nature’s agency. It 
would found a republic that drew its cohesion from nature’s moral unity and 
redemptive agency. Their sustained involvement with eighteenth century scientific 
culture helps explain why Jacobins—many of whom were scientists themselves—
refused to accept regicide as the outcome of a legal trial. Because the people’s agency 
extended that of nature’s, their agency naturally took the form of extrajudicial, 
spontaneous violence. Their will manifested, not through the law, but as a regenerative 
natural disaster—a flood, volcanic eruption, or lightning strike. Hence, if the king 
were to die under the sign of the law, it would be evidence that he was killed by 
something other than the true people 
The drama of the trial of Louis XVI was therefore also a drama about the 
nature of democratic agency. What does action by “the people” actually look like? 
What is its proper form of expression? Jacobins answered that the people’s agency 
manifested as an instance of nature’s agency. That belief shaped their answer to the 
philosophical dilemmas raised in the trial. It led them to approach regicide through the 
sciences of nature rather than the procedures of the law. “Everything has changed in 
the physical order,” Robespierre had explained, and “everything should change in the 
moral and political order.” If Jacobins subsequently crafted an elaborate choreography 
of republican political culture (festivals, dress, oaths) to achieve the task of aligning 
nature and society, in the trial of Louis XVI, the solution was discovered in the 
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lightning strike of regicide. Regicide as redemptive violence suggested a philosophical 
solution to the death of the royal corpus mysticum and the need to reassert a republican 
alternative. “We want,” Robespierre admitted, “to fulfill nature’s wishes.” Fulfilling 
nature’s wishes meant transforming France into “the model for all nations, the terror 
of oppressors.” And “In sealing our work with our blood,” Robespierre reverently 
claimed, “we may at least glimpse the dawn of universal felicity.”107 This ideological 
constellation describes what I am calling the Jacobin language of redemptive violence. 
Conclusion 
On 11 December, Louis finally appeared before his prosecutors at the bar of the 
Convention. In preparation, the Commune was declared permanently in session. All of 
the popular sections took up arms. To communicate the world-historical significance 
of the day’s proceedings, Barère addressed the audience as the session president: 
“Representatives, you are going to exercise the right of national justice… Europe 
observes you. History records your thoughts, your actions. Incorruptible posterity 
judges you with an inflexible severity…The dignity of your session must answer to the 
majesty of the French people. Through your body, it will give a great lesson to kings 
and a useful example to the liberation of nations.”108 Upon Louis’s seating, Jean-
Baptiste Robert Lindet read to him the acte énonciatif, or prosecutorial statement. 
Lindet’s statement, compiled with a committee of twenty-one, described the king’s 
various crimes committed at each of the revolution’s stages. It was damning. 
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Rhetorically, Lindet chose to present the acte énonciatif in the form of a history of the 
revolution with “the people,” and not the Assembly or the Convention, as its 
protagonist. Louis was asked to comment on each charge. He denied each one. After 
the frustrating appearance, the Convention gave Louis and his lawyers—Lamoignon 
de Malesherbes (great-grandfather to Alexis de Tocqueville) and François Denis 
Tronchet, as well as the young Raymond de Sèze—two weeks to prepare his legal 
defense. 
When the roll call vote finally occurred on 15 January 1793, convention 
members were presented with three questions. The first question concerned Louis’s 
culpability. It asked, “Louis Capet, former king of the French, is he guilty of 
conspiring against liberty and attacking the safety of the state? Yes or No.” Of 749 
convention members present, 691 voted yes. Another 27 made various speeches which 
were tallied as abstentions. In the end, there was never any question as to Louis’s guilt 
and the sovereignty of “the nation.” The center of the trial’s gravity lay elsewhere.  
The second question concerned the appeal to the people. It asked the 
following: “The judgment which will be rendered to Louis, will it undergo a 
ratification by the people united in their primary assemblies? Yes or No.” Whereas 
many convention members offered long qualifications or accounts of why they voted 
one way or another, St Just, in his famously crisp, direct style, simply said, “If I did 
not retain from the people the right to judge the tyrant, I would hold it from nature. 
No.”109 Of the 749 convention members present, 287 voted in favor of the appeal to 
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the people, 424 against, with 12 abstentions. It was a major victory for the Jacobins 
and marked their triumphant ascendance in the Convention over the Girondins.  
The final question on the agenda had to be asked the next day, and it took so 
long that the roll call voting lasted until the morning of 17 January. The question 
asked, “What punishment will Louis, the former king of the French, receive?” Here, 
answers did not always observe party lines or ideological expectations. Marat 
answered “Death in 24 hours.” Robespierre and Danton simply said “Death.” But so 
did Gironde leaders like Vergniaud. On the other hand, radical republicans like 
Thomas Paine voted against death, though with qualifications. The exact vote tally 
here has been a matter of dispute among historians because of the challenges with 
interpreting certain votes. But there was a straightforward majority plus one who voted 
death with no qualifications or amendments. Vergniaud announced the results: “I 
declare, in the name of the national Convention…that the punishment that is 
pronounced against Louis Capet is that of death.”110 Except for his two appearances 
before the Convention’s bar—to hear the acte énonciatif and to watch De Sèze read 
his legal defense—Louis had spent the entirety of the trial’s duration imprisoned in the 
Temple with his family. There, he had given his son daily geography lessons while 
reading a copy of The Imitation of Christ at his bedside. But on 21 January 1793, he 
was marched to the scaffold where Sanson, the executioner of Paris, guillotined him. 
At the fall of the blade, the crowd shouted vive la nation and vive la république while 
a few cut their own throats. Depending on the account, the crowd either cheered or 
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groaned as Louis the Last’s head plopped into the basket. Onlookers snatched up 
scraps of the king’s bloodied shroud, souvenirs of monarchy’s end. 
It is not possible to conclude what conception of peoplehood actually 
triumphed. Although a trial was held, a loss for the Jacobins, they were nevertheless 
victorious in defeating the appeal to the people. Moreover, the practical result—
Louis’s death—was compatible with several lines of reasoning offered during the trial, 
and the votes reflected that fact. His death presented the convergent outcome of 
several democratic theories that otherwise conflicted. It happened to be the case that 
they intersected at the point of Louis’s death. The fact that regicide was consistent 
with several normative conceptions of peoplehood meant that Louis’s execution was 
unable to adjudicate between them. The Jacobins, on this score, again failed in their 
avowed task. Louis died, but without leaving in his wake a clear vision of republican 
peoplehood with which to replace royalist ideology. As a result, much of 
postrevolutionary French thought through the nineteenth century would be saddled 
with the same sets of issues, questions, and problems that were opened up in the trial 
and which regicide failed to close. 
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Chapter II 
From Glory to Terror in Algeria 
A diplomatic kerfuffle provided the French a pretext for invading Algiers in 1830: a 
couple years earlier, the dey of Algiers had swiped the French ambassador with a 
flywhisk. Behind this flimsy excuse lay the fact that a powerful liberal opposition 
threatened the Restoration government. Legitimists hoped the conquest of Algiers 
would repair the monarchy’s reputation in time for national elections. Their gambit 
failed. Within months, a revolution replaced the Restoration government with 
“Citizen-King” Louis-Philippe’s July Monarchy, a liberal regime which promised to 
synthesize popular sovereignty with royal rule. 
Despite its liberal credentials, the July Monarchy did not return Algiers. On the 
contrary, it claimed ownership over the Bourbon conquest, appropriating it as a 
monumental achievement for the French nation instead.1 In 1840, the regime 
embarked on its twin quests of total domination and settler colonization in earnest. 
Political leaders appointed a new Governor-General to Algiers, Thomas Robert 
Bugeaud. They also reorganized the army around light mobile columns, the better to 
terrorize the local population. French soldiers razed, pillaged, massacred, and raped 
the tribal communities. Thanks to General Bugeaud’s new and controversial style of 
“total war,” the local population dwindled. During the next decade and a half, France’s 
celebrated Armée d’Afrique exterminated almost half of the local population. Their 
numbers fell from 4 million to 2.3 million. It would take a half century for the 
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Algerian population to return to pre-1830 levels.2  
 Alexis de Tocqueville met with Bugeaud and his staff during his first visit to 
Algeria in the summer of 1841. During a lunch in Philippeville, Colonel Jean Baptiste 
Simon Arsène d’Alphonse explained to the French rapporteur that 
Nothing but force and terror, Gentlemen, succeeds with these people. The 
other day, I carried out a razzia. I’m sorry you weren’t there… Nothing but 
force and terror, Gentlemen, succeeds with these people. The other day a 
murder was committed on the road. An Arab who was suspected of it was 
brought to me. I interrogated him and then I had his head cut off. You can see 
his head on the Constantine gates.3 
Tocqueville was probably alert to the irony of a French officer mimicking the 
“barbaric” practice of mounting decapitated enemy heads for display. The guillotine 
notwithstanding, mounted heads served as a common representational convention for 
Arab barbarism under the July Monarchy [fig 7]. Tocqueville expressed dismay with 
the Colonel’s candor towards terror, but even so, he was keen to excuse it. Upon 
returning to France, Tocqueville would write, “I have often heard men in France 
whom I respect, but with whom I do not agree, find it wrong that we burn harvests, 
that we empty silos, and finally that we seize unarmed men, women, and children.” 
Although he found such actions regrettable, Tocqueville nevertheless insisted that, 
“For myself, I think that all means of desolating these tribes must be employed.”4 
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[Fig 7: “Expédition de Constantine,” Bibliothèque nationale de France, département Estampes et 
photographie] 
On occasion, Tocqueville’s excuses for Bugeaud’s terror extended beyond 
reluctant apologies to silent, tacit approval. In June 1845, the Armée d’Afrique chased 
a tribe of over 650 into the caves of Dahra.5 The fleeing families believed the caves 
provided sanctuary and divine protection. Pressed for time, Colonel Aimable Pélissier 
commanded his soldiers to block the cave entrance with pyres, asphyxiating and 
melting the families inside with their livestock. Fellow officers like Colonel Saint 
Arnaud mimicked the tactic in the following months “on grounds that salutary terror 
would hasten the pacification” of locals.6 When the violence at Dahra publicly broke 
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in France, it provoked widespread criticism of Bugeaud’s tactics within the Chamber 
of Deputies and across Europe. No doubt aware of the outcry, Tocqueville—France’s 
foremost expert on the Algerian question—nevertheless chose to remain silent in the 
Chamber and in his private letters.7 
 It is now commonplace to acknowledge Tocqueville’s support for the 
domination and colonization of Algeria. Political theorists foreground his colonial 
writings as part of their wider appreciation of liberalism’s constitutive entanglements 
with global imperialism.8 Isaiah Berlin’s proud claim that the paradigmatic French 
liberal “opposed paternalism and colonialism…no matter how benevolent” has yielded 
to a new consensus that, in Jennifer Pitts’s words, Tocqueville “embrace[d] 
imperialism as a kind of national salvation” because it provided a source of greatness, 
and for Tocqueville, “Greatness and liberty were mutually necessary.”9 If 
Tocqueville’s “susceptibility to the notion of national glory as a substitute for political 
virtue” contradicted other cardinal values he held, it was nevertheless consistent with 
the overriding importance he placed on politics.10 His belief that “European nations 
could escape from the selfishness of individualism only by undertaking great tasks,” 
Melvin Richter argues, meant that “his argument for colonialism was essentially 
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political, rather than economic.”11 It was in the name of political liberty at home that 
Tocqueville solicited a “higher politics of patriotic grandeur” abroad.12 Imperial 
politics offered an antidote to bourgeois society’s pettiness and mediocrity by 
vivifying public interests and consolidating a democratic political culture. During the 
1840s, Tocqueville would insist on this claim like a catechism. 
 Given how frequently scholars have observed Tocqueville’s attachments to 
glory, it is surprising that they have yet to connect that attachment to the form violence 
took in Algeria: total war. To be sure, scholars have acknowledged that Tocqueville’s 
surprising assent to colonial violence is rooted in his obsession with glory. But rather 
than explaining how that obsession shaped the form that violence took in the colonies, 
they have instead puzzled over whether Tocqueville’s liberalism is compatible with 
his nationalism. Textual justifications for violence are marshaled as evidence that, 
when forced to choose between the two, Tocqueville “placed nationalism above 
liberalism; the interests of ‘progressive’ Christian countries above the rights of those 
that were not.”13 As a consequence, Tocqueville’s justifications of violence are 
described as motivated by contextual factors, more “apologetics” than “objective 
argument,” and a regrettable means to the higher ends of national interest.14  
 However, what is so striking about Tocqueville’s colonial writings is not that 
he justified violence. A wide range of strategic justifications were readily available for 
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that. What calls for explanation is instead a more specific and troubling problem: how 
could the demands of glory justify total war and exterminationist violence? How could 
the realities of Bugeaud’s terror be praised by Tocqueville as “a war conducted ably 
and gloriously”?15 After all, the path connecting a normative justification of 
colonialism to total war was anything but self-evident during the 1840s. The agrarian, 
property-based settlerism preferred by the French was designed as an “enlightened” 
alternative to colonialism based on chattel slavery. Settlerism proposed to break the 
necessary link between colonialism and institutionalized violence as was practiced in, 
say, the French Caribbean. That was why liberals like Tocqueville saw no 
inconsistency in advocating for slavery’s abolition while defending colonization in 
North Africa. Even more, when settlerism turned out to demand its own patterns of 
violence, it did not involve the traditional conflicts that generated glory, namely, two 
armies fighting on behalf of sovereign nations equipped with equivalent claims to 
right. That classical image of warfare bound martial glory to “humanizing combat as 
much as possible, minimizing its destructive force, and treating the defenseless—
women, children, and disarmed enemy combatants—generously.”16 But as Tocqueville 
was well aware, French military leaders discarded these familiar conventions in the 
African war theater. From the outset of France’s pursuit of total domination in 1841, 
Bugeaud implemented “a new theory of war.”17 This new framework called for attacks 
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against enemy combatants as well as civilians and the environment which sustained 
them. There was nothing self-evidently glorious about such violence. The fact is that 
in the early years of Algerian colonization, there was no obvious path connecting the 
pursuit of redemptive glory to total war. That path had to be paved by new theoretical 
arguments. This chapter aims to unearth Tocqueville’s contributions to those 
arguments by bringing his justifications of colonial violence to the fore. It seeks to 
understand how his liberal defense of democratic liberty could be linked to the specific 
shape violence took in French Algeria—environmental, terroristic, exterminationist 
and pitiless.18 
By revisiting Tocqueville’s Algerian writings, I argue that the link connecting 
Tocqueville’s glory to Bugeaud’s terror was rooted in the specific ways he and other 
French intellectuals conceived popular glory in postrevolutionary France. For the 
generation that came of age during and after Napoleon— “the savior of the 
Revolution”—glory was best exemplified in defensive public action. After all, 
national memory had immortalized the revolutionary wars of liberty (1792-1802) as 
defensive struggles on behalf of the peuple and the patrie. Even if that conceit was a 
transparent alibi for expansionary ambitions, the commemorative odes to collective 
glory they inspired were sincere. Revolutionary glory lived off of a national fantasy of 
persecuted republican universalism, under siege by a tyrannical world. In that fantasy, 
terror was always justified through a defensive framing of popular agency. As 
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Robespierre had argued, “We should strike terror not into the hearts of patriots or 
unfortunates, but into the dens of foreign brigands where the spoils are shared and the 
blood of the French people is drunk.”19 The salutary effects of the Terror and the wars 
of liberty were therefore linked to the belief that “the people” could only find salvation 
if they concentrated their agency in a mighty act of defense on behalf of family, 
nation, and universal liberty. There was no greater glory—indeed, no greater claim to 
sovereignty—than that. 
For imperial aggression to appear glorious within the terms of this 
revolutionary legacy, colonialism in Africa would somehow need to be construed as 
an example of republican defense. It would need to be considered as much a protective 
maneuver for France as a cruel exercise of its state prerogative. Tocqueville’s writings 
on Algeria sought to offer just such a description. In his essays and policy memoranda 
on colonization, Tocqueville blurred the line between a war of imperial aggression and 
a patriotic defensive war by portraying the entire Arab people, including their 
environment and their mores, as culpable for the war’s initiative. What the French 
confronted in the Regency of Algiers, Tocqueville suggested, was not a foreign army, 
but an enemy population. In so claiming, Tocqueville encouraged readers to focus on 
war’s inevitability and heroic agency of the professional soldiers who endured it. 
These rhetorical strategies helped reimagine colonial aggression as republican self-
defense. They implied that by simply being in Africa, the Armée d’Afrique was 
“vulnerable” to barbaric Arabs roaming the desert, decapitating virtuous French 
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citizen-soldiers willy-nilly. Just as Jacobins imagined the first Republic’s territorial 
expansion in continental Europe as a defensive battle against the tyrannical world, 
Algiers could be imagined as an oasis of civilized liberty caught in a defensive battle 
amid a desert of barbarism. For all of its shortcomings—and Tocqueville believed 
there were many—the colony’s mere existence expressed a struggle to protect the 
French nation against obsolescence and oblivion. 
Yet once the pursuit of national glory invited Tocqueville to imagine the 
Algerians and their environment as an omnipresent enemy combatant, French 
exterminationist violence found a convenient justification. Bugeaud could defend his 
terrifying “seas of fire” in realist terms, as pragmatic and strategically compulsory: 
“Gentlemen, you don’t make war with philanthropic sentiments. If you want the end, 
you have to want the means.”20 In this way, the qualities that made glory a source of 
public liberty in Tocqueville’s eyes also helped justify terror in Algeria. The paragon 
of French liberalism was driven to excuse colonial violence, not only by contextual 
pressures, but also by the demands of glory. It was a view of glory, Tocqueville 
argued, without which democratic atomization in France could not be checked. 
The chapter begins by explaining why glory appealed to Tocqueville. Against 
prevailing interpretations, it argues that Tocqueville’s passion for glory should be 
seen, not as an aristocratic anachronism, but as a product of postrevolutionary 
scientific debates over voluntarism. In these debates, the passion for glory, grandeur, 
and greatness pointed to the human capacity to transcend utilitarian reasoning for the 
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public interest. For that reason, Tocqueville appealed to glory as a psychological 
antidote to the July Monarchy’s decadent social state and democracy’s atomizing 
effects on the French social body. After describing how Tocqueville turned to national 
glory to provide a vector for modern social cohesion, the chapter turns to his colonial 
writings to analyze how he believed “we shall be able to raise a great monument to our 
country’s glory on the African coast.”21 By describing what I gloss as “the demands of 
glory,” I describe how Tocqueville worked to blur the lines between a lopsided, 
terroristic war in Algeria and a defensive war on behalf of liberty, property, and 
civilization. I focus in particular on the way his call for an African monument to 
national glory enjoyed the corroboration of key historical allusions to classical 
antiquity and the Napoleonic wars of liberty. I conclude by drawing out the 
implications of Tocqueville’s rhetorical strategies for the form violence took in the 
Maghreb, especially the infamous razzia.  
It can be easy to assume that the appeal to a language of redemptive, 
regenerative violence was the provenance of the French left. Millenarian revolutionary 
violence is often seen as the exclusive possession of Jacobinism and its sequels in 
1830, 1848 and 1871. However, by attending to the surprising ways that a French 
liberal like Tocqueville, too, appealed to such violence, we can begin to understand 
the extensive appeal such violence held across ideological divides. How can “the 
people” be constituted with a social cohesion that transcended the mere aggregate of 
individuals, the prerequisite for society to rule itself? Tocqueville obsessed over this 
                                                
21 Alexis de Tocqueville, “Second Letter on Algeria” (1837), in Tocqueville, Writings on Empire and 
Slavery, 14-26, at 24. 
  88 
question and appealed to violence as means of social reconstitution, underscoring how 
fundamental this problem was in postrevolutionary France. Republicans of all 
stripes—whether Jacobin, socialist, or liberal—would turn to terror to refound society 
in the age of democracy. 
The Psychology of Social Disintegration: Tocqueville’s Diagnosis in Context 
Tocqueville’s diagnosis of his democratic age grew out of a liberal republican 
tradition forged in post-Terror France. From Benjamin Constant to the Doctrinaires, 
that tradition found itself responding to society’s dissolution in the age of democratic 
revolutions. Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard, a leading Doctrinaire and mentor to 
Tocqueville, would popularize this diagnosis as the “atomization” of society in a 
speech to the Chamber of Deputies in 1822.22 In many ways, liberals in France 
confronted the same problem encountered by Jacobins in 1792. As I argued in chapter 
one, the French revolution had abolished “the social” because eighteenth century 
intellectuals had identified its corporatist form as an obstacle to individual liberty. 
Social obligations imposed by family, church, and guild conflicted with the rights of 
man and his capacities for improvement. For the Jacobins, this revolutionary attack on 
the social spurred them to refound the social bond on new, modern grounds (nature) 
and to design a language of popular agency appropriate to those grounds. 
 To be sure, liberal republicans had no taste for the Jacobin answer to 
atomization. Yet they did not draw from the Terror the conclusion that a robust 
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conception of “the social” was incompatible with modern liberty, as their physiocratic 
predecessors had once claimed. Instead, they distinguished between ancient and 
modern liberty to remap the relationship between politics and society. Their efforts 
drew on contemporary developments in French scientific thinking: the rise of 
sociological and anthropological theories of kinship; the ascendance of the 
comparative historical method; new organic conceptions of society which displaced 
the probabilistic conceptions of the eighteenth century; and the displacement of natural 
law theory by psychology and political economy as the premier sciences of society. In 
other words, the postrevolutionary origins of French liberalism intersected with the 
invention of modern social theory, and that fact stamped the former with an abiding 
scientific interest in society’s holism and its mechanisms of self-reproduction like 
kinship, education, habits, and moral regulation.23  
As liberal republicans, thinkers like Sieyès, Germaine de Staël, and Benjamin 
Constant prioritized modern liberty. Andrew Jainchill explains that such a 
commitment entailed “the conviction that ‘the social’ took precedence over ‘the 
political.’ ‘Society,’ ‘commerce,’ ‘public opinion,’ or some other such figuration of 
the social would come first, and thus politics would reflect, rather than shape, a prior 
social reality.” Yet as liberal republicans, they believed that modern social cohesion 
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nevertheless depended on “an active commitment to politics itself, or ‘the political.’”24 
Unlike Anglo-American liberalism which exchanged social cohesion for the 
equilibrium of conflicting private interests, liberals in France maintained that there 
could be no “people” without a common interest to unite them. It was why the liberal 
paper Le National could complain that “Deprived of all moral unity, profoundly 
indifferent to the general interest, broken up and reduced to powder like the sand of 
the seas by the most narrow egoism, the French people is a people in name only.”25 In 
the French political tradition, peoplehood depended on individuals identifying with the 
general interest. At times, that belief would lead liberals to endorse nationalism. 
Constant would in fact become an early supporter of Napoleon Bonaparte; Sieyès 
would help engineer the latter’s coup d’état. If Bonapartism’s reality soured their 
attitudes to the First Empire, liberals in France nevertheless believed that they, too, 
needed to produce an account of social cohesion appropriate to modern democratic 
France. French liberalism therefore has to be seen as a tradition responding to the 
democratization of the social.26 
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Like others liberals of his generation, Tocqueville was also anxious about these 
transformations. His visit to America with Gustave de Beaumont in 1831 provided 
him his first major occasion to diagnose democratization’s causes and consequences. 
In Democracy in America (1835, 1840), he joined other engaged intellectuals in 
observing that the rising equality of conditions brought with it égoïsme or la société en 
poussière. Since the Restoration, socialists like Saint Simon had identified egoism as 
an anti-social, acquisitive disposition fostered by industrialism and market 
competition. For them, egoism pointed to the breakdown of social solidarity, or what 
was often glossed as “the social question.” Tocqueville also understood that material 
forces were partly responsible for contemporary social atomization. As an aristocrat, 
he was particularly preoccupied with the abolition of primogeniture which altered the 
form of the social in observable ways. Large traditional estates had been dissolved into 
ever smaller ones, the link between the family and its property had been severed, a 
“constant state of flux” appeared in lieu of stable social reproduction, and “the bond 
that ties generation to generation [was] loosened or broken” (DA 55-57, 484). 
Democracy in America studied how this new democratic social state reshaped 
American political culture and institutions. It aimed to identify the transformations 
such a democratic state engendered, and to educate modern democracies so as to 
preserve liberty and avoid democracy’s excesses. 
In Democracy in America, social fragmentation’s most conspicuous symptom 
was the tendency for individuals to retreat into the private sphere. In that private 
sphere, Tocqueville saw man “withdrawn into himself” and living “virtually [as] a 
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stranger to that of all others.” In that state, the connection between individual self-
interest and the public good was broken. Self-interest was reduced from a vector for 
social cohesion (“self-interest rightly understood”) to “petty and vulgar pleasures.” 
With the ties between private and general interests snapped, men may live “alongside 
[his fellow citizens] but does not see them. He touches them but does not feel them.” 
Possessing only narrow self-interest, “He exists only in himself and for himself” (DA 
818). His mind becomes “nothing more than intellectual dust, blown about by every 
wind and unable to coalesce into any fixed shape” (DA 487), or alternately, the 
“shifting, impalpable dust, on which democracy rests” (DA 54). 
The measure of egoism’s dangers depended on context. In his writings and 
private correspondence, Tocqueville observed that the consequences of equality in 
France differed from those he witnessed in America. Tocqueville’s discussions of 
egoism in Democracy in America had been surprisingly qualified. He lamented the 
atomizing conception of self-interest, but believed that mediocrity for all was 
preferable to excellence for the few. Although the equality of conditions enabled two 
unprecedented forms of domination—the tyranny of public opinion and democratic 
despotism by “an immense tutelary power”—he also suggested that, in America at 
least, equality’s effects were self-limiting in practice. Americans were led by petty 
self-seeking legislators, but those legislators were mediocre and less dangerous; there 
was less cultural genius, but more overall education to help cultivate the practical arts; 
religious passion was attenuated, but its importance to American social life was 
axiomatic. 
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Yet when his eyes turned to France, Tocqueville’s evaluation darkened. If 
narrow self-interest presented a self-moderating condition in America, it was leading 
to national decline in France. Thus, in an 1837 letter to Royer-Collard, Tocqueville 
despaired of “the sorry intrigues to which our society is delivered in our day, the 
despicable charlatans who exploit it, the almost universal pettiness that reigns over it 
and above all the astonishing absence of disinterestedness and even of personal 
interest.”27 Most notoriously, in an 1841 letter to John Stuart Mill written while France 
was embroiled in the Eastern Question, Tocqueville bemoaned the impotence and 
degeneration of France. 
I do not have to tell you, my dear Mill, that the greatest malady that threatens a 
people organized as we are is the gradual softening of mores, the abasement of 
the mind, the mediocrity of tastes; that is where the great dangers of the future 
lie. One cannot let a nation that is democratically constituted like ours and in 
which the natural vices of the race unfortunately coincide with the natural 
vices of the social state, one cannot let this nation take up easily the habit of 
sacrificing what it believes to be its grandeur to its repose, great matters to 
petty ones; it is not healthy to allow such a nation to believe that its place in the 
world is smaller, that it is fallen from the level on which its ancestors had put 
it, but that it must console itself by making railroads and by making prosper in 
the bosom of this peace, under whatever condition this peace is obtained, the 
well-being of each private individual. It is necessary that those who march at 
the head of such a nation should always keep a proud attitude, if they do not 
wish to allow the level of national mores to fall very low.28 
Readers familiar with the traditional portrait of Tocqueville as a moderate liberal, keen 
on protecting individual liberty from the extremes of revolution and nationalist 
chauvinism, may be surprised to read such bellicose words. Mill was certainly caught 
off guard. He chided the Frenchman for his immature attachments to inflated notions 
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of national pride. Yet in his private correspondence, Tocqueville was a consistent 
advocate for nationalism. “National pride,” Tocqueville wrote to Royer-Collard in 
1840, may be “puerile and boastful,” but it “is still the greatest sentiment that we have 
and the strongest tie that holds this nation together.”29 This nationalism was as 
sociological as it was political. The traditional, elitist valuation of great action had 
yielded to trivial concerns about security and well-being in France. Individualistic 
interests had displaced the passion for the common good, threatening liberty. Liberty 
was “a holy and legitimate passion of man,” and as Tocqueville explained to Jean-
Jacques Ampère in 1841, “The further away I am from youth, the more regardful, I 
will say almost respectful, I am of passions.”30 
* * * 
Tocqueville’s theoretical portrait of la société en poussière is one that places 
the accent on the psychic ramifications of the democratization of the social. For all the 
analytical importance he placed on power and property’s centrifugal dispersion, it was 
its impact on the psyche that captured his attention. In Tocqueville’s view, France had 
finally seized economic prosperity, but that prosperity concealed moral and spiritual 
stagnation. Its citizens were isolated, adrift, and deprived of the inner fortitude that 
genuine moral conviction conferred. Nor was Tocqueville immune to these effects 
himself. He complained bitterly about his loneliness and isolation, and believed 
himself born “too late,” having missed the era of great statesmanship.31 The heights of 
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political passion, such as they were known in the age of Robespierre and Napoleon, 
had been supplanted by trivial commercial interests. No wonder that in Tocqueville’s 
eyes, political life under the July Monarchy was “no more than a game in which each 
person seeks only to win,” a game populated by “actors not even interested in the 
success of the play, but only in that of their particular roles.”32 For all of its benefits, 
the equality of conditions had cheapened the meaning of politics. 
 In foregrounding equality’s consequences for the self, Tocqueville was 
adapting a major motif of his intellectual context: that moral and social development 
were mutually constitutive, and that social fragmentation called for a psychological 
antidote. Philosophically and institutionally, elite French intellectuals were in the 
midst of a revolt against the passive sensationalist epistemology of Locke and 
Condillac. Locke had famously critiqued the existence of “innate ideas” in An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding (1690). He claimed that all knowledge derived 
from sensory experience, which language organized and indexed for the purposes of 
drawing logically consistent inferences. Although Locke’s argument would ground the 
empiricist British political tradition, its trajectory was quite different in France. 
Whereas the British (and Voltaire) viewed the Essay’s argument as a triumph of 
reason over prejudice, in the 1730s, a Lockean-inspired Newtonianism appeared in the 
French academies that stressed a different aspect of Locke’s critique of innate ideas: 
reason’s inadequacy.33 If all knowledge is based on sense perception, it is not reason 
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but sensation which grounds knowledge, and if this is true, then emotions, moods, and 
irrational experiences can participate in the formation of scientific knowledge. This 
insight led to the doctrine of “sensationalism” in France, and it justified elite anxieties 
over disorders in the popular imagination: virulent masturbators, women who read 
novels, and workers no longer hemmed in by trade corporations.34 
 Tocqueville was involved with the critique of sensationalism by both 
intellectual temperament and personal filiation. He was acquainted with Victor 
Cousin, the foremost French philosopher of the mid-nineteenth century and 
sensationalism’s greatest critic. A normalien (unlike the socialists of the Ecole 
polytechnique), Cousin had been recruited to the circle of Doctrinaires by Royer-
Collard. He eventually succeeded the latter as a philosophy professor at the University 
of Paris. Cousin was institutionally powerful. He served on the Council of Public 
Instruction under the Restoration, and with his supporters, he set the agenda for 
philosophical research and curricula for generations of students. Moreover, his 
lectures on the history of philosophy were considered major events among the French 
educated public. His influential program of “eclecticism” would provide the major 
precursor to the political Bergsonism of the 1890s.35 
Cousin criticized Locke’s sensationalism for yielding a conception of the 
psyche that was fragmented and passive. As a tabula rasa limited to receiving sense 
impressions, the Lockean self resembled an inert vessel reproducing within the mind 
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fragmentary sensations impinging from without. “It is certain,” Cousin conceded, that 
“upon the first examination of consciousness, we perceive a succession of phenomena 
which, decomposed into their elements, may be traced back to sensation.”36 He 
insisted, however, that “if everything in man is reduced to sensation, then everything 
is reduced to enjoyment and suffering; avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure would be 
the sole rule of our conduct… This system is that of the Sensual school.”37 Criticizing 
sensationalism was no mere philosophical quibble for Cousin. Sensationalism posed a 
problem for liberty because it unraveled the notion of a volitional self. Its portrait of 
the psyche (passive, fragmented, ruled by sensations) analogized to the social 
fragmentation brought about democratic modernity. There was a reciprocal relation, in 
other words, between the psychic and the social: sensationalism was a philosophy of 
mind adequate to an age of democratic disintegration. 
For these reasons, a philosophical critique of the Lockean subject in the name 
of a new philosophy of personhood was needed to repair French social cohesion.38 
Cousin sought to provide this new postrevolutionary self by “demonstrating that 
personality, the ‘me’ is eminently free and voluntary activity; that this is the true 
subject, and that reason is no less distinct from this subject than sensation and organic 
impressions.”39 Cousin proposed to rescue the rational, volitional self from 
sensationalism by demonstrating that certain experiences like the inner will “clearly 
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had no source in perception.” They were instead “volitional facts,” essentially 
psychological, and “which sensation by no mean explains.”40 Thus, one needed to 
deduce a pre-social self, an a priori moi, defined by its willing activity. By discovering 
this voluntarist moi as the starting point of psychology, philosophy could offer a new 
psychic anchor—the unified, voluntarist self—for modern democratic societies. 
Nothing less than liberty itself was at stake. As he explained in Fragmens 
Philosophique, 
Retain the will within itself, let it act without any external manifestation; let its 
free determinations not depart from the inward sanctuary; do not seek to mark 
your volition by sensible effects, and you will then be wholly enfranchised 
from the material world; your life becomes completely spiritual; you have 
ascended to the source of true activity… To place ourselves beyond the 
conditions of sense, to will, without regard to the consequences of our will; to 
will, independently of every antecedent of every consequent; to rest our 
determinations upon themselves; this is true liberty, the commencement of 
Eternity…41 
Cousin’s point was that Lockean sensationalism had robbed philosophy of its capacity 
to conceive of the “moral personality,” the inner will without which moral agency 
would not exist. Since there were good reasons to reject sensationalism, Cousin 
believed that French philosophy now had to reconstruct the links between reason, 
sensation, and experience in ways that brought back the possibility of a unified moral 
personality. At a broad level, these claims intersected with the French liberal belief 
that “the power of the people was above all a sociological and moral power, not an 
institutional one.” As Lucien Jaume has explained, liberal republicans believed society 
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was “a moral personality” rooted in a set of unexamined and widely shared beliefs.42  
Tocqueville was acquainted with Cousin and his work. He was only a degree 
removed from Cousin and his associates. He also held Cousin’s writing in high 
esteem. Years later, he would chastise Arthur de Gobineau for not appreciating the 
intellectual achievements of his contemporaries, asking, “what better writer than 
Cousin” was there in France?43 It is thus not surprising that in the second volume of 
Democracy in America, Tocqueville dedicates several sections to explaining 
skepticism’s deleterious consequences on social cohesion. After all, besides defending 
the voluntarist moi or personalité, Cousin was preoccupied with denouncing the ways 
sensationalism led to skepticism (“To limit philosophy to observation [of sensations] 
is, whether we know it or not, to place it in the path to skepticism”).44 In those 
sections, Tocqueville identified the sensationalist epistemology of the seventeenth 
century as a force that “destroyed the empire of tradition, and overthrew the authority 
of the master” (DA 485). If individuals believed only what their senses revealed to 
them, they would lose access to “a certain number of ready-made beliefs” without 
which “men may still exist, but they will not constitute a social body.” (DA 490). For 
society to exist, it needed to be “held together by certain leading ideas,” drawn “from 
the same source,” and which gave it a distinctive moral personality. Without shared 
moral commitments “there is no such thing as society, for what is a group of rational 
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and intelligent beings held together solely by force?” (DA 272). Readers of 
Democracy in America would have had little trouble connecting Tocqueville’s 
discussion of skepticism to wider debates over sensationalist epistemology’s socially 
disintegrating effects. 
 More than Cousin, it was François Guizot who taught Tocqueville that 
reconstituting the social depended on a psychological antidote.45 Guizot was an 
esteemed historian, Doctrinaire, and Minister of the Interior under Louis-Philippe. In a 
series of lectures on the history of European civilization in 1828—the same year as 
Cousin’s famous Sorbonne lectures on the history of philosophy—Guizot developed 
an influential theory of government and historical progress. Known for advocating 
“liberalism through the state,” Guizot and Cousin were close.46 Together with Royer-
Collard, the two intellectuals were involved in the circle of Maine de Biran, a 
philosopher dedicated to theorizing voluntarism. They worked together as the 
principal voices of the journal Le Globe before it transferred to Saint-Simonians. 
Importantly, Guizot also taught Tocqueville: from 1828 to 1830, the latter travelled 
from Versailles to Paris each week to attend the historian’s lectures on European 
civilization. In fact, Guizot’s History of Civilization in Europe was the only book 
Tocqueville requested upon landing in America. He and Beaumont carried it with 
them as they travelled, using its categories to frame their observations. 
 In these lectures, Guizot offered an historical version of Cousin’s argument. He 
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claimed that societies in stagnation could possess material prosperity without 
civilizational progress. That was because civilization was much more than a collection 
of social facts. It consisted, rather, in “two elements,” social progress and moral 
development.  
it [civilization] subsists on two conditions, and manifests itself by two 
symptoms: the development of social activity, and that of individual activity; 
the progress of society and the progress of humanity. Wherever the external 
condition of man extends itself, vivifies, ameliorates itself; wherever the 
internal nature of man displays itself with lustre, with grandeur; at these two 
signs, and often despite the profound imperfection of the social state, mankind 
with loud applause proclaims civilization.47 
Guizot was at pains to emphasize that the “social development and the moral 
development” of Europe must be seen as “closely connected together,” as possessing 
“so intimate and necessary a relation between them” that they “reciprocally produce” 
one another.48 Even so, the two aspects were not always synchronized. Uneven 
development explained why even in societies riven by social instability, humanity 
could nevertheless “[stand] forth in more grandeur and power.” So long as there was 
moral progress, societies could produce grandeur through men who “live and shine in 
the eyes of world.”49 
 In defining civilizational development along two interdependent axes, Guizot 
proposed a synthetic historical method. He explained progress through the interplay of 
the inner, moral life of individuals and their objective social conditions. Civilizations 
existed at the intersection of these two domains, just as men (according to Cousin) 
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“live…on the confines of two separate kingdoms [inner freedom and outward 
necessity], of which we form the mysterious union.”50 For Guizot, that interplay made 
regeneration possible. Just as Christianity had “regenerated the moral man,” equality 
of conditions had “changed and regenerated society” as it now addressed itself “not to 
the internal man, but to his external condition.”51 In Guizot’s view, even socialists who 
critiqued liberalism because it “[did] not regenerate…the moral, the internal state of 
man,” were tacitly agreeing to his definition of civilization. From the standpoint of the 
providential movement towards equality, there was no doubting that “the regeneration 
of the moral man by Christianity” was bound up with “the regeneration of the social 
state,” namely democracy.52 
To a French intellectual listening to Cousin and Guizot in the late 1820s, two 
related implications would have stood out. First, as Guizot argued, if moral and social 
regeneration “reciprocally produced” one another, then social regeneration would have 
to pass through the regeneration of the people’s inner moral life. Second, as Cousin 
claimed, if that inner life was not the passive subject of sensationalism but a unified 
volitional power, then moral regeneration would require engineering contexts in which 
that volitional moi could be cultivated. The people would need to relearn how “to will, 
independently of every antecedent of every consequent.” Put simply, in the intellectual 
context in which Tocqueville entered politics, if a psychological antidote to la société 
en poussière suggested itself, it probably looked a good deal like glory. 
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* * * 
Tocqueville’s taste for glory, greatness, and grandeur were well known. It was 
a motif sustained across decades of writing. In an 1840 letter to Beaumont, he 
reminded his friend, “You know what a taste I have for great events and how tired I 
am of our little democratic and bourgeois pot of soup.”53 Sixteen years later, he would 
paraphrase Guizot in lamenting that however “wealthy, sophisticated, attractive, even 
impressive” a democratic society might be, without freedom, it would not have “great 
citizens, still less a great nation.”54 Tocqueville was so keen on greatness that, despite 
his antipathy to despotism, he came to respect Napoleon. He extoled to Paul 
Clamorgan the emperor’s grandeur, calling the general “the most extraordinary 
being…who has appeared in the world for many centuries.”55 In an unfinished study of 
the French Revolution, he would add in praise that Napoleon knew how “to direct 
enthusiasm” to “[make] people die in battle.” Unlike Tocqueville’s own effete 
generation, Napoleon understood that “high passion [was] always needed to revivify 
the human spirit, which otherwise decays and rots. It would have never occurred to 
[Napoleon] to make hearts and spirits concentrate merely on their individual 
welfare.”56  
Tocqueville’s critics and biographers have characterized this obsession with 
glory as an anachronistic predilection, an antique attachment “transferred” to France’s 
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nascent democratic society.57 This characterization suggests that Tocqueville’s 
attachment to greatness was foreign to his liberal republicanism. It also implies that 
Tocqueville sought to transplant glory into democracy wholesale. Yet both 
insinuations are misleading. Reducing Tocqueville’s pursuit of glory to an 
anachronism participates in a familiar strategy of disavowal, recently criticized by 
historians of French colonialism, that “effectively protects an idealized republicanism 
[or liberal republicanism] by pointing to its supposed violation rather than exploring 
its actual operation.”58 It posits glory as intrinsically premodern, vindicating liberalism 
of national chauvinism and its consequences by definitional fiat. Similarly, to suggest 
Tocqueville transplanted glory into democracy wholesale misunderstands the nature of 
his attachment to it. Tocqueville never suggested that aristocratic glory could coexist 
with the equality of conditions. Aristocratic glory was tied to individual feats of 
heroism, to which democracies were disinclined by nature. Although Americans 
appreciated it when the occasion arose, the sentiment did not come easily. 
 Rather than invoking a defunct notion of aristocratic heroism, Tocqueville 
appealed to a new type of glory adapted for the democratic social state. This glory was 
collective, republican, and rooted in the pursuit of the general interest. Its magnitude 
reflected the people’s capacity to expand their sense of self-interest to encompass that 
of the public weal, an act Tocqueville sometimes called a “rational form of patriotism” 
(DA 269-70). It was an expression of the people acting as a collective moral 
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personality rather than a collection of private individuals. As I will soon suggest, it 
was also surprisingly Bonapartist. 
Tocqueville described some of the features of democratic glory in his analysis 
of public monuments in America. Comparing the public monuments of old Europe 
with those in America, he observed that American monuments differed from the 
former’s in both form and function. “Nowhere do citizens seem more insignificant 
than in a democratic nation. Nowhere does the nation itself seem greater or make a 
vaster impression on the mind.” Thus, where aristocratic monuments drew attention to 
the heroic individual or courtly grandeur, democratic greatness found its subject in the 
people qua the state: “In democratic societies man’s imagination shrinks when he 
thinks of himself and expands without limit when he thinks of the state.” That was 
why Americans who were otherwise self-seeking nevertheless “nurse[d] gigantic 
ambitions when they turn[ed] their attention to public monuments” (DA 536). Just as 
Rousseau’s citizens rediscovered their natural liberty in civic form through the state, 
Tocqueville believed modern citizens bereft of individual heroism could rediscover 
their greatness in the state’s monumental reflection. If public monuments were 
decorative or ornamental accoutrements to royal power under absolutism, in 
democracies, public monuments were essentially pedagogical instruments of self-
awareness. They provided a means for the people to glory in their own agency. In 
memorializing the state, they paid homage to themselves. 
Tocqueville acknowledged that this expansive, public, and collective glory 
could threaten the local liberties he prized. A culture of public monumentality is only a 
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short step away from unfettered statism. Yet Tocqueville believed the risk for 
democratic glory had to be taken. In times of democratic and social disintegration, “we 
must make up our minds and dare to choose between the patriotism of all and the 
government of a few” (DA 272). Discovering occasions for the people to exercise their 
political will was pressing. For France to weather democratization’s atomizing effects, 
its natural inclinations needed to be guided towards values “immaterial to a certain 
degree” and passions that  “[raise] souls above contemplation of private interests.”59  
Tocqueville convinced himself that French liberals could fulfill this 
pedagogical project. The coming of democracy was like a great biblical flood. The 
task of modern liberalism was not to dam that flood, but to pave a path to salvation 
and redemption. “Democracy!” he wrote in his preparatory notes for Democracy in 
America, “Don’t you notice that these are the waters of the flood? Don’t you see them 
advance constantly by a slow and irresistible effort?... Instead of wanting to raise 
impotent dikes, let us seek rather to build the holy ark that must carry the human 
species over this ocean without shores.”60 Tocqueville therefore did not pursue glory 
because he was an aristocrat (though he was). He pursued it because he was a modern. 
He was a student of the latest philosophical and scientific debates in French 
intellectual life, and those debates shaped his attachments to glory. Like a catechism, 
he juxtaposed his attachment to regenerative glory to modern instrumental reasoning. 
He detested French socialism’s “rehabilitation of the flesh,” which amounted to 
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Lockean sensationalism run amok.61 He complained of utilitarianism, writing “Is it not 
obvious to you that belief everywhere is giving way to reasoning and sentiment to 
calculation?” (DA 274). Speaking of slavery’s abolition, he called for it to “be seen as 
the product of passion and not the result of calculation.”62 He fulminated to Royer-
Collard that “Reason has always been for me like a cage that keeps me from acting, 
but not from gnashing my teeth behind the bars.”63 This recurring voice belonged to a 
liberal searching for emancipation from cramped bourgeois interests by a passion for 
public liberty. 
If equality of conditions was a providential flood, then we can read 
Tocqueville’s appeals to glory as his holy ark. Modern liberty thereby became 
dependent on the pursuit of glory. In his marginalia on public monuments in America, 
Tocqueville scribbled that “in democracies the State must take charge of large and 
costly works not only because these large works are beautiful, but also in order to 
sustain the taste for what is great.”64 His prescription was clear. If democratic citizens 
were to overcome psychological withdrawal, the state would need to foster a taste for 
glory, even if doing so was economically imprudent, maybe even because it was 
economically imprudent. For the sake of man’s inner regeneration, the French state 
needed to provide an opportunity for its citizens’ utilitarian self-interest to grow into a 
volitional self capable of great public acts. In between the publication of Democracy 
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in America’s two volumes, Tocqueville nominated one such opportunity: “The future 
seems to me to be in our hands, and I shall tell you sincerely that with time, 
perseverance, ability, and justice, I have no doubt that we shall be able to raise a great 
monument to our country’s glory on the African coast.”65 
The Glory of the Armée d’Afrique 
 There were already hints that Tocqueville might turn to colonization in pursuit 
of French glory. In Democracy in America, Tocqueville observed that the greatest 
public monument to the people was the one illuminated by the fires of war and 
combat.  
…a man facing urgent danger rarely remains as he was: he will either rise well 
above his habitual level or sink well below it. The same thing happens to 
peoples. Extreme peril does not always impel a nation to rise to meet it; it is 
sometimes fatal… In nations as well as individuals, however, it is more 
common to see the very imminence of danger act as midwife to extraordinary 
virtues. At such times great characters stand out as a monument hidden by the 
dark of night will stand out in the illumination of a blaze. Genius no longer 
shuns the light, and the people, struck by the perils they face, forget for a time 
their envious passions (DA 228) 
An allusion to the anachronistic ideal of chivalrous glory through combat? Perhaps. 
But in light of Tocqueville’s claim that “the same thing happens to peoples,” 
contemporary readers should consider whether such allusions are really so intrinsically 
aristocratic. Political theory in the age of democratic revolutions was just as 
susceptible, if not more so, to linking violence to regeneration, war to social cohesion, 
as early modern thought.66 More than any other activity, it was in war that people 
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could feel their freedom, not as atomized individuals, but as a people. Tocqueville 
certainly believed this to be true. If only the French were “struck by the perils they 
face,” they could reawaken to their own collective agency seemingly forgotten in the 
face of decadent economic self-satisfaction. 
 Tocqueville’s suggestion that the people’s greatness might be disclosed in the 
face of urgent danger, just “as a monument hidden by the dark of night will stand out 
in the illumination of a blaze,” connects him in surprising ways to what Nancy 
Rosenblum has called “romantic militarism” and whose exemplar was popular 
Bonapartism.67 There was no question that Napoleon Bonaparte’s rule had been 
authoritarian and illiberal. That was why postrevolutionary liberals in France cut their 
teeth in opposing his First Empire. Yet as a political culture, Bonapartism articulated a 
different set of values. The latter grew out of the historical memories of the 
revolutionary and imperial wars of liberty. It functioned as a revolutionary political 
language that lionized the volontaires, soldiers who sacrificed their individual interests 
for the general interest of national salvation. Indeed, despite the coercive realities of 
military conscription, in the Bonapartist imagination, the volontaire was a subject 
defined by his free will. We might say that if the acquisitive, utilitarian person 
described the subjectivity adequate to philosophical sensationalism, the volontaire was 
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the analog for Cousin’s definition of liberty (“to will, without regard to the 
consequences of our will”). As a voluntarist anchor for social cohesion, the volontaire 
pointed to an entire vision of the nation.  
 Although this political culture appealed most to outright Bonapartists, by the 
time of the July Monarchy, popular Bonapartism had grown into a generic language of 
political dissent that foregrounded popular virtue, egalitarianism, selfless sacrifice for 
the patrie, an expansive suffrage, and the glory of common, ordinary men. It became 
“a left-wing code word,” even “a manifesto for political freedom and the elimination 
of privileges associated with the Ancien Régime.”68 Even if Bonapartism continued to 
name a specific party affiliation, its normative representation of democratic violence 
appealed across ideological divides because it offered something much more: “a 
renewable legacy and the basis of a truly national culture.”69 
1840 provided an opportunity to assert just such a vision of the French nation. 
That year, France commenced its aggressive program of settlement and domination in 
Algeria. Tocqueville and Beaumont immediately made plans to visit Africa to study its 
society, much as they had already done in America. After some initial delays, 
Tocqueville finally left for Algiers with Beaumont from Toulon on 4 May 1841, 
landing in Algiers three days later. The two travelled the region for a month, 
interviewing General Bugeaud, his subordinates and local Arabists. They had planned 
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to stay for another month, but Tocqueville was struck with dysentery, and the two 
returned prematurely to Toulon on the eleventh of June.70 
 Already before his trip to Algeria, Tocqueville studied second hand reports of 
the Maghreb. He drafted a raft of essays that criticized contemporary anticolonial 
arguments and designed an argument for a French civilizing presence in the regency. 
However, after his trip with Beaumont in 1841, his attitude towards colonization 
hardened. Where he had once advocated for peaceful racial integration “to form a 
single people from two races,” after 1841 Tocqueville became a prominent proponent 
of differentiated legal systems and the violent conquest of indigenous populations.71 
He turned his visit’s notes into a series of effective reports on all aspects of French 
colonial policy and Algerian society. Tocqueville would make a second investigative 
trip to Algeria again in 1846 as part of a delegation from the Chamber of Deputies. 
Again, he traveled with General Bugeaud and his officers. By the end of the 1840s, 
Tocqueville had become one of France’s foremost experts on “the Algerian question.” 
As a member of the government, he served on numerous parliamentary commissions 
which had a direct hand in guiding French foreign policy in the former regency. 
From the beginning, Tocqueville saw the Algerian question as a question 
concerning national glory. With the withdrawal of the Ottomans in 1831, the various 
indigenous communities, from Moorish to Kabyle, fell into disarray. Algeria was like 
a “newborn society whose naturally unstable elements have a particular need to be 
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held firm and stable.” This was especially true after a decade of haphazard French 
rule. If Algeria was to chart a different path from its Caribbean counterparts hollowed 
out by resource extraction, it would need a proper society. Alas, French rule had only 
made society in Algeria more arbitrary and disorganized. As Tocqueville complained, 
“the truth is that there does not yet exist in Africa what Europeans call a society. The 
men are there, but not the social body.” 72 
When it came to proposing a solution, Tocqueville departed from the British 
ideology of indirect rule in India. Instead of conscripting metropolitan-educated 
natives to run the colonial government, Tocqueville recommended France “replace the 
former inhabitants with the conquering race.”73 The technique for doing so was two-
pronged: domination and colonization. Domination entailed systematic violence, the 
destruction of indigenous homes and harvest, and raids on Arab communities to 
disintegrate any preexisting tribal cohesion. Colonization named the “constructive” 
prong. Spearheaded by institutions like the bureaux arabes, the French state would 
consolidate the rule of law, centralize government, offer language instruction and 
professional advancement for civil administrators, regulate property titles, and provide 
basic capital for new settler families to plow their land. Where other French leaders 
recommended each prong separately or in sequence, Tocqueville insisted the two be 
pursued concurrently. “Colonization and war…must proceed together,” and only 
through this double approach could a reconstituted social body be forged.74  
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 Undoubtedly, a “realist policy” occasionally motivated Tocqueville.75 
Tocqueville did not believe domination was an end in itself. He simply accepted that it 
was impossible to settle French citizens without territorial expropriation, and that 
meant “domination is the necessary means we must use.”76 Tocqueville admitted, 
almost as an aside, that he was “quite hostile to violent measures,” but reminded his 
readers that “we must recognize that we shall never manage to possess the land around 
Algiers without the aid of a series of such measures.”77 
At the same time, Tocqueville’s recommendations revealed a second voice. 
Domination was not only justified as a means for territorial expropriation. It also 
became a demand of glory itself, which became the overriding principle of French 
geopolitical expansion. Glory, national grandeur, and international prestige were first 
principles. They expressed values superior to and independent of economic desiderata, 
“great in themselves.”78 The first sentences of Tocqueville’s 1841 memorandum on 
Algeria, written after he returned from his first trip, were unequivocal on this point. 
I do not think France can think seriously of leaving Algeria. In the eyes of the 
world, such an abandonment would be the clear indication of our decline 
[décadence]… if France shrank from an enterprise in which she faced nothing 
but the natural difficulties of the terrain and the opposition of little barbarous 
tribes, she would seem in the eyes of the world to be yielding to her own 
impotence and succumbing to her own lack of courage. Any people that easily 
gives up what it has taken and chooses to retire peacefully to its original 
borders proclaims that its age of greatness is over. It visibly enters the period 
of its decline [déclin].79 
These claims anticipate the social theories of decadence and degeneration that would 
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preoccupy the liberals of the Third Republic. France could not abandon Algeria, 
irrespective of its material costs, for that would jeopardize its prospects for grandeur. 
Tocqueville was unambiguous in declaring this reason the “foremost in [his] view” for 
African colonization. In a remarkable admission, Tocqueville even conceded that if 
Algeria flourished, it would become a competitor to metropolitan markets. So much 
the worse, then, for bourgeois interests at home.  
I know that metropolitan commerce and industry will protest that we are 
sacrificing them; that the principal advantage of a colony is to provide an 
advantageous market for the mother country and not to compete with it. All 
this may be true in itself, but I am not moved by it. In the current state of 
things, Algeria should not be considered from the commercial, industrial, or 
colonial point of view: we must take an even higher perspective to consider 
this great question. There is in effect a great political interest that dominates all 
others.80 
However peculiar these pronouncements may sound, they were not isolated polemics. 
Tocqueville reiterated these claims in his most famous speech as an expert on the 
Algerian question. Delivered during an 1846 debate over a special funding request for 
the colony, Tocqueville chastised his fellow parliamentarians for their fussy objections 
over Algeria’s enormous economic costs. Algeria, Tocqueville argued, was “the 
country’s greatest task,” an enterprise “at the forefront of all the interests France has in 
the world.” Yet “once I thought that the government, or rather the men in the 
government who put their hearts above their politics…would want to go abroad to 
create a great theatre for their glory.” “I believed it,” Tocqueville mourned, “and if this 
supposition was once founded, perhaps it still is… But, Gentlemen, what I once 
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believed, I now doubt.”81 
 The subordination of economic concerns to the primacy of politics 
characterized Tocqueville’s entire approach to French colonization in North Africa. 
That approach ought to be seen as a kind of antidote to la société en poussière at 
home. France needed to create “a great theatre for [French] glory,” whatever the 
economic cost. It was a commitment so unconditional that he remarked that France 
could only abandon Algeria “at a moment when she is seen to be undertaking great 
things in Europe.”82 France would either find glory in Africa or in Europe, but under 
no circumstance was she to surrender the pursuit of glory altogether. 
This voice in Tocqueville, keen on colonial domination’s regenerative effects, 
did not contradict his liberalism. It grew out of French liberalism’s emphasis on the 
reciprocal relation between the psychic and the social, the inner moral life of man and 
the social state of the people. Whereas social republicans would eventually weaponize 
that insight to construct a “social economics” of solidarity in the Third Republic, 
liberals like Tocqueville pursued the means to regeneration abroad. Only in 
conquering Algeria would France join the other European powers in partaking in the 
greatest source of glory in democratic modernity: “Something more vast, more 
extraordinary than the establishment of the Roman Empire is growing out of our 
times, without anyone noticing it; it is the enslavement of four parts of the world by 
the fifth. Therefore, let us not slander our century and ourselves too much; the men are 
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small, but the events are great.”83 In creating “a vast theatre where [Frenchmen] will 
come to play out tragedy or comedy, according to the stamp of their character,” the 
French followed the British, for whom, according to Tocqueville, India provided a 
“sense of greatness and power…to the whole people” and “A flash of brilliance that 
reflects back on the entire nation.”84 Like the public monuments of America, French 
citizens would be able to rediscover their collective agency, indeed their peoplehood, 
in the public monument that was Algiers, its glistening white edifices reflected in the 
African coastal skyline. 
* * * 
There was an obvious problem with Tocqueville’s desire to transform Algeria 
into a theatre for French glory: there was nothing at all glorious about exterminating 
indigenous peoples. He admitted as much, in both Democracy in America when he 
decried the extermination of Native Americans and in 1847 after the conquest of 
Algeria was an accomplished fact: “Let us not, in the middle of the nineteenth century, 
begin the history of the conquest of America over again.”85  
We might put Tocqueville’s problem this way. Tocqueville was committed to 
erecting in Algeria a monument to national glory as a matter of first principle. That 
commitment framed his observations and motivated his recommendations for colonial 
administration. But the conception of democratic glory passed down from the 
revolutionary wars of liberty—a conception to which he was compelled to speak as a 
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political thinker—placed specific demands on war. Foremost among those demands 
was that war be waged in the name of national defense and on behalf of persecuted 
liberty. Volontaires did not fight wars of aggression motivated by chauvinistic self-
interest. Instead, they fought defensive wars where citizens were called to protect the 
most general interest of all: national defense. It was only in the process of 
transcending individual interest for the patrie en danger that, in a rite of self-
abnegation, men seized glory. 
Within the terms of this romantic militarism, the realities of colonial warfare in 
Algeria could not have been considered glorious. Even the soldiers of the Armée 
d’Afrique acknowledged this fact. In the years following Bugeaud’s appointment in 
Algeria, many soldiers died from malnutrition, alcoholism, and exhaustion, but only 
upwards to a hundred or so soldiers actually died in combat in any given year. In 
contrast, the number of Algerians killed, often directly through massacres like those at 
the caves of Dahra, exceeded tens of thousands. The sheer mismatch in the scale of 
violence was so apparent and indisputable that to call colonial domination a “war” in 
the first place seemed farcical.86 Thanks in part to the normalization of slaughter, rape, 
and looting, the Armée d’Afrique developed problems with suicide. Jean-de-Dieu 
Soult, the French Minister of War and Guizot’s colleague, became sufficiently 
concerned with the poor optics of French colonial terror that he worked diligently, if to 
futility, to redact the violence from the regular military bulletins published in 
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metropolitan newspapers.87 
In such a context, how could French thinkers like Tocqueville square the 
practice of colonial warfare with the demands of glory? What could justify 
Tocqueville’s description of Bugeaud’s terror as an example of “a war conducted ably 
and gloriously”? Charles X’s Restoration government had solved this dilemma by 
analogizing the conquest of Algeria to the Christian Crusades.88 According to the 
King’s addresses to the Chambers of Deputies on the eve of the 1830 invasion, 
conquering Algiers would be a victory for enlightened Christendom against oriental 
despotism. Ecclesiastical leaders echoed his claims. From the pulpit, they proclaimed 
the African invasion to be a Crusade against Muslim infidels, and they circulated short 
histories of the Crusades as propaganda.89 The mobilization of the Crusades had a 
specific ideological aim: the allusions transformed imperial aggression into a source of 
glory by identifying aggression with Christian evangelism. 
 Tocqueville was unsympathetic to these royalist strategies. He had already 
criticized the proactive pursuit of military glory as an example of “the coldest, most 
calculating” spirit (DA 320). Thus, Tocqueville chose to square the realities of colonial 
terror with the demands of glory in a different way: he reimagined colonial aggression 
as a war of national defense. Specifically, he shifted the source of initiative to the 
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indigenous population and away from French soldiers. The latter were thereby 
transformed back into heroic volontaires selflessly enduring harsh war conditions in 
Africa. Put simply, Tocqueville brought the realities of colonial war closer to the 
normative representation of violence provided by the French revolutionary tradition. 
He helped draw the attention of French readers to a defensive portrait of their 
collective agency, thereby meeting in more satisfactory ways the demands of glory. 
 Interpreting Tocqueville’s colonial writings this way helps us reconcile 
otherwise conflicting expository strategies in his Algerian memoranda. Tocqueville’s 
policy recommendations in Algeria, after all, justified colonial violence in two 
different ways. He would often blame colonial terror on Abd-el-Kader, “a sort of 
Muslim Cromwell” who was building an anti-imperial army among Arabs who were 
in principle capable of peaceful coexistence with the French.90 Just as often, however, 
he would argue the opposite by blaming “Moslem civilization” itself for the war. 
Algerian culture was one driven ineluctably towards war by its religious zeal, against 
which the French were compelled to defend themselves. 
These two justifications point to conflicting accounts of indigenous culpability 
for the war. But they both rhetorically reassign initiative to indigenous populations and 
away from French. They therefore imply that the Armée d’Afrique stood in a position 
of defensive retaliation. Cheryl Welch is surely correct to argue that Tocqueville’s 
rhetorical mode in these memos is not methodical philosophical argumentation, but 
apologetics.91 But it is also important to see how these apologetics were not ad hoc. 
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Instead, they shared the common rhetorical ambition to frame French military agency 
in defensive terms. 
 Let me turn to the first strategy concerning Abd-el-Kader. Tocqueville was 
well aware that the communities that populated Algeria were heterogenous and held 
conflicting interests and values. “Although the tribes that compose the Arab 
population of the Regency have a single language and fairly similar ideas and 
customs,” he admitted, “their interests differ prodigiously, and they are deeply divided 
by old hatreds.”92 If they possessed any unity prior to France’s invasion, it was a 
flimsy product of Ottoman rule, a “center where so many divergent rays met.”93 
According to Tocqueville, if Algeria had remained in this state of fragmentation, it 
might have been possible to minimize coercive violence or to peacefully colonize the 
region by developing shared interests between the two races. He wrote in one of his 
1837 essays, for example, that the indigenous communities living in the mountains, 
the Kabyles, were “a prosaic and interested race who worry far more about this world 
than the other, and that it would be much easier to conquer them with our luxuries than 
with our cannon.”94 In fact, after the French conquered the region a decade later, 
Tocqueville again proposed peaceful co-existence with with Arabs and Kabyles. 
Although full integration was implausible, a kind of bond between the French and 
Africans could be fostered a new “community of interests.”95 In an extraordinary act of 
ideological misrepresentation, Tocqueville even suggested that a commitment to 
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private property provided one such shared interest. However different the two races 
might be, Arabs possessed a latent, almost secret belief in the sanctity of private 
property that could be uncovered through careful consideration of their rituals of 
ancestral worship and memorialization.96  
 Why then was this peaceful route barred for much of the 1840s? According to 
Tocqueville, the ascendance of Abd-el-Kader had dashed the prospects for peaceful 
colonization. He was “convinced that before Abd-el-Kader’s power developed, it was 
possible” for the French to rule the region “without exactly waging war but only 
stirring up the Arabs’ passions and setting them against one another.”97 But with Abd-
el-Kader’s rise, waging war against the entire population had become compulsory. The 
emir had risen to power amid the social anarchy unleashed by the expulsion of the 
Ottomans. Deprived of the supports provided by “old habits of obedience” or 
“superstitious respect,” Abd-el-Kader found himself compelled to unite the warring 
Arab tribes through a Machiavellian process of emulating their religion passions (“he 
constantly hides behind the interest of the religion for which he says he acts”).98  
Although these unification efforts resembled that of Muhammad and the first 
caliphs, Tocqueville believed its true precedent lay in Europe’s own political 
development.99  
Such is the secret of his power; it is not difficult to understand, for what Abd-
                                                
96 Tocqueville, “First Report on Algeria,” 140, 144-45. 
97 Tocqueville, “Essay on Algeria,” 69. 
98 Tocqueville, “Essay on Algeria,” 64: “In order to turn these people to advantage, one must either 
destroy the tribal divisions in their hearts or excite in all the tribes at once a common passion that will 
hold them together artificially and violently, despite the vices of their social organization that are 
constantly dividing them.”  
99 Tocqueville, “Essay on Algeria,” 64. 
  122 
el-Kader is attempting is not new in the world. These half-savage African 
countries are now undergoing a social development very much like that which 
took place in Europe at the end of the Middle Ages. Abd-el-Kader, who has 
probably never heard of what happened in fifteenth-century France, is acting 
toward the tribes precisely as our kings, and in particular Charles VII, acted 
toward feudalism.100 
Abd-el-Kader’s European semblance was one of Tocqueville leitmotifs. It implied that 
the emir’s actions were in some way foreign to Muslim culture. The emir “gave [his] 
battalions a European organization, an organization powerless against our own, but 
that made him master of his countrymen.” His method of nation building was “quite 
new among the Arabs… he is the first who took from his contact with Europe the 
ideas that would make his own enterprise similarly durable.”101 By weaponizing 
European techniques of centralization, Abd-el-Kader “stands at the head of a united 
army that can fall on those who would betray him, at any moment and upon the least 
suspicion.”102 Thus, the French were compelled to wage war. The hope of fostering a 
community of interest had to be deferred until the Muslim Cromwell was defeated.  
 This argument implies that culpability for the war lay, not with the French 
invasion, but with Abd-el-Kader’s initiative. Without his Machiavellianism, 
indigenous tribes would be more receptive to creating a community of shared interests. 
The Armée d’Afrique, in turn, is tacitly portrayed as having been backed into a 
defensive position. No choice remained but to destroy Abd-el-Kader’s unified army 
through terror. Only total war could persuade local communities to abandon Abd-el-
Kader by raising the costs of allegiance to prohibitive thresholds.  
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 This conclusion, however, pushes in the opposite direction of another 
argument Tocqueville makes to justify colonial violence: France could have adopted a 
peaceful method of colonization and racial integration. Unfortunately, unlike other 
colonial powers in Europe, the French were dealing with a region predisposed to 
violence for cultural and social reasons.  
But it can be said nonetheless that for quite a long time—we cannot know how 
long—domination of the Arabs will be onerous. This is because of the social 
organization of this people, their tribal organization and nomadic life, 
something we can do nothing about for a very long time, perhaps ever. Very 
small, nomadic societies require great effort and expense to be held in an order 
that will always be imperfect.103 
 
In this scheme, total war was demanded, not by a Machiavellian prince, but by 
indigenous “culture” itself. The distinctive qualities of the Algerian social state made 
it impossible for the French to rule the region without domination. Indeed, Tocqueville 
even suggested that no matter who led the region, that leader would always be 
compelled to wage war on France for these cultural reasons. 
Unlike the Kings of Europe, an emir does not rule over individuals who can be 
kept down by the social force at the prince’s disposal. Rather, he governs tribes 
that are completely organized little nations, which cannot normally be guided 
except in the direction their passions lead. But the Arab tribes’ passions of 
religion and depredation always lead them to wage war on us. Peace with 
Christians from time to time, and habitual war, such is the natural taste of the 
populations that surround us.104  
Thus, the enemy is not Abd-el-Kader, but something intrinsic to the social state of 
Arabs. Their zealotry places them beyond the bounds of reasonable discourse. Even if 
France had wanted to avoid war by creating a community of interests, Arabs would 
have never permitted them to settle in peace. For Arabs, war against the French is 
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expressivist rather than strategic. It articulates their values and religious orientation. 
Indeed, Arabs are not even retaliating against a French invasion. They are simply 
playing out their cultural esprit, their principle of peoplehood. As Tocqueville forced 
himself to conclude, “To flatter ourselves that we could ever establish a solid peace 
with an Arab prince of the interior would, in my view, be a manifest error.” That was 
because “the permanent state of such a sovereign would be war with us, whatever his 
personal inclinations might otherwise be, and whether he were as pacific by nature or 
as fanatical in his religion as one could imagine.”105 Leaders of Algerian communities 
are simply ciphers of culture. They express, but cannot manipulate or redirect, the 
social state of those they rule. Ergo, the French must fight fire with fire. They must 
wage total war and destroy the enemy civilization, for as a matter of culture, Arabs 
will never surrender of their own volition. Since their barbarism stems from something 
below the level of politics or institutions, it is like a natural disaster that the French 
cannot prevent. “There is no way to know when the war will end,” Tocqueville 
admitted. “Domination over semi-barbarous nomadic tribes, such as those around us, 
can never be so complete that a civilized, sedentary population could settle nearby 
without any fear or precaution. Armed marauding will long outlast war itself.”106 And 
so his prescription was domination without end, demanded by indigenous culture 
rather than French values. 
 Although Tocqueville put forward conflicting accounts of indigenous 
culpability for the war, we can make sense of his apologetics if we interpret them as 
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part of a larger effort to assign initiative to the conquered, and to deflect it, however 
partially, away from the conquerors. From the perspective of understanding why, 
exactly, the French must wage total war in Algeria, the two arguments pull in 
opposing directions. But from the perspective of assigning aggressive and defensive 
agency, or of assessing culpability for the war, they pull in the same direction: 
culpability lay with Algerians.  
This defensive fantasy played out unvarnished in Tocqueville’s diary entries of 
his visit. In them, he observes a harsh environment in which anyone, even a civilian 
like Tocqueville, could be at risk of decapitation. That may have been true. But it is 
hard not to notice that Tocqueville believed barbaric Algerians were at fault for this 
rather than the terroristic French presence. He lauds Algeria as “a promised land,” 
only to add, “…if one didn’t have to farm with gun in hand.” He complained of his 
own anticipated beheading multiple times, observing the “Superb road…that one 
cannot follow more than three leagues without being beheaded,” “blockhouses beyond 
which one could not walk without risking one’s head,” “Bougie. Very picturesque 
town…We are enclosed there as if in a sentry box, from which we can’t stray even a 
rifle shot away without risking our heads.”107 In an almost tongue-in-cheek follow-up, 
Tocqueville remarked that “Still, in the past several months, two shipwrecked crews 
were not assassinated. They were returned for ransom, but after having been 
circumcised and raped.”108  
It is unclear if Tocqueville was ever really in danger. It is more likely, as some 
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scholars have suggested, that like most colonists, Tocqueville’s own travel 
experiences unfolded at both the level of reality and fantasy.109 As Tocqueville 
travelled along the Barbary Coast, he was also traversing an imaginary geography 
sensationalized in the travel literature of early nineteenth century France. This was a 
fantasy of an environment intrinsically hostile to civilization, populated by Arabs 
murdering travelers without discretion, and in which a French citizen would only dare 
to explore if fortified with extraordinary courage. Even the grueling environment, 
heat, and desert conspired against the French. Indeed, one can almost hear in 
Tocqueville’s personal journal mild angst over unwarranted persecution. 
By shifting the sense of initiative away from the French army, Tocqueville 
invites his readers to reimagine French colonial aggression in defensive terms, just as 
the volontaires of the Revolution “defended” French republicanism against the 
retrograde monarchism of European powers—nevermind that it was the Republic, and 
not Europe, that instigated the expansionist revolutionary wars of liberty. If these 
apologetics amounted to sheer ideology, Tocqueville did not seem to mind. After all, 
as he once admitted, since in democracies “it is no longer possible to aim for 
greatness, one seeks elegance and and prettiness instead. One strives not so much for 
reality as for appearance” (DA 534). 
* * * 
Tocqueville’s defensive portrait of colonial aggression drew on, and enjoyed 
the corroboration of, the larger political culture of French colonialism. If he was 
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unique in his direct participation in colonial administration, his arguments nevertheless 
recapitulated familiar tropes of that culture. Indeed, French metropolitans were 
obsessed with the defensive nature of African war. Visual representations of the 
Algerian conquest, for example, were structured around Napoleonic motifs that 
emphasized the war’s defensive character. Horace Vernet had portrayed the battle for 
Constantine in just that way in his Première campagne de Constantine (1837) [fig 8]. 
Vernet was one of the most preeminent painters of military battles under the 
Restoration and July Monarchy. A member of the official artistic establishment, his 
technique was known for its aspiration to scientific accuracy and visual realism. In 
Première campagne de Constantine, he used that realism to draw a contrast between 
the familiar defensive line formation of the revolutionary and Napoleonic armies and 
the guerilla combat of Arabs. In the painting, French soldiers are illustrated on the 
defense. Their shoulders are locked together as brothers in arms. Confronting them is 
an aggressive and guerilla melee force, attacking almost haphazardly. However, 
despite its “scientific” visual style, its image of colonial violence was enormously 
misleading by the 1840s: Bugeaud’s war in Africa was itself a form of guerrilla war. 
The general’s most important military innovation consisted in organizing the French 
army around “flying” mobile columns that contrasted sharply with Napoelon’s slow-
moving infantry units saddled with complex supply chains. Bugeaud’s units were 
mobile, fast, and deadly. They did not need supply lines because they subsisted on the 
spoils of razzias against indigenous encampments. In other words, after 1840, 
Vernet’s representation of the conquest of Constantine would have redirected the 
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[fig 8: Horace Vernet, Première campagne de Constantine (1837), Anne S. K. Brown Military 
Collection, Brown University] 
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[fig 9: Pellerin Publishing House, Epinal Print, “Défense héroïque de Mazagran” (1840).  
Bibliothèque nationale de France, département Estampes et photographie] 
spectator’s attention away from the realities of Bugeaud’s techniques of total war by 
monumentalizing a defensive battle as if it were exemplary or generic. 
Nor were these defensive tropes limited to the state’s official visual culture. 
The most famous instance of “defensive” colonial war, of which Tocqueville was 
certainly aware, was the 1840 “Heroic Defense of Mazagran.” Metropolitan 
citizensoften viewed this siege as a founding legend of the Algerian war. The legend 
describes how thousands of Arab soldiers assailed a small detachment of 123 French 
soldiers under Captain Lelièvre at their outpost at Mazagran from February 2-6. 
Miraculously, “the 123” successfully endured the siege for four days until a sortie 
from Mostaganem rescued them.  
It is unlikely that such an event really happened, or at least in the way that the 
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myth described. Nevertheless, reports of the “Heroic Defense of Mazagran” grew into 
a sensational craze in France. It became a familiar object of depiction in painting, 
verse, and print culture. Importantly, it also became the subject of the popular Epinal 
print series published by the Pellerin publishing house—the very publisher that played 
such a crucial role in recrafting Bonapartism into an egalitarian and democratic 
political culture [fig 9].110 Besides its apparent focus on national defense, the 
composition of Pellerin’s print of the Mazagran siege emphasizes the numerical 
difference between the two armies: thousands upon thousands of Arab soldiers 
attacking a single outpost protected with a mere 123 soldiers. This lopsided 
representation exaggerated and inverted the reality of French colonial warfare. More 
often than not, the thousands-strong attack forced raiding small settlements belonged, 
not to Arabs, but to the Armée d’Afrique. Jean Adolphe Beauce’s Défense héroïque du 
capitaine Lelièvre à Mazagran (1842) brings together these Epinal tropes with the 
classical line formation [fig 10]. Beauce’s subject, too, is defensive French glory: 
heroic volontaires enduring an attack by a numerically superior enemy force. In short, 
the “Heroic Defense of Mazagran” was cited, time after time, “as living proof that the 
warrior ethos of the Napoleonic era lived on in contemporary French men.”111 
The legendary status of the “Heroic Defense of Mazagran” escalated to such 
world-historic importance that the French public occasionally analogized Captain 
Lelièvre and the 123 soldiers to Leoniadas and the Spartans at Thermopylae. As is 
well known, Leonidas the Spartan King led 300 soldiers to defend the small pass at  
                                                
110 Day-Hickman, Napoleonic Art, 48-83. 
111 Sessions, By Sword and Plow, 155. 
  131 
 
[fig 10: Jean Adolphe Beauce, Défense héroïque du capitaine Lelièvre à Mazagran (1842)] 
Thermopylae in 480 BC. By sacrificing themselves to defend the pass against many 
thousands of Persians, the 300 created an opportunity for the larger Greek army to 
retreat. Leonidas and the 300, in other words, are the archetypical myth of glorious 
national defense on behalf of the people and the patrie. It communicates the belief that 
a volunteer army, even a tiny one, will always possess more strength than its mere 
numbers suggest. Unlike the barbaric Persian throngs led by Xerxes, Leonidas’s 
Spartans are fortified with virtue, discipline, and the spirit of self-sacrifice. 
In the early 1820s, the French were enthralled with Spartan example because 
of the Greek War of Independence. Thanks to the latter, a powerful philhellenic 
movement appeared in France, and it even involved prominent liberals like Benjamin  
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[fig 11: Jacques Louis David, Léonidas aux Thermopylae (1814) 
Constant. It was a vicarious identification already beautifully illustrated by Jacques 
Louis David’s painting of Leonidas at Thermopylae from 1814 [fig 11]. David was a 
Jacobin and a Bonapartist (the two affiliations shaded into one another). In Léonidas 
aux Thermopylae, he brought together his neoclassical painting style with Napoleonic 
visual motifs.112 In the top-right corner, the worldly possessions of the Spartans are 
being carted away before the final battle; they will not be needed after the Spartan 
soldiers win immortal glory. In the top-left corner of the painting, a soldier is etching 
into the mountain pass Leonidas’s final message: “Go tell the Spartans, traveler / That 
here obedient to their laws we fell.” The 300’s glory lay in surrendering their “natural” 
instinct for well-being to the sacrificial, “social” law of national salvation. For 
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Tocqueville’s post-revolutionary generation, Leonidas’s example offered a kind of  
civilizational and founding mythology that connected Sparta to France, Leonidas to 
Napoleon—and the Armée d’Afrique. 
As if to fulfill Tocqueville’s request “for a great monument to our country’s 
glory on the African coast,” the French state answered the Mazagran craze by 
proposing a public monument to commemorate the 123. The city of Algiers and 
Louis-Philippe’s press opened a subscription to collect funds for the monument. Under 
a commission led by Marshall Gérard—a veteran of the Napoleonic wars—the 
government proposed to build the monument on the Champs Elysées, to complement 
other monuments to Napoleonic glory like the Arc de Triomphe and the Hôtel des 
Invalides. Marshall Gérard even modeled the monument’s design after its Napoleonic 
precedents: it was to be a column, like the Vendôme, made of Roman ruins salvaged 
in Algeria. Although funding shortages led the state to scrap the enormous monument 
in favor of a smaller one at the site of Mazagran itself, the original proposal for the 
public monument suggested that France sought to “bring the symbols of French 
colonial domination to the heart of Paris and give material form to the analogies drawn 
between the Algerian and Napoleonic armies in popular culture.”113 
Tocqueville was therefore far from alone in performing the ideological work of 
reimagining the conquest of Algeria through historical allusions to antiquity and the 
Napoleonic wars of liberty. The memorialization of events like the “Heroic Siege of 
Mazagran” popularized precisely those imaginary historical links. It taught French 
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citizens—Tocqueville included—to imagine the war in Africa as a defensive war for 
civilization and against barbarism, not unlike the revolutionary wars of liberty. 
Together with colonial political culture, Tocqueville drew attention to a defensive 
portrait of French national agency that was more consistent with the revolutionary 
tradition than with the realities of Bugeaud’s total war. It is important to not lose sight 
of that reality. Total war in Algeria consisted of terroristic raids, pillaging small tribes 
and burning their harvests to starve them. In Pélissier’s case, war also meant 
asphyxiating indigenous tribes in caves by the hundreds. Tocqueville’s memoranda on 
Algeria may read like a sober, technical report analyzing a complex governmental 
project. In reality, it was a work of ideology. Tocqueville’s demand for an African 
monument to French glory ought to be read as a call to connect the new practice of 
war in Algeria to the normative representation of political violence inherited from the 
French revolutionary tradition: defensive, patriotic, and democratic. 
Thus, in the end, it did not matter whether the war found its cause in Abd-el-
Kader’s Machiavellian machinations or something intrinsic to Arab “culture.” It did 
not matter because the point was never to understand with much precision why war 
was necessary. At stake was something more important: identifying French colonial 
aggression as a defensive war on behalf of liberty and civilization. Rather than small, 
inconsequential tribes, the enemy was an implacable barbaric population. In the face 
of such an intransigent enemy, the French needed to muster all of its courage to defend 
every acre it conquered. In the wayward paths of liberal colonial ideology, 
Tocqueville’s defense of civic participation and “a rational form of patriotism” paved 
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the path to his own justification for terror in Algeria. To foster individual interest in 
public affairs at home, one needed a theater for glory abroad. To check democratic 
statism in France, one needed extraordinary projections of state power in Africa.  
Conclusion: From the Science of Politics to the Science of War  
 In the 1841 “Essay on Algeria,” Tocqueville asked, “What type of war we can 
and must wage on the Arabs”? The French liberal, known for his defense of local 
liberties and his critique of despotism, answered that the only type of war appropriate 
for Arabs was total war. Since “the war cannot be won at one blow,” no choice 
remained but to undermine the conditions of life for indigenous communities.114 
Specifically, France must “ravage the country…we must do it, either by destroying 
harvests during the harvest season, or year-round by making those rapid incursions 
called razes, whose purpose is to seize men or herds.”115 The razzia not only starved 
Abd-el-Kader’s army, but decimated the local population. It robbed them of their 
means of subsistence. In this war, civilians were fair game because nobody was only a 
civilian. All Arabs were culpable in some way for the war, whether as potential allies 
of Abd-el-Kader or as slaves to religious passions for war. Tocqueville admitted that 
his answer might shock European sensibilities, but he insisted that “If we do not burn 
harvests in Europe, it is because in general we wage war on governments and not on 
peoples.”116 In the history of political thought, this is an incredible admission. 
Although the idea of waging war on populations may be cynically familiar to 
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contemporary readers, in early nineteenth century France, waging war on an entire 
people stood far outside the accepted conventions of war. Its main precedent was the 
first Republic’s 1792 Edict of Fraternity in which France promised to “liberate” 
monarchical Europe through imperial expansion. Yet even here, Tocqueville 
radicalized that edict. What Tocqueville justified was a new application of democratic 
terror, forged in the crucible of the African theater, and which made war on an entire 
foreign people not only strategically compulsory, but glorious and regenerative.   
 Five years later, France had essentially reduced Abd-el-Kader to a weak 
guerilla force. Although resistance to French colonization would continue for 
generations to come, by 1846, Tocqueville believed Bugeaud’s method of total war 
had been successful. Victory was fragile, but France had conquered the region through 
violence. Looking back with a measure of pride, Tocqueville tried to sum up France’s 
accomplishments in the half decade since his first visit.  
Today we can say that war in Africa is a science whose laws are known to 
everyone and that can be applied almost with certainty... First, we came to 
understand that we faced not a real army, but the population itself. The 
perception of this first truth soon led us to another: given that this population 
would be as hostile to us as they are today, in order for us to remain in such a 
country, our troops would have to be almost as numerous in times of peace as 
in times of war, for it was less a matter of defeating a government than of 
subjugating a people.117 
“War in Africa is a science,” Tocqueville wrote. The reader is reminded of his 
proclamation in Democracy in America that “A world that is totally new demands a 
new political science” (DA 7). It is as if the political science Tocqueville had been 
searching for since 1831 had finally reached its conclusion in Bugeaud’s total war. 
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France had learned “the true conditions of war in Africa.” The enemy was not “a real 
army, but the population itself.”118 They had learned, not only how to defeat Abd-el-
Kader, but how to “subjugate a people” with a continuous application of violence that 
would not cease even in times of peace. 
 The implications of Tocqueville’s stance reach beyond his context. 
Tocqueville had not only discovered in his science of war the means of dominating 
Algeria. He had discovered a link connecting the liberal conception of modern liberty 
to total, redemptive violence. David Bell has remarked that something unexpected, 
and decisive, occurs in early nineteenth century history concerning “western attitudes 
towards war.” That unexpected discovery was that “the dream of perpetual peace and 
the nightmare of total war have been bound together in complex and disturbing ways, 
each sustaining the other.” What Tocqueville therefore articulated was more than a set 
of cascading justifications for violence that concluded with colonial terror. What he 
reveals is a persistent theoretical link between liberalism’s anxieties over statism and 
an enthrallment with total war, or what Bell calls the “powerful tendency to 
characterize the conflicts that do arise as apocalyptic struggles that must be fought 
until the complete destruction of the enemy and that might have a purifying, even 
redemptive effect on its participants.119 It has been easy for liberal historians of 
political thought to portray such inclinations as the exclusive possession of the left or 
of twentieth century totalitarianism. And yet, under the July Monarchy, France’s most 
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prominent and exemplary liberal succumbed to just that vision of war. As 
Tocqueville’s commitment to the primacy of politics was forced to move through 
history, to be applied in the course of actual politics, that very commitment 
transformed him into a proponent of redemptive violence.  
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Chapter III 
From the Ballot to the Barricade in the Paris Commune 
In his study on the 1871 Paris Commune, Karl Marx had asked, “On the dawn of the 
18th of March, Paris arose to the thunderburst of ‘Vive la Commune!’ What is the 
Commune, that sphinx so tentalising to the bourgeois mind?” During and after the 
event, its defenders answered that the Commune presented a breakthrough for 
democracy. Marx, for example, believed that among its many achievements, the 
Commune supplied the Republic “with the basis of really democratic institutions.” 
Unlike parliamentary republicanism, which had hitherto presented little more than a 
“joint-stock government,” the Commune’s “working existence” embodied the 
“tendency of a government of the people by the people.”1 Friedrich Engels had called 
the Commune the creation of “a new and really democratic state.”2 Marx’s daughter, 
Eleanor, claimed in her introduction to Prosper-Olivier Lissagaray’s 1886 L’histoire 
de la commune de 1871, “It is time people understood the true meaning of this 
Revolution, and this can be summed up in a few words. It meant the government of 
the people by the people.”3  
 Today, these interpretations are familiar, even self-evident. Republican 
national memory has memorialized the Commune as a monument to working class 
radicalism and a testament to the vitality of nineteenth century revolutionary 
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democracy. In 1871, however, claims like those of Marx were still controversial. 
Undoubtedly, Communards viewed their own revolution as a democratic achievement. 
Louise Michel had claimed that “the eighteenth of March could have belonged to 
allies of kings, or to foreigners, or to the people. It was the people’s.”4 But claims like 
Michel’s were made at a time when the French state portrayed the Commune as a riot 
by a criminal minority and foreign provocateurs associated with Marx’s International 
Working Men’s Association.  
They were not wholly unjustified in doing so. In the months following the 
September 1870 proclamation of the Republic, a numerical majority of Parisians often 
withheld support for the communal movement and the revolutionary socialist 
organizations which led it. Even as Paris radicalized under the siege and capitulation, 
the city’s revolutionary movements were defeated in elections, time and again, 
between September and March. Only a quarter of the electorate gave their support to 
the Republican Central Committee (the precursor organization to the Commune) in the 
November 3 plebiscite, despite Jacobin and Blanquist campaigns to convince Paris 
otherwise. A January 6 call to Paris to organize its Commune—the famous “red 
poster” proclamation—went unheeded. The February elections to the new National 
Assembly propelled monarchists and conservatives into power with the sanction of a 
national majority. Paris was virtually alone in electing radicals into the government, 
and even there, the left’s victory was uneven, concentrated in working class 
neighborhoods. In this context, Paris’s revolutionary socialist movements could not 
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presume to speak on behalf of “the people.” As Michel had once bitterly remarked, 
these “unthinking crowds” of Paris behaved like “the great herd that bares its back for 
the whip and holds out its neck to the knife.”5 If subsequent history has memorialized 
the Commune as a heroic example of popular insurrection, it has done so by eliding 
what was apparent to all at the time: its democratic credentials had to be earned rather 
than presumed. 
 How can an insurrection claim the mantle of “the people” when it has been 
refused accepted means of popular legitimation? If not through electoral means, on 
what grounds could the Commune have claimed to voice the will of the people? 
Historians and political theorists have long acknowledged that the Commune could not 
draw its democratic legitimacy from universal suffrage. Indeed, the Commune owes 
its lasting commemorative authority to its attempt to construct political authority 
outside the state’s channels. To explain how the Commune successfully secured its 
democratic credentials, however, scholars have generally turned to its associational, 
anti-statist, and participatory political culture. Like some communards themselves, 
these scholars attribute its democratic credentials to its street and club politics, at once 
below the level of the state and beyond parliamentary or electoral representation. The 
Commune’s clubs, lecture halls, vigilance committees and journals made up a rich 
political culture of direct, popular engagement independent of official venues of 
political participation. It is why the Commune remains an important historical focal 
point for conceptualizing participatory politics and popular sovereignty outside the 
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state and electoral fora.6  
It is my contention, however, that the Commune’s title to a democratic 
revolution cannot be fully explained by this associational political culture. After all, 
invoking it begs the question. In 1871, it was far from self-evident why a divisive 
movement could incarnate “the people” simply by rooting itself in direct action in the 
streets. Unlike prior revolutions which had tacitly spoken for a downtrodden national 
consensus against an aristocratic and economically powerful elite, the Commune could 
not even maintain that pretense. After 1851, that right was held by Napoleon’s 
plebiscitary dictatorship. In the autumn of 1870, it transferred to the Provisional 
Government of National Defense. In early 1871, it passed again into the hands of 
Adolphe Thiers’s national government. 
For the Commune to nevertheless claim that it voiced the will of the people, it 
needed to depart from its predecessors’ conception of a majoritarian revolution.7 As a 
result, even if the Commune drew its support from the popular classes and fostered a 
culture of direct action, more arguments are needed to explain why that could 
transform a minority movement into the will of the people. To explain the communal 
movement’s democratic credentials by invoking its culture of insurrection and direct 
action, as many scholars have done, is to presuppose what was still unsettled for much 
of the nineteenth century: whether popular insurrections articulated the will of the 
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people more faithfully than elections based on universal manhood suffrage. 
This chapter claims that, in its search for a way to express the will of the 
people in ways more authoritative than elections, the Commune called upon the 
classical language of republican war to redefine who “the people” were. It moved 
beyond incarnating a local insurrection by linking Paris’s mobilization to the 
awakening of a mythic, martial national subject. That national subject was born in the 
French Revolution and personified by the revolutionary tradition as the most concrete, 
real, and felicitous manifestation of “the people” of all: “the people in arms.”  
By “the people in arms,” I do not mean the repertoire of public contention 
familiar to scholars as politics “in the streets,” or direct action by the politically 
disenfranchised. Rather, “the people in arms” names an historically specific 
personification of spontaneous collective agency, inherited from the Year II, and 
which became a central motif of nineteenth century French republican thought.8 This 
collective subject was born on 20 September 1792 at the battle of Valmy, where it 
won a miraculous military victory against the united continental armies. Outnumbered 
and alone against an alliance of hostile European monarchs, it was nevertheless armed 
with the true sources of military strength: not numbers or strategic prowess, but 
republican unity and morality. Clad in the uniforms of the Universal Republic, “the 
people in arms” routed the nation’s enemies at Valmy against all odds. In so doing, 
they turned the course of the first revolution around, saving both the Great Revolution 
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and the First Republic. Their glorious victory that day made it possible to hold the trial 
of Louis XVI in the following weeks. Indeed, they had been responsible for striking 
down his tyranny on August 10th with a flash of their catastrophic agency. 
 My argument is that construing the true people as “the people in arms” 
provided a way to solve the Commune’s central political dilemma, namely, how to 
speak on behalf of the people without an electoral or municipal mandate. Commune 
leaders had learned the all-important lesson of the French Revolution: revolutionary 
democratic authority is rooted not in right, but action. By grounding popular 
sovereignty in the communal movement’s “culture of violence” and the “duties of 
revolutionary action,” the Commune could claim to voice the will of the people 
outside official channels of popular acclamation.9 Their appeals to the moral authority 
of spontaneous action allowed Communards to credibly institute themselves as an 
authority superior to the state. Even more, as the spontaneous incarnation of the people 
at war rather than an electorate in possession of the franchise, the Commune could 
position itself as an expression of popular will even more direct than Bonapartist 
plebiscitary dictatorship. Cannons, chassepots, and petrol conveyed the people’s will 
in ways the ballot could never do. As long as the Commune’s clubs insisted on that 
fact, they could compete with the state’s sovereignty, their actual numbers 
notwithstanding. Far from being relegated to a minoritarian movement, then, the 
Commune’s ability to embody “the people” depended on waging war; that was the 
source of its democratic standing. 
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In this respect, it is conspicuous that recent scholars have analyzed the 
Commune’s anti-statist political culture without acknowledging how the Commune 
was initially proclaimed as a war measure. Faced with a national government which 
refused to follow its 1793 predecessor in ordering the levée en masse, the 
proclamation of the Commune was foremost an anti-statist claim to Paris’s right to 
armed self-defense and universal male conscription. Its culture of civic participation 
and voluntary self-organization updated republicanism as a language of patriotic 
warfare. In both its classical and French iterations, republicanism’s veneration of civic 
virtue and public participation had always been inseparable from its commitment to an 
armed citizenry. Machiavelli had praised the armies of the Roman consuls as 
empowered by love of country while lamenting its occasional reliance on selfish 
foreign mercenaries.10 Rousseau famously insisted in his Considerations on the 
Government of Poland that every citizen should be a soldier, not by trade, but by 
duty.11 During the French Revolution, Brissot linked the Republic’s morality to war 
abroad: “War is actually a national benefit… our salvation lies that way, for strong 
doses of poison remain in the body of France, and strong measures are necessary to 
expel them.”12 
Yet despite this history, scholars like Kristin Ross have recently argued that the 
Commune “never really quite belonged to the French national fiction, to the heroic 
radical sequence of French republicanism, of which it was purported to be the last 
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nineteenth-century spasm.” Ross traces the connections between the Paris Commune 
and communal movements abroad to show how, at bottom, the Commune generated 
new ways of thinking about democracy—cooperative, internationalist, and 
ecological—that broke with the national republican tradition which preceded it and 
which would eventually destroy it. Its political culture was therefore not an inheritance 
from French republicanism, but its repudiation. Similarly, Martin Breaugh has recently 
argued that the Commune’s allusions to the revolutionary wars of liberty were 
antithetical to its radical democratic aspirations. When confronted with the 
Commune’s war measures—like its controversial decision to institute a Committee on 
Public Safety—he concludes, evasively, that such measures “betrayed” the 
Commune’s deeper, “plebeian” democratic ambitions.13  
 These prevailing accounts recuperate the Commune’s radical democracy by 
isolating it from French republicanism’s militarism. In so doing, they yield a portrait 
of the Commune as singularly preoccupied with attacking political authority. It is thus 
no surprise that, subsequently confronted with the Commune’s enthusiasm for war or 
its Committee on Public Safety, these scholars can only see a tragic betrayal of its 
democratic vision. Attending almost exclusively to the Commune’s anti-
authoritarianism, they write as if communards were uninterested in the nature and 
origins of democratic authority. On the contrary: communard critiques of the state 
were motivated above all by the desire to construct alternative sites of popular 
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sovereignty. That was the reason they turned to the language of republican war in the 
first place. Communal democracy and republican war were reciprocally dependent on 
one another, and appreciating that fact changes our understanding of the conflict 
between Paris and Versailles in 1871. The civil war appears less as a battle between 
democracy and its critics than a battle between two conceptions of peoplehood: “the 
electorate” versus “the people in arms.”  
My argument is thus more than an intervention in the historiography of the 
Commune. It aims to bring back into focus the historical entanglement between 
spontaneous democratic participation and the republican ideal of the citizen-soldier in 
France. As contemporary political theorists continue to search for ways to 
conceptualize popular sovereignty outside the arena of the state and electoral politics, 
they must also confront the fact that one of the most historically prominent solutions 
has been war. Especially in nineteenth century political thought, republican war led by 
“the people in arms” was the quintessential expression of popular sovereignty. In that 
militarism lay the Commune’s powerful appeal.  
 The chapter begins by rooting these appeals to “the people in arms” in the 
context of the industrializing 1840s, where socialists of all stripes pursued what they 
called “the Social Republic.” As the consummation of 1789’s historical trajectory, the 
Social Republic promised equality and popular sovereignty in the economic sphere. 
Even as it provided the orienting ideal for socialists from the 1840s through 1871, 
however, the means of achieving its promise of social harmony would shift in the 
intervening decades. In the lead up to 1848, French socialists hoped to win the Social 
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Republic through the weapon of universal manhood suffrage. Understood as the best 
answer to the social question, they cathected the suffrage with extraordinary religious, 
millenarian significance. Yet with another Bonapartist coup and political defeat, the 
suffrage receded as the accepted means of creating the Social Republic. Although 
freemasons, feminists, and underground republican networks continued to advocate 
for the vote, many anarchists and socialists returned instead to “the cult of the 
revolutionary tradition,” especially the historical memory of 1792-3.14  
Disillusionment with the suffrage laid the ground for the 1871 communal 
movement to eventually forego, in the face of its own electoral defeats, the idea of the 
Commune as an elected government. To complete the work of the First Republic, 
Communards would forge the Social Republic by bypassing electoral politics with 
republican war. Against the state’s atomizing, quantitative conception of “the 
electorate,” communards would incarnate the cohesive, qualitative, and spontaneous 
subject, “the people in arms.” These conceptual reorientations would justify the 
revolutionary Commune, modeled after its 1793 antecedent, and which privileged a 
mobilized, armed citizenry over an electorate as the true body of the people. I look to 
the participant accounts of Louise Michel, Prosper-Olivier Lissagaray, and Jules 
Vallès to unpack these claims. 
By approaching the Commune through the notion of “the people in arms,” my 
aim is to try to think together two things which have often been treated separately: the 
Commune’s anti-statism, and its existence as a war mobilization effort. If the 
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Commune sought to construct political authority outside the state, its success hinged 
on incarnating democratic terror’s mythic agent: the morally virtuous, concrete, and 
spontaneous “people in arms.” Lissagaray remarked after the fact that the Commune 
“was a barricade, not a government.”15 That observation is the key to grasping why the 
Commune’s politics of anti-statism was also a politics of war. 
 
The Body of the People: The Electorate and 1848  
 When Parisians considered proclaiming the commune in the fall of 1870, they 
had in mind an elected government. Modeled after its 1792 precedent, the idea of the 
Commune was synonymous with Paris’s claim to municipal autonomy, a right the city 
had been denied for the better part of the century. Yet by the following March, 
revolutionary socialists had redefined the Commune as a revolutionary government 
sustained by armed mobilization and whose authority was rooted in the extralegal, 
spontaneous agitation of the people.  
 In shifting from the ballot to the barricade, “the electorate” to “the people in 
arms,” Paris’s communal movement was both recapitulating a debate among French 
socialist republicans stretching back to the 1840s: whether universal manhood suffrage 
was capable of realizing the “social” revolution. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
French society entered into industrialization in earnest under the July Monarchy. 
Though it unfolded more slowly than its British counterpart, by the 1840s the rise of 
market competition and wage-labor had redrawn France’s demographic and economic 
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patterns. Rural male workers in particular were migrating to France’s urban centers, 
spurred by the need for temporary work in times of agricultural recession, exclusion 
from patrimonial inheritances, and family debt.16 These large-scale patterns of 
migration and social dislocation were also thought to be causally linked to urban 
squalor, sexual immorality, and poverty. France, in other words, saw the rise of “the 
social question.”17 
The social question was most often a question of poverty and inclusion. How 
can the poor be integrated into the social contract? French intellectuals gave 
competing accounts of its origins: psychological breakdown from political 
atomization, economic inequality and distributive injustice, the repression of human 
desire, a state that was too centralized, a state that wasn’t centralized enough, 
collective moral enervation, and atheistic materialism. In turn, reformers also offered 
diverse, competing answers to the question: sexual liberation, the worship of 
androgyny, intentional communities, trendy mysticisms, state-led management, and 
economic cooperation outside the state.18  
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For all these differences, however, most observers believed that the social 
question was, at bottom, a moral one. More often than not, they grasped it in 
psychological, subjective terms rather in light of a structural theory of society.19 We 
see this in their frequent appeals to a heterodox and primitive Christianity, like 
Auguste Comte’s “New Religion of Humanity,” Pierre Leroux’s “Doctrine of 
Humanity,” Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s early Christian socialism, Alphonse-Louis 
Constant’s La bible de la liberté, Alphonse Esquiros’s L’Evangile du peuple, and in 
popular representations of Jesus as a worker. Industrialism, these thinkers believed, 
was a moral crisis rooted in the disintegration of “the social,” and it called for answers 
that were at once scientific and religious.  
Henri de Saint-Simon, a wealthy aristocrat and avid social reformer, was the 
most prominent source for framing “the social question” this way. Enormously 
influential, Saint-Simon endorsed a dual technocratic and religious approach to the 
social question. On one hand, “the method of the experimental sciences should be 
applied to politics.”20 On the other, modern social theory had shown English 
liberalism’s atomized conception of society to be empirically mistaken. The latter had 
powerfully misrecognized society’s essentially corporate nature, which Christianity 
correctly grasped. “In every good national government,” he explained, “the patriotism 
which is part of each individual changes into an esprit de corps or corporate will the 
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moment the individual becomes a member of it.” “This corporate will,” according to 
Saint-Simon, provided “the soul of government, which unifies all its actions and 
harmonizes all its movements.”21 
This dual approach implied a repudiation of violence.22 It also implied that the 
reins of government—finances, law, the military, public functions—ought to be seized 
by educated elites. Most importantly, it called on social reformers to attend to “the part 
played by religious sentiment in society,” to acknowledge “the predominance of 
morality over the law,” and to proclaim “the great aim” of social policy to be 
“improving as quickly as possible the condition of the poorest class.”23 Indeed, far 
from banishing the sacred, modern society needed primitive Christianity more than 
ever to repair its corroded social bond. 
The more society progresses morally and physically, the more subdivision of 
intellectual and manual labour takes places… The result is that, the more 
society progresses, the more necessary it is that the form of worship should be 
improved; for the purpose of the form of worship is to remind men, when they 
assemble periodically on the day of rest, of the interests common to all 
members of society, of the common interests of the human race.24 
“Progress” did not replace religion with materialism; instead, it made the former more 
urgent. Answering the social question required a moral revolution that prioritized 
society and the common good. That belief led Saint-Simon to promote morality as the 
highest science of all: “there is a science much more important for the community than 
                                                
21 Saint-Simon, “On the Reorganization of European Society,” 89. 
22 Henri de Saint-Simon, “The Catechism of the Industrialists” (1823-6), in Saint-Simon, The Political 
Thought of Saint-Simon, 182-203, at 184. 
23 Henri de Saint-Simon, “New Christianity” (1825), published in Henri de Saint-Simon, Social 
Organization, the Science of Man and Other Writings, trans. Felix Markham (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1964), 81-82, 87. 
24 Saint-Simon, “New Christianity,” 103. 
  153 
physical and mathematical science—the science on which society is founded, namely 
ethics.”25 
 Saint-Simon’s arguments persuaded an entire generation of reformers. His 
religious and technocratic approach to the social question attracted wealthy, elite 
citizens, and many of them entered into important governmental positions. Famously, 
they helped industrialize Algeria, develop foreign economic and commercial policy, 
and served as architects of the Suez and Panama Canal.26 In public, the most 
enthralled members were identifiable by their uniforms: flamboyant, they zipped up in 
the back, which required another person’s aid and ritualistically enacted man’s social 
interdependence. 
Like any decent left movement, Saint-Simonism devolved into sectarian 
factionalization, from Barthélemy Prosper Enfantin’s cult of sexual complementarity 
at Ménilmontant, Etienne Cabet’s “Icarianism” (named after Cabet’s famous 1840 
utopian text Voyage en Icarie) to Charles Fourier’s phalanstères. For all of their 
differences, however, each of these splintering reform movements established their 
own paradigm of social regeneration. For Fourier, answering the social question was 
the key from evolving from “Civilization” to “Harmony” which was outlined in his 
“Table of the Progression of Social Movement, Succession and Relation of its 4 
Phases and 32 Periods.” For Auguste Comte, “disorganization” would yield to the 
sacralization of society, “Humanity as the True Supreme Being” and the Positivist 
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Church.27 For Cabet, developmental progression was plotted through revolutionary 
history, from the English Civil war to the French Revolution. For Louis Blanc, the 
task was to transcend “concurrence” into “cooperation” under the state’s expert 
leadership. In Pierre Leroux’s eyes, the transition from egoism to social harmony 
entailed an acknowledgment of the progressive interrelatedness of all life forms, 
achieved as each person was reincarnated 405 times throughout history. Still others 
appealed to new visions of technological vitalism: steam power, energy conversion, 
printing presses, energetic matter and nature worship, and (again) Mesmerism. Michel 
Chavelier, the Saint-Simonian most involved with setting French commercial policy 
abroad, crooned that “the railroad [was] the most perfect symbol of universal 
association.”28 He spoke on behalf of a generation: technological progress was to 
serve as a handmaiden for the repair of the moral, associative bases of social cohesion. 
In many ways, the apocalyptic vision of social disintegration which underlay 
utopian proposals for moral and social regeneration analogized to Jacobin anxieties 
over the ancien régime’s disincorporation decades before. Just as in 1789, the social 
bond itself appeared on the cusp of dissolution, threatened by the abstraction inherent 
to contractualist economic citizenship. As Michael Behrent has argued, these thinkers 
“occupied a distinct ideological space on the French left, defined by the conviction 
that republicanism required a far denser conception of society than that which could be 
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elicited from the social contract or individual rights alone.”29 Leroux, who coined the 
term “socialism,” put it like so: “We wanted it [the new government] to stand at the 
head of progress; and not to let society, momentarily united in heroic sympathy, 
scatter and dissolve again.”30  
* * * 
 Given the way reformers posed the social question in France, it might be 
surprising that socialists originally argued that universal manhood suffrage could 
fulfill these millenarian hopes for social regeneration. After all, the franchise—a single 
vote for a single citizen—seems to exemplify the atomism that utopian and republican 
socialists decried. However, up to and during the Second Republic, most French 
thinkers actually viewed the suffrage as a vector of socialization rather than of 
individuation. Unlike voting privately in a booth, which became common practice in 
the twentieth century, voting occurred publicly in assemblies in nineteenth century 
France. Presiding officers were nominated and selected, often by popular acclamation, 
at the beginning of electoral assemblies. Although voting happened by ballot, the 
public character of voting, and the assembly context in which it was conducted, gave 
voting an associational, even corporatist meaning. Voting was much more than a 
minimalist form of political participation. It involved articulating oneself into a 
collective body (the assembly), and to join one’s voice to its esprit de corps. In this 
perspective, voting was as much a qualitative and incorporating activity as it was a 
                                                
29 Michael C. Behrent, “The Mystical Body of Society: Religion and Association in Nineteenth-Century 
French Political Thought,” Journal of the History of Ideas 69, no. 2 (2008): 219-43, at 220. 
30 Andrews, Socialism’s Muse, 3. 
  156 
quantifying and individuating practice. 
This perspective on the suffrage appealed to figures across the spectrum of 
republican socialism. Alexandre Ledru-Rollin, editor of La Réforme and one of the 
most visible leaders of the left, endorsed the suffrage as key to social republicanism. 
An advocate for the right to work, Ledru-Rollin ran for the presidency in 1848 and 
would later briefly join the 1870 Provisional Government as its most left-leaning 
cabinet member. Louis Blanc, a statist like Ledru-Rollin and the most important 
republican socialist of the 1840s, agreed. For Blanc, the suffrage was indispensable for 
“double reform,” or the simultaneous pursuit of political and social reform. Outlined 
in his 1840 L’organization du travail, which sold by the thousands and enjoyed five 
editions by 1848, Blanc called for the state-led reorganization of work to counteract 
competition’s punitive effects: individualism, familial breakdown, and civil war. Like 
Saint Simon, he believed “industrial reform” required “a profound moral revolution,” 
one that would “bring about in one day more conversions than all sermons of 
preachers and all speeches of moralists could in a century.31 And yet Blanc, so 
resolutely technocratic, nevertheless defended universal suffrage as a means to the 
Social Republic. In an 1850 letter, he took his stand: “Universal Suffrage or civil war: 
that is the choice.”32  
To Ledru-Rollin and Blanc’s left were journals Le representant du peuple. 
Founded and initially edited by Charles Fauvety, Le representant du peuple 
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formulated its agenda around a revision of Sieyès: “What is the producer in today’s 
society? Nothing. What should he be? Everything.” (In the shadow of the June Days, 
this slogan was edited on August 9th to read: “What is the capitalist? Everything. What 
should he be? Nothing.”) Like utopian socialists before him, Fauvety dedicated the 
magazine “to you, O People! Universal producer!”33 At the end of August, the journal 
was rebooted as Le peuple, and the editorship passed to Proudhon. It also added a new 
slogan, “Division of Functions, Indivisibility of Power.”  
Fauvety and Proudhon despised Blanc. And yet, until 1848, they shared his 
enthusiasm for universal manhood suffrage. Le peuple published on 2 September 1848 
“the Manifesto of the People.” In it, the editorial team reiterated their millenarian 
hopes attached to the suffrage. “The People have called for the democratic and social 
Republic,” the text proclaimed, and that meant calling for monogamous marriage 
(“inviolable and sacred”), the veneration of art and science (which were given “a new 
signification”), and the defeat of materialism and atheism. Readers needed to 
understand that the 1848 revolution was more than a change of government. It also 
disclosed the transcendent within man and the sacred within society. 
Yes, we want revolution: but make no mistake. Religious, for us, is not 
symbolic: it contains within it the symbolic word. To discover the true religion, 
it is necessary to begin our exegesis, to show philosophically and with the aid 
of new social data, the supernaturalism in nature, heaven in society, God in 
man. That is when civilization will appear to us as a perpetual apocalypse, and 
history as a miracle without end.34 
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This apocalyptic vision of social revolution, according to Le peuple’s editorial 
team, was perfectly consistent with, and even required, “the organization of universal 
suffrage: with royalty, this suffrage is merely a lottery.” It was an extraordinary 
perspective on the suffrage’s unifying and exalting power, dramatically echoed at a 
banquet on 17 October. There, the leaders of the French left gave toasts to their ideals. 
Leroux, Proudhon, and Cabet were all in attendance. At 4 o’clock and under a banner 
that read, “Democratic and Social Republic; Liberty, Equality, Fraternity; the Right to 
Work; Abolition of the Exploitation of Man by Man,” a worker, Citoyen Charpentier, 
toasted to universal suffrage. 
Citizens, friends and enemies know that the day when the right to the vote was 
acquired by all [men] was a grand day on earth and in the heavens. It was as if 
a divine trumpet had announced to tyrants that their reign had come to an end, 
and that the reign of God had begun… Brothers, let us be united; tighten our 
ranks; the end of the great drama approaches!...  
To the universal vote, the image of heavenly lightning placed into the 
hands of men to pulverize and reduce all aristocrats into nothing!  
To the universal vote, a living whip that servants have seized to hunt 
down their incapable and indignant masters! 
To the universal vote, which permits us to clutch to our breasts this cry, 
symbol of the future: 
Vive le République démocratique et sociale!35 
Charpentier was followed by Proudhon (“Greetings to you, Revolution! I serve you, as 
I have served God, as I have served Philosophy and Liberty, with all of my heart, all 
my soul, all my intelligence and all my courage, and never will any sovereign rule 
other than you!”) and a Citoyen Morel (“Yes, citizens, to the family! But to the family 
perfected and purified of contamination! To the family based on love, on this pure and 
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divine love which, spiritualizing man, elevates him to indefinable regions of felicity 
and happiness!”) One could be forgiven for confusing this revolutionary banquet 
toasting universal manhood suffrage for a religious revival. 
* * * 
 The fate of 1848 is well known. The Second Republic was declared in 
February, and universal manhood suffrage extended the next month. With the 
franchise enlarged, the republic elected its first and only president, Louis Napoleon, 
handing him an enormous popular mandate. Immediately, his political repression of 
the left began in earnest with the conservative “Party of Order”: the President banned 
the Marseillaise, invited the clergy back into secondary education with the Falloux 
Laws, and intensified press censorship. Blanqui was jailed, and both Blanc and Ledru-
Rollin went into exile. To break the power of the Left, the president briefly restricted 
the franchise again in May 1851, only to restore it with his coup d’état on December 2. 
It was a clever maneuver. Twelve days after universal manhood suffrage was restored, 
the president organized a national plebiscite which returned support for his 
government by ten to one. The following year, the Republic would officially be 
replaced by the Second Empire upon the president’s crowning as Emperor, to popular 
acclamation. The revolution was defeated by the politics of democracy itself.  
The events were a turning point for the history of the French left. As Marx had 
bitterly remarked, “Universal manhood suffrage seems to have lasted just long enough 
to make its own testament in the eyes of the world and to declare in the very name of 
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the people: ‘What’s worth building is worth demolishing.’”36 It is difficult to 
understate the philosophical defeat Bonapartist plebiscitary dictatorship presented for 
democracy in France.37 Napoleon III’s coup not only brought down the Republic, but 
did so to popular enthusiasm. The Empire enjoyed its legitimacy from universal 
manhood suffrage and the democratic theory cultivated in the decades before 1848. 
Given the millenarian and redemptive power that socialists and republicans had 
assigned to the suffrage, Napoleon’s coup could only appear as a direct expression of 
popular sovereignty. His election appeared to transcend the mediation of political 
representation. As Marx put it, unlike individual representatives who “merely 
represents this or that party, this or that city, this or that outpost…He is the elect of the 
nation, and electing him is the trump card which the sovereign people plays once 
every four years.” As a result, his election embodied the height of direct democracy. 
Unlike the elected assembly which “stands in a metaphysical relation to the nation,” 
Marx lamented, “the elected president stands in a personal one…the president is the 
spirit of the nation incarnate. As opposed to the assembly, he has a kind of divine 
right, he is president by the people’s grace.”38 As Marx understood, Bonapartism was 
a crisis for the left precisely because it was a democratic, even revolutionary 
phenomenon. Its world-historic precondition was the belief in “the people” as the 
ultimate source of political authority. 
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With Bonapartist plebiscitary democracy, the redemptive promise of universal 
manhood suffrage no longer enjoyed widespread enthusiasm. The coup defeated both 
the republican regime as well as the political visions which had been gradually forged 
in the 1840s. Alongside the closing of Blanc’s National Workshops, a grave defeat to 
the working class, the coup also defeated the millenarian meaning of electoral popular 
sovereignty. Social republicans were encouraged to abandon the terrain of electoral 
politics and to adopt “social” solutions to the social question. Blanc’s famous 
argument for “double reform” no longer convinced. 
 As often happens in the history of political thought, conceptual innovation 
grows out of political defeat. In this case, it was Proudhon who forged in the crucible 
of 1848 the most powerful and influential critique of the suffrage. Although his 
arguments were modestly popular during the revolution, the experience of 
Bonapartism would popularize them as a credo for the French left on the eve of the 
Paris Commune. Prior to the revolution, Proudhon was famous for his 1840 text What 
is Property? (and its incendiary answer, “property is theft!”). In a sequence of texts 
published in 1848 and afterwards, however, he turned his critical energies towards the 
“mystification of universal suffrage.”39  
Proudhon’s critique of universal suffrage, or democracy—for much of the 
century, the two were the same thing—was given early articulation in places like his 
1848 “Solution of the Social Problem,” a collection of articles published at the end of 
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March and which explicitly sought to evaluate whether the suffrage could answer the 
social question. In that text, Proudhon placed the question of “the People’s 
sovereignty” as “the starting point of the social sciences.” How is that sovereignty 
expressed? “We cannot take one step forward until we solve that problem.”40 This 
problem resembled the theological question that concerned Christians, namely, how 
do we know when God is speaking? “It is the same with the People as it is with 
divinity: vox populi, vox Dei,” Proudhon complained. The stakes of the answer were 
high, because before we can accept the absolute authority of the will of the people, we 
must, Proudhon argues, make sure we are not being duped.41 
 Proudhon’s objections to universal suffrage were manifold and haphazardly 
expressed in “Solution of the Social Problem.” Broadly, he was concerned to show 
how socialists were mistaken to believe universal manhood suffrage voiced the will of 
the people. For one, since the people do not literally have a mouth, voting was an act 
of representation rather than immediate voice. It could only approximate the vox 
populi by producing a “personification, symbol or fiction of national sovereignty,” 
incarnated as the state.42 For another, the actual decisions reached by universal 
manhood suffrage were not universal at all, but majoritarian, a “disguised aristocracy.” 
How could we believe, Proudhon asked incredulously, that “this law, the expression of 
some bizarre will, is deemed the People’s will” when it could be decided arbitrarily by 
a single swing vote? Even worse, because most elections concerned representative 
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offices, the suffrage actually amplified the voice, not of the people, but of those 
socially powerful enough to get elected. Thus, “There is not and never can be,” 
Proudhon concluded, “legitimate representation of the People. All electoral systems 
are mechanisms for deceit.”43  
Nor did these arguments mean that Proudhon reviewed Rousseau’s general 
will favorably. He was impatient with the notion that popular sovereignty required 
procedures for abstracting away social ascriptions. Not only were women never 
included in the electorate in the first place, but “who does not see that deputies thus 
elected apart from all special interests and groups, all considerations of place and 
person, supposedly representing France, represent absolutely nothing, that they are no 
longer representative, but senators…?”44 Representatives who claimed to speak on 
behalf of the general will were, in fact, “judges and referees of their constituents’ 
interests.” That was why “the most certain way of making the People lie,” he wrote, 
“is to establish universal suffrage.”45 
 Of the scattershot criticisms Proudhon leveled at the suffrage, none were as 
devastating as his objection that the suffrage recapitulated the atomism that socialists 
were trying to ameliorate. It was an objection that held a special persuasive power in 
light of ongoing anxieties over social disintegration. According to Proudhon, voting 
was neither associational nor incorporating. Instead, it was individuating. Universal 
manhood suffrage merely aggregated preferences. It could never voice the 
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qualitatively distinct will of the people, a kind of indivisible esprit de corps. 
Universal suffrage is a kind of atomism through which legislators, who cannot 
make the People speak as a unit about their essence, invite citizens to express 
their opinions one-by-one… It is political atheism in the worst meaning of the 
word. As if adding up some quantity of votes could ever produce unified 
thought!”46  
Like his Saint-Simonian opponents, Proudhon believed that a thick form of social 
cohesion was the proper answer to the social question. Against the fractured 
conception of peoplehood normalized by industrialization and recapitulated by the 
suffrage (“political atheism”), the moral bases of social cohesion had to be reasserted. 
 Yet unlike most socialists of the 1840s, Proudhon denied the suffrage a place 
in that program of regeneration. It wasn’t only that the suffrage expressed a misguided 
will of the people—say, because they were uneducated or misled by oppression—but 
that it gave voice to the wrong conception of peoplehood in the first place: the 
electorate. “The individual vote, with regard to government, as a means of observing 
the national will, is exactly the same thing as a new division of land would be in the 
political economy,” he explained. “It is the agrarian law transported from the soil to 
authority.”47 Universal manhood suffrage reproduced in politics what was occurring 
socially and economically: society’s disintegration and the corresponding subjection 
of the economy to the demands of wage labor, credit and debt. Nothing revealed that 
France had lost sight of “the actual formula for sovereignty” as clearly as the fact that 
socialists believed universal manhood suffrage could answer the social question.48 
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If not universal manhood suffrage, what then was “the actual formula for 
sovereignty”? For Proudhon, it was the opposite of democracy (the suffrage): the 
Republic. 
In the republic, everyone reigns and governments; the People think and act as 
one person. Representatives are plenipotentiaries with the imperative mandate 
and are recallable at will. The law is the expression of the unanimous will: 
there is no other hierarchy besides solidarity of functions, no other aristocracy 
besides labour’s, no other initiative besides the citizens’. Here is the republic! 
Here is the People’s sovereignty! 
Where democracy atomized, the Republic unified. Where the former embodied a 
fragmented people in subjection to the state, the latter expressed “the People…as one 
person” legislating for itself. The former yielded a unity abstractly represented through 
the calculus of votes; the latter produced a unity concretely expressed through the 
“solidarity of functions.” 
We might say that Proudhon is explaining Le peuple’s unusual headmast, 
“Division of Functions, Indivisibility of Power.” The problem with electoral 
representation in democracy, Proudhon wants to say, is that the subject of 
representation is the citizen. In the Republic, in contrast, society, especially its division 
of labor, is represented directly because representatives are bound by the mandat 
impératif. Not the general will, but the social division of labor is the object of 
representation. This produces a qualitative rather than quantitative unity. Just as the 
cooperation between husband and wife, artisan and peasant, or merchant and banker 
calls on their social particularity to thread together a social fabric, the republic 
expresses unity grounded in the “solidarity of functions.” That is why the Republic 
calls forth a real rather than artificial people. 
  166 
With the fall of the Second Republic, Proudhon’s ideas ascended in 
prominence. Proudhon’s prescriptions for the Republic shaped what Communard 
leaders later proclaimed for themselves. The communal movement would repudiate 
the general will by reimplementing the mandat impératif, endorse the idea that popular 
sovereignty expressed “unity in power” achieved through complementary social 
differentiation, and denounce any gap between representative and represented. Unlike 
the democratic atomism of merely adding up votes, in the Republic everything would 
be “thinking and acting as a single man.”49 It would be a real rather than a symbolic or 
“insubstantial” collective subject.50 Unlike representative democracy, the Social 
Republic is a society. As the editors of Le Peuple reminded their readers in September 
1848, “Socialism is a science, politics is an art; Socialism has principles, politics has 
only fantasies; Socialism knows only humanity, politics knows only individuals.”51 So 
much the worse, then, for political answers to the social question.  
 
From the Electorate to the People in Arms  
 With the fall of the Second Republic, debates over the social question, 
industrial reform, worker emancipation, and education moved underground. Imperial 
censorship laws created a hostile environment for socialists to discuss the social 
question. Booming economic modernization also bolstered Napoleon’s political 
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prestige, leading Marx to judge the Second Empire the best realization of the modern 
state’s independence from society.52 This was the time of Paris as “the capital of the 
nineteenth century,” an era when French cultural expression defined European 
intellectual life.53 In a context of imperial economic and cultural supremacy, it was up 
to underground networks of Blanquists and freemasons to preserve the historical 
memory of 1793 and February 1848.54  
The social question would not return to public prominence in France until 
economic contraction in the 1860s forced France into a depression. The glamour of 
Haussmanization, gas lamps, arcades, and bourgeois boutiques lining the Champs-
Élysées appeared in unacceptable contrast to urban working class men and women 
scraping by on five sous dinner specials, purchased on credit. Together with press 
censorship, the economic contraction turned liberals against the Empire. Napoleon 
responded by liberalizing his rule, expanding the right to strike, freedom for the press, 
and legislative power for parliamentary bodies. But these reforms backfired. Rather 
than consolidating support for his regime, the partial restoration of the right to 
association and a free press empowered opposition groups. In particular, the relaxation 
of laws on public assembly in the late 1860s gave birth to a flourishing “public 
meetings” movement.  
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Amid these imperial reforms, the issue of the social question, revolution, and 
anticlericalism resurfaced. However, engaged workers and intellectuals did not return 
to the romantic socialism of 1848 uncritically. Although the enchantment of work, 
technological utopianism, faith in positivism and naturalism all reappeared, the 
millenarian hopes of electoral popular sovereignty were noticeably attenuated. Much 
of the revolutionary Left now appeared indifferent towards the suffrage and the 
political process. Within the vocabularies of dissent that prevailed in the Empire’s 
final days, Charpentier’s heavenly lightning of universal suffrage no longer provided a 
compelling weapon of revolutionary democracy. 
Indeed, given its prominence in 1848, the disaffection from electoral popular 
sovereignty is striking. It would be easy to explain this by pointing to the fact that 
universal manhood suffrage existed under the Second Empire. But everyone knew its 
de jure existence was just that. The constitution stipulated the automatic reelection of 
Napoleon III after each of his ten year terms, and voting was constrained to a 
preordained plebiscitary function. Suffrage under the Empire did not amount to the 
fullness of electoral popular sovereignty pursued by earlier social reformers. And yet, 
rather than reclaim electoral popular sovereignty against plebiscitary dictatorship as 
liberal statesmen like Léon Gambetta did, many socialists abandoned the idea of the 
“political” republic wholesale. When the librarian and publisher Édouard Dentu 
surveyed “the wreckage of 1848” in the halls of the public meetings, he found “heroes 
of barricades, professors of social science, doctors of communism and the parceling of 
property, blue-stockings from the womens’ clubs…all of the personnel of the Terror.” 
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What he could not find was interest in electoral popular sovereignty. Socialists, he 
warned his imperial colleagues, were abandoning the rights of man and property for 
what amounted to a cornucopia of evil: 
In these assemblies… Authority, whether it comes from heaven or earth, is 
denied and rebuffed; public morality, like religious morality, is outraged in all 
its forms. The family, paternity, marriage are covered with spit and insults. 
One proclaims there the abolition of property, the communism of goods, the 
suppression of proprietors, government, and religions. Finally, and it is a 
particular trait of demagogues today, after having proclaimed the abolition of 
all tyrannies, dogmas, constitutions, civil and penal codes, religion and 
government, they also abolish liberty as antirevolutionary and anti-popular.55 
These public meetings, Dentu warned, “prove[d] with the clarity of irresistible 
evidence that… the most applauded orators and audience members preach: ATHEISM, 
REGICIDE, CIVIL WAR, SPOLIATION, THE COMMUNALIZATION OF PROPERTY, THE 
ABOLITION OF THE FAMILY, at last, despotism through the suppression of all individual 
liberties and social superiorities.”56  
Louise Michel’s memoirs confirm Dentu’s horror. Michel, a schoolteacher in 
Paris involved in the socialist renascence, recalls attending public meetings where 
lecturers prophesized a post-scarcity utopia of communal plenty. On the hither side of 
history, the downtrodden would enjoy “chemical mixtures containing more iron and 
nutrients than the blood and meat we now absorb” from the “putrefied flesh we are 
accustomed to eating.” Sensual self-making, as the young Marx had claimed, would 
provide the backbone of human emancipation. “We were all poets, a little,” even if 
imperial ideology had tried to make us forget it.57  
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Just as Dentu observed, however, Michel believed politics had little, if any, 
role in the coming social revolution. Amid this talk of engineered food, public art, 
educational reform, there was no place for electoral politics. As she put it, “politics is 
a form of that stupidity” which causes worldly evils. It is thus “incapable of ennobling 
the race.”58 Revolutionaries had learned that “the attempt to work through parliaments 
has been going on for a long while, but parliaments, standing as they do in the midst of 
rottenness, can no longer produce anything worthwhile.”59 If Michel and her fellow 
revolutionaries had retrieved the 1848’s utopian program, the millenarian power of 
electoral popular sovereignty was left behind.  
The absence of any significant role for the franchise in replacing the Empire 
with a Republic marked a mutation in mid-century republicanism, a break in the chain 
of identifications between the Republic, democracy, and universal manhood suffrage 
that prevailed on the eve of 1848. Even though the vote was still rightfully pursued by 
women who did not have it, Bonapartism had persuaded many men (and a few 
women) of its impotence for realizing the harmonious and equal society they craved. 
Rather than what communards called a “social society,” the suffrage produced 
atomization and statism. Something else, I now want to argue, took on the role of 
bringing about the Democratic and Social Republic, something anathema to Saint-
Simonism but already celebrated in Proudhon’s political thought: republican war led 
by “the people in arms.” 
* * * 
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I want to turn to three participant accounts of the Commune—Prosper-Olivier 
Lissagaray’s L’histoire de la Commune de 1871, Louise Michel’s Memoires, and Jules 
Vallès’s L’Insurge—to illustrate how “the people in arms” supplanted “the electorate” 
as the people’s true body during their quest for a social rather than political Republic. 
By focusing on “the people in arms,” I also mean to contrast the Commune’s 
militarism with that of the Empire’s. In 1868, active service for the imperial army was 
extended to five years. Although the reform sought to improve the wartime viability of 
conscripts, it confirmed that the imperial army stood apart from civil society as a 
professional cadre. In contrast to this hierarchically organized standing army, “the 
people in arms” were ordinary citizens culled from the commercial classes or skilled 
trades. Each soldier was equal to all others, no matter one’s trade, class, or social 
standing—and sometimes sex. “The people in arms” were therefore an example—
maybe even the most important example—of what Marx identified as the Commune’s 
true achievement: the seizure by “society” of its original powers hitherto alienated in 
the form of the state. As an incarnation of society’s reclaimed power, “the people in 
arms” expressed an altogether different conception of collective agency than the 
Empire’s standing army: not the careerist ambitions of professional soldiers, but the 
spontaneous virtue and selfless sacrifice of republican citizens. By describing how 
each author narrates the Commune’s political history, my aim is to show how at 
crucial junctures, they each believed the communal revolution’s success depended on 
awakening this legendary collective agent of 1792. 
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[fig 12: Decree for the abolition of the Expiatory Chapel of Louis XVI by the Paris Commune’s 
Committee on Public Safety. Broadsides, no. 260. Stanford University, Paris Commune Collection, 
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Let me begin with Lissagaray’s L’histoire de la Commune de 1871. Published 
five years after the Commune, it was translated into English in 1886 with the help of 
Karl and Eleanor Marx after Lissagaray escaped to London. Unlike Michel and Vallès, 
who both sought the meaning of the Commune through first personal accounts, 
Lissagaray chose to write a history. More than a chronological record of events, 
however, L’histoire narrates the transmission of popular sovereignty between various 
bodies after the fall of the Empire: first to the provisional government, then the mayors 
of Paris in competition with the Central Committee of the National Guard, then the 
elected Paris Commune in tandem with the National Guard, and finally the 
“revolutionary” Commune which, controversially, instituted a Committee on Public 
Safety, toppled the Vendôme column, and decreed the demolition of the Expiatory 
Chapel of Louis XVI [fig 12]. Each transfer of the baton of popular sovereignty 
represented a moment armed conflict and military turmoil.  
Lissagaray’s L’histoire opens with a charge: the provisional government 
formed in the Empire’s wake had never intended to activate the people in arms. The 
Empire collapsed with the Napoleon III’s military defeat to Prussian forces at the 
battle at Sedan on 2 September 1870. In Paris, a confused but enthusiastic republican 
movement took over the Hotel de Ville and proclaimed the Third Republic as a war 
measure against the invading army. And at first, that provisional government seemed 
to invoke the people in arms. On 5 September, Louis Arago, the mayor of Paris, 
exhorted that “Just as our fathers did in 1792, so I call on you today: Citizens, the 
fatherland is in danger!” With other republican leaders, he acknowledged that “To 
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save the patrie en danger they [the people] asked for the republic” and thus reminded 
his audiences that “The Republic was victorious in 1792. The Republic has once more 
been proclaimed... Citizens, watch over the polity that is confided in you: tomorrow, 
with the army, you will avenge the patrie.” Gambetta, now Minister of the Interior, 
echoed the mayor a couple weeks later, proclaiming that “today is 21 September. 
Sixty-eight years ago on this day our fathers founded the Republic and took an oath, 
faced with a foreign invader who defiled the sacred soil of the fatherland, that they 
would live in freedom or die on combat.”60 These appeals to the people in arms 
encouraged the extraparliamentary left to cooperate with the provisional government. 
On September 6th, Blanqui joined his fellow conspirators Gustave Tridon and Émile 
Eudes in declaring his support. He also founded his magazine, La Patrie en danger. Its 
first issue called the extraparliamentary left to throw its support behind the provisional 
government. 
In hindsight, Lissagaray sees that the rhetoric was merely that. “The people 
instinctively offered their help to render the nation unto herself” with Napoleon’s 
defeat at Sedan. Yet “the Left repulsed them, refused to save the country by a riot,” 
thereby allowing “the fettered nation [to sink] into the abyss in the face of its 
motionless governing classes.”61 Echoing by now familiar denunciations of 
parliamentary politics as mere chatter, Lissagaray reports that the parliamentary left 
“exhausts itself in exclamations.” When Gambetta cries “We must wage Republican 
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war,” he promptly “sits down again,” unmoving.62 Jules Favre demands the formation 
of a Committee of Defense; he is rebuffed and concedes without argument. When 
Prussian forces defeat the French army at Metz—something the government denied 
but newspapers were reporting—no deputy rose to call for an inquiry into the 
discrepancy. Although the Prussian armies rapidly approached Paris, threatening the 
fledgling republic, no evacuation was implemented, no casting of cannon and 
ammunition systematically initiated, no earthworks and defense fortifications built.63 
Readers must conclude, Lissagaray insists, that from the beginning, the provisional 
government intended to capitulate. There was never a sincere war effort.  
In Lissagaray’s view, the provisional government’s duplicitous war effort was 
damning given that “the people in arms” were lying within the city’s population as a 
dormant power awaiting reincarnation. 
The necessary armaments might have been supplied in a few weeks, the 
cannon especially, everyone depriving himself of bread in order to endow his 
battalion with five pieces, the traditional pride of Parisians… in every Parisian 
mechanic there is the stuff of a gunner… Paris swarmed with engineers, 
overseers, foremen, who might have been drilled as officers. There lying 
wasted were all the materials for a victorious army.64 
The defeat of Napoleon’s imperial army merely represented a defeat of a professional 
corps that stood independently from society. It was not a defeat of the French people, 
and that was the decisive fact. Rather than drawing out and manifesting a latent 
“victorious army,” however, the national government “up to the last hour refused to 
utilize it.”65 “Were they to give in,” Lissagaray cried, “their arms intact?”66 With 
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capitulation to Prussian on January 28, after a humiliating half-hearted military 
resistance, the answer was apparently yes. 
 The first demands for a Commune arose in response to the state’s inaction. 
Angered by its refusal to mobilize the National Guard and initiate the levée en masse, 
the Central Republican Committee, the Revolutionary Socialist Party and then later 
the Central Committee of the National Guard, demanded Parisian municipal 
sovereignty (the Commune) as a defensive war measure. Paris held the right to defend 
itself in spite of the provisional government’s overtures towards capitulation. 
 As communards quickly learned, however, to proclaim Paris’s autonomy and 
right to self-defense did not mean that Parisians wanted to invoke it. Committees and 
fellow-travelers of the Revolutionary Socialist Party organized continuously to bring 
the mass of Parisians to their program during the late autumn. But nothing 
demonstrated the latter’s reluctance to form a commune more clearly than the 
communal movement’s failed insurrections and electoral defeats. Lissagaray had 
already observed to his dismay that when Blanquists had earlier marched through 
Belleville to the cries of Vive le République! Death to the Prussians! “No one joined 
them. The crowd looked on from affair, astonished, motionless.”67 Even as the 
provisional government refused the levée en masse and fumbled in its defensive 
maneuvers on the battlefield, mass demobilization prevented the communal movement 
from successfully retrieving for itself the mantle of the people. If revolutionary 
authority is rooted not in right, but action, this popular demobilization meant that there 
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was no authority to be found under the Prussian siege. What existed was, instead, 
institutional inertia and empty parliamentary rhetoric. That was the meaning of 
communal politics under the siege: 
All is silent. Save the faubourgs, Paris was a vast sick chamber, where no one 
dared to speak above his breath. This moral abdication is the true 
psychological phenomenon of the siege… If they [the parliamentary left] dread 
the giddy-headed, the fanatics, or compromising collaborators, why do they not 
take control of the movement into their own hands? But they confine 
themselves to crying, ‘No riots now we are faced with the enemy! No 
fanatics!’ as though capitulation were better than an insurrection; as though 
10th August 1792 and 31st May 1793 had not been insurrections in the face of 
the enemy threat…And you, citizens of the old sections of 1792-94 who 
supplied ideas to the Convention and the Commune, who dictated to them the 
means of safety…do you recognize your offspring in these gulls, weaklings, 
jealous of the people, prostrating before the Left like devotees before the 
host?68 
At a time in which France needed the memory of 1793 more than ever, Paris’s “moral 
abdication” frustrated Lissagaray. How could Paris concede to its elected 
representatives the revolutionary role only an armed people could fulfill? 
 As in virtually all accounts of the Commune, the turning point in L’histoire is 
the 18th of March. That morning, the French national government tried to disarm Paris 
by seizing its cannons, paid for by the subscriptions of the National Guard. It ordered 
its soldiers, dispatched under Generals Clément-Thomas and Lecomte, to reclaim the 
artillery from neighborhoods like Belleville and Montmartre. Short on horses, they 
struggled to cart the heavy weapons away. In an iconic episode of French 
revolutionary history, the neighborhood women rang the tocsin and shielded the 
cannons by climbing atop them or obstructing the path. When ordered to shoot the 
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gathering crowds, soldiers disobeyed by turning their rifle butts up. In the afternoon’s 
chaos, the National Guard arrested Lecomte, who was soon executed by an angry 
crowd. Minutes later, crowds identified and killed Clément-Thomas as well. In 
response to these executions, Adolphe Thiers ordered the city abandoned. He 
withdrew Paris’s functionaries, markets, telegraphs, and hospitals. With that retreat 
began the Commune, the civil war between Paris and the French national government. 
Upon the government’s withdrawal of “all the respiratory and digestive 
apparatus of the city to 1,600,000 souls,” those in the streets who defended the 
cannons, ultimate symbols of Paris’s sovereignty, filled the vacuum of authority. 
When members of the parliamentary left tried to ensure that General Lecomte was 
given a military trial, the crowds murdered him on the spot instead; when officers of 
the National Guard asked the people to “Wait for the Committee! Constitute a court-
martial!” for General Clément-Thomas, they were answered with his immediate 
execution: “Twenty muskets levelled at him battered him down.”69 In short, on the 
18th of March, “the people, so long standing on the defensive, had begun to move.”70 
The Commune, Lissagaray is keen to stress, began as an instantiation of 
Parisian electoral sovereignty. Thus, when a majority of Paris voted to form a 
Commune in the municipal elections of March 26th, it was providing the Commune 
with an electoral origin (although by March, most well-to-do Parisians had already left 
for Versailles). And, it is true, the redemptive power of the vote here is consistent with 
the arguments made in 1848 where the vote was interpreted as a vector of social 
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cohesion rather than individuation.71 However, even on its election day, Lissagaray 
suggested that the Commune’s election presented a victory, not only for an electorate, 
but for the nascent republican army. As he described it, communards had only 
temporarily set aside their knowledge “that this was a life-and-death struggle.” And far 
from manifesting Parisian unity, it revealed its divisions: not only bourgeois residents 
of the Right Bank, but also polytechnic engineers and university students in the 5th 
arrondissement voted against the Commune. Vallès, for his part, was even more 
explicit that the Commune’s “election” was best seen as a military victory. 
This clear, warm sun gilding the mouth of the cannon, this smell of bouquets, 
the ripple of the flags, the quiet sound of a revolution passing by, as peaceful 
and lovely as a blue river; these thrills, these lights, these brass fanfares, these 
bronze reflections, these flaming hopes, this perfume of honor, all intoxicating 
the victorious republican army with pride and joy.”72 
Nor was Vallès and Lissagaray’s portrayal of the electoral proclamation of the 
Commune as a quasi-military victory a stylistic quirk. The various proclamations of 
the Commune published on election day and afterwards echoed those sentiments 
unambiguously. On March 29, the elected Commune decreed the standing, 
professional army be abolished in favor of the National Guard, to which all French 
men were now asked to join. It echoed a call by the twenty arrondissements published 
in le Cri du Peuple on the March 26, where praises of Parisian municipal sovereignty 
were joined to a request for the organization of an autonomous National Guard as 
Paris’s sole armed force. After all, it was thanks to their “spontaneous and courageous 
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effort” that the revolution of March 18th was successful.73 
These calls to abolish the professional standing army in favor of the supremacy 
of the National Guard, in turn, reiterated the program of the famous “Red Poster” of 6 
January 1871. That flyer, which was the most important proclamation of the 
Commune under the Prussian siege, is worth citing at length:  
 To the people of Paris, 
 The Delegates of the Twenty Arrondissements of Paris, 
 Has the government charged on September 4 with national defense fulfilled its 
task? No!  
 We have 500,000 combatants, and 200,000 Prussians have us trapped! Who 
else is responsible for this if not those who govern us? Instead of casting cannons and 
manufacturing weapons they only thought of negotiating.  
 They refused the levée en masse.  
 They left the Bonapartists in place and arrested republicans. 
 They only decided to finally act against the Prussians after two months, after 
October 31 [when the Blanquists attempted to overthrow the government—KD] 
 By their slowness, their indecision, their inertia, they have brought us to the 
edge of the abyss; they didn’t know how to administrate or fight, even though they had 
at hand all possible resources, both in supplies and men.  
 […] 
 If the men of the Hotel-de-Ville still have any patriotism, their duty is to retire 
from the scene and let the people of Paris themselves take care of their own 
deliverance. The Municipality or the Commune, whatever name we give it, is the sole 
salvation of the people, its only recourse against death.  
 […] 
 Will the great people of ’89, which destroys bastilles and overthrows thrones, 
wait in inert despair while cold and famine freeze its last drop of blood in its heart – 
whose beats the enemy is counting? No!  
 The people of Paris will never accept this misery and this shame. It knows that 
there is still time, that decisive measures will permit the workers to live, and all to 
fight. 
 A general requisitioning, Free rationing, A Mass attack.  
[…] 
MAKE WAY FOR THE PEOPLE! MAKE WAY FOR THE COMMUNE!74 
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Virtually all of the documents proclaiming the Commune recapitulate this poster. 
They do not focus on the ways the national government suppressed their participatory 
political culture (which it did). They objected, rather, to how that government refused 
the levée en masse, how they failed to mobilize the National Guard, how they failed to 
protect Paris, and how they did not throw the full brunt of popular power against the 
enemy. They failed to call the people in arms into being. That is why the Commune 
“or whatever name we give it” consisted in “A general requisitioning, free rationing, a 
mass attack.” To proclaim the revolutionary Commune was to proclaim a war 
measure. It was to make way for the people in arms, with cannon and chassepot in 
tow. That was the basis of its competing claim to popular sovereignty against the 
French state. 
 Lissagaray drives the point home when he recounts the Communal Council’s 
controversial decision to institute a Committee on Public Safety. At the end of a 
council meeting on 28 April 1871, Jules Miot, a veteran of 1848, called for the 
committee’s creation. He felt urged to do so in light of the ineffectual war effort. 
Communard sorties were disorganized and ended in embarrassing retreat. After losing 
the fort of Issy to Versailles at the end of April, Paris faced imminent invasion. For 
Miot, the time had come to create a Committee on Public Safety to defend the 
Commune and the Republic. The Commune needed a committee that could wield 
executive authority over its scattered, decentralized commissions. It needed a source 
of energy, initiative, and centralized action in place of paralyzing deliberation and 
legislative sessions. 
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 The Council’s majority eventually voted in favor of Miot’s proposal on the 
first of May, but not before acrimonious debate among its members and fellow 
communards. Gustave Courbet worried that “We are reproducing to our detriment a 
terror that does not belong to our times.”75 Creating a new Committee on Public Safety 
amounted to an authoritarian betrayal of the Commune’s professed ambition for a 
democratic and social republic. It trapped the communal revolution in the shadow of 
Robespierre, St Just, Hébert, and Babeuf. Raoul Rigault, in contrast, insisted that 
working within that shadow was the point. Rigault, the infamous head of the 
Commune’s Prefecture of the Police, already believed himself to be the reincarnation 
of Hébert and the Commune a reincarnation of its regicidal 1793 antecedent.76 
 The debate turned in large part on the nature of republican dictatorship. And in 
his recounting of it, Lissagaray chastised “the minority” like Courbet and Tridon for 
voting against the Committee on Public Safety. Though sympathetic to the minority 
on philosophical grounds, Lissagaray believed “these men could never understand that 
the Commune was a barricade, not a government.” These men “strained the reaction 
against the principle of authority to the verge of suicide,” jeopardizing the Commune’s 
survival with their unconditional antiauthoritarianism.77 
 Lissagaray’s assessment is revealing. A Paris Commune that was afraid of 
authority, he wants to say, missed the point. The Commune was never just an anti-
authoritarian experiment. Its mission was to reconstitute democratic authority outside 
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the state. That was why Miot’s proposal highlighted stakes of the communal 
movement’s political thought: is the Committee on Public Safety an acceptable way of 
concentrating communal power and energy outside bureaucratic or electoral channels? 
Although the committee was subordinated to the Communal Council, it nevertheless 
exercised broad discretionary executive and war powers. For Lissagaray, “the 
minority” that protested against it misunderstood the matter at hand: Communal 
democracy was a democracy at war.  
Lissagaray is thus relieved to report that, despite the divisive debate over the 
Committee on Public Safety, members reunited over the most important value of all: 
“no one, even in the thick of the peril dared to utter the word capitulation.”78 
Capitulation, after all, was more than a military concession. It was the defeat of the 
Social Republic by the Political Republic, the people in arms by the national 
electorate. That Lissagaray believed the Commune was first and foremost a barricade, 
not a government, meant that the sovereignty of the “social society” was born, not in 
the halls of representative government, but at its “smoking ramparts.” 
Do you at least recognize this Paris, seven times shot down since 1789, and 
always ready to rise for the salvation of France? Where is her programme, say 
you? Why, seek it before you, and not at the faltering Hôtel-de-Ville. These 
smoking ramparts, these explosions of heroism, these women, these men of all 
professions united… do they not speak loudly enough our common thought, 
and that all of us are fighting for equality, the enfranchisement of labour, the 
advent of a social society?79 
* * * 
Like Lissagaray, Louise Michel was a combatant of the Commune. An active 
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participant of the public meetings movement, she was also a member of the 
Commune’s Union de Femmes and the 18th arrondissement’s vigilance committee. On 
the 18th of March, she marched with the crowds of Montmartre to protect the cannons. 
In her Mémoires de Louise Michel écrits par elle-même, published the same year that 
Lissagaray’s L’histoire appeared in English, Michel similarly chose to interpret the 
day’s significance as the reawakening of the people in arms. 
On this day, the eighteenth of March, the people wakened. If they had not, it 
would have been the triumph of some king; instead it was a triumph of the 
people. The eighteenth of March could have belonged to the allies of kings, or 
to foreigners, or to the people. It was the people’s.80  
Michel knew first hand that the 18th of March could not self-evidently speak for the 
people, either of France or Paris. She participated in the failed popular insurrections 
prior to March, including the October 30 takeover of the Hôtel de Ville (in response to 
the Government of National Defense’s announcement of negotiations with Prussians) 
and the January 22 insurrection with the National Guard. The failure of the first led to 
Blanqui’s arrest; the second saw Breton mobile guards kill several protesters in a 
crowd much too small to threaten the provisional government. 
Like L’histoire, these failures of popular, spontaneous collective action led 
Michel to distinguish between two types of collective subjects. She denied that a 
demobilized or unarmed crowd belonged to “the people” at all. Recounting her 
indignation at Paris’s refusal to spontaneously rise up, she writes,  
One holiday I was going to Julie’s when I encountered a vast multitude of 
people on the boulevard. With the hopes I held, I believed the hour had come, 
but it was a carnival, in the midst of which the old republican Miot was being 
                                                
80 Michel, The Red Virgin, 64. 
  185 
taken to prison… It was a joyous crowd on a day of mourning, but they 
weren’t really the people. They were the same crowd you see at public 
executions, but which you can never find when you need to rip up paving 
stones to build barricades. They are the same unthinking crowd that bolsters up 
tyrannies and cuts the throats of people trying to save them.81 
Michel’s claim that a demobilized crowd “weren’t really the people” goes beyond 
distinguishing a pacific people with an armed one. It is not a matter of simply 
qualifying “the people” as armed or not. By excluding a demobilized crowd from “the 
people,” Michel is suggesting that armed mobilization is essential rather than 
accidental to peoplehood. It is not one among many activities that they may choose to 
engage in. It is their defining activity. “The people,” Michel says, enact themselves 
through a special kind of collective agency, and it is that agency that qualitatively 
distinguishes them from Bonapartism’s electoral crowds, “the same unthinking crowd 
that bolsters up tyrannies.” The true people’s agency is expressed, not through the 
ballot but the barricade.  
 From this perspective, the significance of the 18th of March lay in the way 
Paris exchanged one kind of social interdependence for another. The electorate, an 
atomized body politic that sustained state despotism, yielded to the people in arms, an 
absorptive and spontaneous body erupting from beyond official institutional channels. 
Nor was this moral reincarnation figurative or metaphorical. Despite Michel’s 
direct participation on the 18th of March, her memoir describes the insurrection as the 
product, not of her own actions nor that of many others, but of a supra-personal 
agency. Reading Michel’s larger account of the Commune, the reader is struck by how 
individual agency is continually disavowed. She fought behind barricades in 
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Montmartre during “the bloody week,” but she emphatically denies any role for her 
own personal qualities or capacities. Instead, she focuses on the experience of being 
articulated into a qualitatively superior collective actor. 
Some people say I’m brave. Not really. There is no heroism; people are simply 
entranced by events. What happens is that in the face of danger my perceptions 
are submerged in my artistic sense, which is seized and charmed. Tableaux of 
the dangers overwhelm my thoughts, and the horrors of the struggle become 
poetry. It wasn’t bravery… It was beautiful, that’s all. Barbarian that I am, I 
love cannon, the smell of powder, machine-gun bullets in the air.82 
Michel’s courage was not sourced in personal will or moral conviction, but in her 
being “entranced” or “submerged” in the arresting experience of “the smell of powder, 
machine-gun bullets in the air.” “One person is nothing and yet part of that which is 
everything—the Revolution,” she reiterated.83 
We might say that although Michel’s account is autobiographical, she is not its 
protagonist. It is instead “the people in arms.” Individually, they were “nothing,” but 
in taking up arms, they entered into a larger revolutionary drama, not as themselves, 
but as the latest instance of a collective subject that predated their individual biological 
births.  
Thus, as in Lissagaray’s L’histoire, when it came to the matter of the 
sovereignty of the people, the utopian imaginary of the 1840s had to give way to the 
master symbol of the Commune, the cannon. Michel was effusive about the lectures 
on physics, chemistry, law, and pedagogy that she attended in the months prior to the 
Commune. “We didn’t waste a minute, and our days were stretched to fit so that 
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midnight seemed early.”84 Nevertheless, as the Empire’s grip on sovereignty 
weakened, it was cannon fire that took center stage.  “The Revolution was rising, so 
what good were dramas? The true drama was in the streets, so what good were 
orchestras? We had cannon.”85 
The last two years before 1871, the rue Hautefeuille was a hotbed of 
intellectual women… But prose and verse and music disappeared because we 
felt so near the drama coming from the street, the true drama, the drama of 
humanity. The songs of the new epoch were war songs, and there was no room 
for anything else.86 
Michel is not saying that war was more desirable than poetry, verse, and music. Her 
claim that “there was no room for anything else” but “war songs” was not a normative 
claim about the latter’s desirability. Rather, she was trying to communicate that this 
romantic culture could not fill the void of sovereignty opened up in the Empire’s final 
days. An associational political culture can make life under capitalism more livable, 
but it does not make the people sovereign. Only the poetry of revolutionary violence 
can do that. “The Russian revolutionaries are right,” Michel came to conclude, for 
“evolution is ended and now revolution is necessary or the butterfly will soon die in its 
cocoon.”87 At a time in which the Empire was wracked with a legitimation crisis, the 
solution lay in being seized and charmed by machine gun bullets, not by the “prose 
and verse and music” which provided the warp and weft of utopian political culture. 
To forge the social republic, it is not enough for the Commune to pursue social 
harmony and economic cooperation. The people needed cannon. 
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* * * 
 Like Lissagaray and Michel, Jules Vallès was a combatant in the Commune. A 
familiar critic of the Second Empire and editor of Le Cri de Peuple, Vallès was also a 
member of the Communal Council. His autobiographical recounting of the event, 
L’Insurge, actually bills itself as a novel. However, except for naming the main 
character Jacques Vingtras, the novel is barely fictionalized. It functions as the third 
installation of his autobiographical trilogy. L’Insurge recounts Vallès’s life (as 
Vingtras) from the Second Empire to the fall of the Commune. Unlike Lissagaray and 
Michel, Vallès locates the origins of the Commune a bit earlier than the 18th of 
March—although, like them, he will identify that day as the moment of popular 
awakening.  
According to Vallès, the incipient spirit of the Commune was discovered at the 
funeral of Victor Noir on 20 January 1870. Noir had been shot and killed in a duel 
with Napoleon’s cousin, and his funeral became the focal point of a Blanquist 
conspiracy to start an uprising against the Second Empire. Unfortunately, armed 
soldiers successfully dissolved the thousands-strong procession.  
 Despite the insurrection’s failure, Vallès believes that Noir’s funeral signaled 
that the people were on the cusp of incarnating the people in arms. He describes the 
procession members as “fragments of an army seeking other fragments, shreds of a 
Republic stuck together by a dead man’s blood…all held to the body by a single idea.” 
Under the cloak of each worker was a weapon at the ready: “Their hearts were swollen 
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with the hope of battle—their pockets were swollen as well.”88 They moved as an 
absorptive, organic unity. During the procession, a fellow journalist came up to Vallès 
to speak to him, presuming him to be the leader. The journalist was rebuked. “No 
one’s in command, get that straight! Not even Rochefort and Delescluze, who would 
soon be completely forgotten if some street orator produced a dazzling flash of 
lightning, even if he just made the sun break through the cloudy sky.” Moreover, 
although the insurrection failed, the Empire received its warning. In the face of the 
people’s nascent reawakening, the Empire “better hurry if they want to sap the fresh 
strength to escape through the cut, if they want…to drown the fire of the mob as the 
sound of thunder is a signal that the murderous electricity has died in the earth.”89 
Once the Empire hears the thunderclap, the people will have already struck.  
 Of course, Bonapartism threatened to mislead the people once again. With 
Napoleon III’s declaration of war against the Prussians, the Empire coopted this 
nascent energy of popular mobilization. It redirected the ire of the people against 
another nation rather than the state. Vallès was in despair. “But can’t you hear the 
‘Marseillaise’?” someone asks him. He mentally replies, “I am appalled by your 
‘Marseillaise’ and what you have made of it. It has become a State Hymn. It does not 
inspire volunteers, it leads flocks of sheep.” The juxtaposition of volunteers and sheep 
ought to be read as a juxtaposition between the people in arms, free and spontaneous, 
and the imperial army, hierarchical and professional. Stumbling on a group of soldiers 
preparing for war against the Prussians, a drill sergeant shouting “Left, Right, Left, 
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Right!” Vallès scornfully remarks, “Do you think that men maintain the proper 
distance and wield bayonets like those metronomes when, after suddenly meeting the 
enemy, they find themselves in the heat of battle in some meadow, field or 
cemetery?”90 This imperial army was no spontaneous and organic republican body, 
but a machine that moved without will or consciousness.  
 Fortunately, with the Empire’s collapse, the ideological fog lifted and the 
people instinctively sought the Social Republic. The day after the Third Republic is 
proclaimed at the Hotel de Ville, Vallès observes that “Everyone had come there out 
of instinct, no plans had been made.” In the rain, he and other artisans “[wandered] 
about, looking for one another and talking of the Social Fatherland, the only possible 
salvation for the Classical Fatherland.”91 It was time to arm the people and to defend 
Paris against the Prussian forces, to protect “the Social Fatherland.” 
 Like Lissagaray and Michel had also suggested, the social republic was no 
electoral product. In this alternative incarnation of the body politic, authority was not 
generated through institutional channels or bestowed from above. It was, instead, 
generated spontaneously from below. In direct repudiation of the millenarian vision of 
the suffrage that prevailed in 1848, authority was not conferred by the ballot but 
through collective armed struggle. Vallès was appointed as a commander to a battalion 
of the National Guard and given a military coat with epaulets to symbolize his 
authority. The guard members rebuffed him. Vallès quickly learned that conferral of 
an official rank in the guard diminished, rather than bestowed, authority. Authority 
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had nothing to do with rank; it was the product of combat. Realizing this, Vallès tore 
off his epaulets and reflected: 
I quickly ripped off my four pitiful little stripes, faded, pinkish, cruddy…and I 
was free! Now I could be the real leader of the battalion. Oh, you must never 
accept regular commands in the revolutionary army! I thought rank conferred 
authority—it removes it. You’re nothing but a cipher before the companies. 
You truly become a hero only in combat, when you’re the first to leap into 
danger. Then, since you’re in front, the others follow. And for that the baptism 
of the ballot is useless. All that counts is the baptism of fire.92 
Stripped of the symbols of rank, “he presided over the deliberations of every group 
without being the president of any.”93  
This scene stands in for the extraordinary distance travelled between 1848 and 
1871. Blanc had proclaimed political and social reform as mutually constitutive 
weapons for creating the Social Republic. It followed that universal manhood suffrage 
was part of revolutionary democracy’s arsenal, a vector for social harmony and 
regeneration. But in 1871, Vallès had discovered that the two had become 
disaggregated and staged as opposites. On one side now lay the state, the electorate, 
and the political republic built on bourgeois rights; on the other lay antistatism, the 
people in arms, and the social republic built upon the primacy of society. In the 
context of these conceptual realignments, it was futile for Gambetta, Favre, and other 
leaders of the Provisional Government to reassert parliamentary authority. According 
to Vallès, they were nothing but false prophets, men “who wanted to play the 
thundering Jupiter.”94 As deliberators and lawmakers, they were alienated from the 
people as a natural disaster, the catastrophic manifestation of revolutionary, 
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redemptive agency. 
Oh those who think that leaders control insurrections are incredibly naïve! 
Scattered, dispersed, torn, drowned—those are the words to describe what men 
call the general staff in the tumultuous movement of human waves. At the very 
most, the head of one of the leaders might emerge at some moment like the 
painted busts of women, carved in the prows of ships, which appear and 
disappear at the will of the tempest, at the roll of the waves.95 
 In the weeks connecting the funeral of Noir to the 18th of March, Vallès would 
discover the violent sources of authority time and again. When he and Tridon drafted 
the Red Poster, the Provisional Government jailed them along with other signatories. 
Imprisoned, Vallès desperately sought to escape (“Who knows whether noises from 
the city would reach me, whether I would be able to see the flashes of lightning 
through the bars of my cell?”)96 As he bided his time, he read Proudhon and Blanc 
with fellow prisoners. Although he does not list the specific texts, it is possible they 
read Proudhon’s 1861 La Guerre et La Paix, where Proudhon argued that “war [was] 
divine…primordial, essential to life and to the production of men and society.” For 
Proudhon, war was the origin “of morality itself” and a religious revelation, that action 
was “the principal condition of life, health and strength in an organized being,” and 
that death was the “noble end” for “the thinking, moral, free being.” Given the shift 
away from universal manhood suffrage and towards revolutionary violence after 1848, 
Proudhon’s identification of action with combat (“To act is to fight!”) would have 
resonated with the radical workers imprisoned with Vallès. It was probably easy for 
Proudhon’s readers to agree that war was the origins of the social, that it was “linked 
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at a very deep level…with man’s sense of religion, justice, beauty and morality… War 
is the basis of our history, our life and our whole being. It is, I repeat, everything.”97 
Whether Vallès and the other prisoners read together La Guerre et La Paix, however, 
they had certainly learned its theses. Upon escaping, Vallès remarked, “In my retreat I 
saw no one and heard nothing. But I could feel the storm brewing nonetheless, I could 
see the horizon darkening. Let the people be made to lose patience—and let the first 
thunderbolt explode!”98 
 Naturally, that thunderbolt exploded on the 18th of March: “two generals had 
their brains blown out this morning.” Upon hearing the news, Vallès shouts, “Well! 
It’s the Revolution! So here it is, the moment hoped for and awaited.”99 With the 
execution of Lecomte and Clement-Thomas, the people in arms had awakened. The 
Commune was no longer just a coalition of socialist committees and clubs; it was now 
also a sovereign power. Vallès regrets ever doubting—as he did after the funeral of 
Victor Noir and the Red Poster affair—that the people would take up arms against 
their enemies. “Cowards that we were,” he laments, “we were already talking of 
leaving you and going far away from your streets, which we considered dead. Forgive 
us! Fatherland of honor, city of salvation, bivouac of the Revolution! No matter what 
happens, even if we are to be conquered once more, even if we die tomorrow, our 
generation will have been consoled.”100 The 18th of March redeemed their generation. 
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Like their forefathers, they, too, would incarnate the legendary collective subject of 
the Year II. 
 His predictions proved true during the Bloody Week. As Versaillais breached 
Paris’s gates, Vallès was thrilled to see that the people in arms with his own eyes.  
Where was my head! I thought the city was going to play dead before being 
killed, and now women and children are doing their part… Fever everywhere, 
or rather health. No one shouting, no one drinking. Just from time to time a trip 
to the bar, and, quickly, lips are wiped with the back of the hand, and man gets 
back to business. ‘We’re going to do our damnedest to put in a good day’s 
work,’ one of this morning’s whiners tell me. ‘You had doubts about us a 
while ago, comrade. Drop by when things get hot, you’ll see who’s a coward!’ 
The poppy harvest is waving in the wind…they can die now.101  
Here is Proudhon’s “Republic.” The social division of labor adds up to an organic 
unity in combat. Fraternity and equality materialize as citizen-soldiers cooperate on 
the barricade. Men, women, children, and workers of all trades cooperate in unison in 
preparation for battle. This is the legendary people in arms and whose agency had a 
restorative, regenerative effect on the social body. Not “fever,” but “health,” “a good 
day’s work,” everyone “doing their part”—this language, ordinarily reserved to 
discuss the moral education of the shop floor, is now the language of the barricade. 
This was not an electorate, but the people in arms. 
 Vallès was correct that, having been reincarnated, the people “can die now,” 
for the French state had orders for systematic and exterminatory murder. Its invading 
forces were led by the veterans of the colonial theater; Joseph Vinoy and Patrice de 
MacMahon had both participated in the capture of Algiers. But Vallès, looking back 
on the Commune’s final hours and watching them set fire to buildings in a desperate 
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bid to stall invading line troops, believed he glimpsed something immortal in the 
Commune: its redemptive image of spontaneous insurrection, “an invincible 
weapon…the tool no one can break, the tool rebels will from this moment pass on 
from hand to hand along the road to civil wars.”102 As Michel argued, the Paris 
Commune had created an alternative location of popular sovereignty to that of the 
state in its “war songs.” Such songs were what electoral politics could never provide.  
 
Conclusion 
Choosing to ground popular sovereignty in republican war rather than 
universal suffrage was not much of a choice. Besides the suffrage, few alternative 
languages of popular sovereignty had been passed down in the revolutionary 
republican tradition. Even if political thinkers had tried to invent a new idiom that was 
not modeled on republican war, it probably would have been unconvincing to a 
population whose pride and self-definition had become so entangled with the historical 
memory of its military achievements. Nor was more liberalism an option. After all, it 
was liberalism’s shortcomings—its unconvincing account of the social, its economic 
attacks on corporatism and the moral economy, its normalization of individualism—
that motivated utopians and communards to pursue the Social Republic in the first 
place. Although the subsequent Third Republic would adopt this aim as a state 
imperative, until 1871, to answer the social question was, almost by default, to critique 
the state. If I have foregrounded communal democracy’s dependence on war, it is not 
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to criticize it. It is to draw attention to the constrained historical and conceptual space 
in which an unprecedented socialist achievement was compelled to do its thinking, and 
in which the inherited vocabularies of democratic action were limited to two: the 
ballot or the barricade.  
Those constraints imposed real costs on the Communards. Substituting war for 
the suffrage meant forfeiting the commitment to non-violent revolution that 
characterized social republicans of the 1840s. It also placed communards in a uniquely 
disadvantageous position to respond to popular demobilization. When a political 
tradition designs its commitments to sovereignty around the moral authority of 
spontaneous collection action, it earns the right to claim popular sovereignty against 
the state’s channels of legitimation. That is its weapon when it is speaking from the 
margins. At the same time, its compels its political thinkers to grow dependent on the 
fact of continuous mobilization when in power. As Lissagaray conceded, popular 
paralysis becomes interpreted, not as a lull in popular sovereignty, but its “moral 
abdication.” Hence, generations of French socialists found that their aspirations for 
everyday egalitarianism created room for authoritarian instruments like the Committee 
on Public Safety, which appeared as a means to institutionalize popular insurrection in 
the face of spontaneity’s inevitable exhaustion. Only a tradition that places this 
premium on spontaneity makes demobilization a crisis of popular sovereignty itself. 
In short, my aim has not been to cheapen the significance of “the communal 
idea,” the mandat impératif, workers’ association, or the ideal of federative 
government. Those are surely at the heart of the Commune’s prescriptions for a 
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repaired society. Instead, I have tried to show that for all that contemporary scholars 
justly defend that culture, they err in attributing the Commune’s title to popular 
sovereignty to it. The politics of association and the primacy of work may have 
formed the normative heart of the communal movement, but it was not its warrant to 
usurp the state’s own claim to electoral popular sovereignty.103 That warrant came, 
rather, from the Commune’s identification of “the people” with “the people in arms,” 
its heroic conflation of republican citizenship and spontaneous armed insurrection. 
When it came to sovereignty, it was what the Commune did (wage war) and not who 
they were (workers) that counted. 
As in the French Revolution and the postrevolutionary political culture of 
Bonapartism, “the people in arms” did not present a rhetorical figure, but the most 
concrete and naturalized manifestation of the people possible. The people appear 
spontaneously and unpredictably. Their activity of violence enacts their natural, 
undivided popular sovereignty. The “concreteness” of this conception of the people is 
not grounded in any demographic characteristics, but in the activity of insurrection 
itself. It was not bound by a physiological conception of the social body, but 
demarcated by participation in a specific vocabulary of extralegal action. 
It would therefore be a mistake to understand the people in arms in terms of 
Sieyès’s constitutionalist appeal to a pouvoir constituent, prior to any social or 
institutional particularization. That claim would have violated the deeply held belief 
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that the people were a collective subject readily describable within the positivistic 
social and moral sciences of the late Empire. Communards like Michel, Lissagaray, 
and Vallès were fully consistent with the prevailing orientation of nineteenth century 
French social thought in seeing “the people” as a natural and moral, rather than 
metaphysical and formal, collective subject. Indeed, that was why the appearance of 
“the people in arms” served a scientific function as much as a political one. Their 
appearance shattered the Empire’s false, stupefying ideological pretense to moral and 
industrial progress. Their agency was a force of demystification and progress.  
Together with utopian political culture, the Paris Commune hewed closely to 
the tradition of 1792 in which the republic was not only an experiment in democracy, 
but a democracy at war with its enemy. The two threads were braided together. In 
positioning “the people in arms” as the protagonist of its democratic experiment, the 
Commune was invoking democratic terror’s most conspicuous element. With it, 
leaders hoped to overcome electoral or legal means of expressing popular sovereignty. 
That is why I think it is not enough to point to the participatory political culture of the 
Commune as the basis of its sovereignty. The spontaneous presence of “the people” 
was not best exemplified in associational culture, but rather in armed struggle. As 
Communards discovered, in the Social Republic, baptism by ballot is not enough for 
democratic authority. For that, one needed a baptism by fire. 
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Chapter IV 
Irrationalist Violence on the Eve of World War I 
On 22 January 1914, a few months before the outbreak of World War I, Jean Jaurès 
exhorted to an audience of students, 
Today, you are told: act, always act! But what is action without thought? It is 
the barbarism born of inertia. You are told: brush aside the party of peace; it 
saps your courage! But I tell you that to stand for peace today is to wage the 
most heroic of battles…Defy those who warn you against what they call 
‘system’! Defy those who urge you to abandon your intelligence for instinct 
and intuition!1 
Condemning a deformed intellectual culture that he believed motivated the cries for 
war, Jaurès would spend the next six months organizing for diplomatic de-escalation 
to prevent war’s outbreak. He fought a losing battle. Fellow political leaders across the 
political spectrum were increasingly convinced of the virtues of war against the 
German “hereditary” enemy, with the more bellicose seeking recompense for France’s 
defeat in the Franco-Prussian war. Jaurès could not undo this overwhelming 
compulsion for revenge: on July 31st, he was assassinated at a café by Raoul Villain, a 
revanchist [fig 13, 14]. 
As Jaurès warned students of “those who urge you to abandon your 
intelligence” for “instinct and intuition,” leading French intellectuals were urging them 
to do precisely that. On the right, Charles Maurras, leader of Action Française, and 
Maurice Barrès, a conservative novelist, were summoning young men to war in the 
name of the Republic. They did so despite the fact that both identified their 
nationalism as a form of anti-republicanism. As Maurras once put it bluntly: “The  
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[Fig 13: “Jaurès assassiné,” L’Humanite (1 August 1914). Paris, Bibliotheque Nationale de France, 
Droit, Économie, Politique. Grand folio, Lc2-6139.] 
 
[Fig 14: Jaurès’s funeral. Leaders from the left and right, including Jaurès’s critics from the Maurassian 
right, used it as an opportunity to praise the importance of French "unity" on the eve of war.]2 
 
republicans can choose: the Republic, or the Country?”3 They were joined on the left 
by Charles Péguy, a fervent Dreyfusard who nevertheless dismissed the Third 
Republic in 1910 as a regime for “those who believe in nothing, not even in atheism, 
who devote themselves, who sacrifices themselves to nothing…And who boast of it.” 
When war was announced, Péguy enthusiastically volunteered to march for the 
republic he once condemned as “the sterility of modern times.”4 To the astonishment 
of many, Gustave Hervé, the leftist leader of French antimilitarism, could also be 
found pleading with authorities to conscript him after 1914. After defiantly 
announcing in his 1906 Leur patrie that if faced with war, “we [working class] shall 
not march, whoever be the aggressor,”5 the committed socialist was reborn a 
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nationalist, renaming his magazine La Guerre sociale to La Victoire.6 
 The trouble with “the generation of 1914” went beyond the fact that their 
ideological realignments depended on impending war.7 Jaurès was an historian of the 
French Revolution, and he would have been familiar with the ways war could bridge 
domestic political cleavages. What alarmed him, instead, was how French intellectuals 
folded something unusual into their calls for national unity: an irrationalist image of 
violence. Henri Massis and Alfred de Tarde, for example, had just called for a 
rejection of “intellectualism” and “rationalism” in favor of a “cult of action,” “national 
energy,” and the “classical spirit” in their infamous 1913 pamphlet, “Jeunes gens 
d’aujourd’hui” [fig 16]. Péguy had extoled the redemptive power of war in his 1913 
poem “Eve”: “Blessed are those who die in great battles / Lying beneath the sun in the 
sight of God’s face. / Blessed are those who die in a high place / Surrounded by the 
trappings of great funerals.”8 Still others were contrasting war’s “immediate 
experience” to the moral abstractness and cowardly self-interest of antimilitarism [fig 
15]. In short, French intellectuals were not citing geopolitical necessity or strategic 
utility to justify the war. Instead, they proclaimed their desire to repudiate the Third 
Republic’s intellectual culture—rationalist, positivist, secular, and seduced by a belief 
in progress. 
As it happens, these were the years in which virtually every major intellectual 
program in Europe was concerned with the irrational sources of human motivation.  
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[Fig 15: “L’Antimilitariste et le Tambour-Major,” Le Petit Journal. Supplément illustré (11 April 
1909). BNF, Philosophie, Histoire, Sciences de l’homme, Fol-Lc2-3011. An illustration of an "anti-
militarist" being mocked by a crowd for his antinationalism, and portrayed as a hooligan when 
compared to the nationalist drum major.] 
 
[Fig 16: “Agathon” was the collective pseudonym for Alfred de Tarde and Henri Massis. “Jeunes gens 
d'aujourd'hui” (1913) was an influential study—and really a defense—of the new nationalism and the 
renascence of a Catholic faith among France’s elite young men. It stressed a rejection of “rationalism” 
and offered an ode to Barrès’s cult of “national energy.”] 
The study of crowd psychology, psychoanalysis, phenomenology, vitalism and 
“collective effervescence” found their origins between 1885 and 1914. So widespread 
was this cultural “crisis of reason,” a “revolt against reason,” or an “embrace of 
unreason,”9 that one scholar concluded that by 1914 “nothing remained of the proud 
structure of European certainties. The demolition was systematic, and covered almost 
every field of culture.”10 Jaurès was not exaggerating when he detected in the calls for 
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10 S. P. Rouanet, “Irrationalism and Myth in Georges Sorel,” The Review of Politics 26, no. 1 (1964), 
  203 
war an invitation “to abandon your intelligence for instinct and intuition.” For many 
French youth, marching for war meant participating in this generational intellectual 
reorientation. Their nationalism intersected with the vogue critique of reason in ways 
that, H. Stuart Hughes laments, combined “respect for authority with the cult of 
spontaneous creation.” It was why they “greeted the outbreak of the slaughter with 
enthusiasm.”11 
How did a claim to irrational violence unite otherwise conflicting political 
programs at the end of France’s long nineteenth century? What political problems did 
war—imbued with irrational, moral, even life-affirming qualities—promise to solve? 
Political theorists have long condemned this irrationalism as a romantic turn to anti-
democratic chauvinism. The “mystique of violence” found in fin de siècle Europe, 
according to Raymond Aron, amounted to “invectives against democracy” in the name 
of an “aesthetic of existence” and a “degraded romanticism.”12 Judith Shklar agreed: it 
was the product of “the romantic mood of that time,” the desperate search for a 
“substitute religion” driven by an “escapist motivation” to return to “the perpetual 
movement of reality.”13 Isaiah Berlin saw in these thinkers “the apotheosis of the 
romantic will.”14 Intellectual historians of the period have offered similar lines of 
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1997), 575. 
  204 
interpretation, with some deeming it a “romantic anti-capitalism” and an “alternative 
political tradition” to republican democracy altogether.15 
This chapter argues that these claims to irrationalist violence held a more 
complex relationship to republican democracy. The rally to the Republic by many of 
its former critics was neither reducible to realpolitik nor a romantic escape from 
democratic politics. On the contrary, it was an effort to reconceive war as an answer to 
a perceived moral crisis of parliamentary democracy. It was under the Third Republic 
that mass political parties arose for the first time in modern France, and far from 
hailing that fact as an unequivocal step forward for democracy, many critics believed 
the consolidation of parliamentary politics frustrated it. Indeed, the difficulty of the 
matter is that many proponents of irrationalist violence believed they were asserting a 
more concrete and felicitous peoplehood against a corrupt and bureaucratic state. 
However perverse, Maurras, Barrès, and Péguy understood the nationalist revival as a 
continuation of the bottom-up, “democratic” sentiments that emerged in the Boulanger 
Affair of the late 1880s.16 Against the elitist cosmopolitanism and philosophical 
rationalism of the Third Republic, they juxtaposed a spontaneous, moral people 
grounded in the life and soil of the nation. As Péguy put it, they were searching for 
“the marrow” of France, everything that made up “the tissue of the people.”17 Their 
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language therefore articulated something more than dissatisfaction with the Third 
Republic’s political scandals. The cathexis of war in 1914 also radicalized available 
arguments about popular violence from the preceding century. Those arguments 
identified in popular violence something irreducible to utilitarian calculations or 
interest politics. That was why it offered a resource for reconstituting “the tissue of the 
people” in the face of parliamentary stasis and moral entropy.  
The chapter turns to the most visible theorist of violence during this period, 
Georges Sorel, to better understand the redemptive power of irrationalist violence. 
Admired by Carl Schmitt and Mussolini, and retroactively mythologized as the 
intellectual “father of fascism,” Sorel stood at the intersection of the intellectual 
networks that fostered this enthusiasm for irrationalist violence.18 His Reflections on 
Violence (1908) was enormously influential for intellectuals both in and beyond 
France. In it, he argued for proletarian violence’s spiritual and morally reparative 
power. He also proposed that violence as a remedy for familiar problems with French 
republican citizenship: it was atomizing rather than associating, and it was leading 
France into moral decadence. In ways that echoed Victor Cousin in the 1830s, Alexis 
de Tocqueville in the 1840s, and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon in the 1850s, Sorel identified 
the culprit to be bourgeois decadence. And nowhere was that decadence as clearly 
expressed as French intellectual culture’s relentless rationalism, which was now 
simply condemned as “positivism.”  
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The “underlying philosophical support” for the Third Republic and something 
of a “semiofficial creed,” positivism inspired social theorists working under the sign of 
Durkheim to design statist, technocratic approaches to social progress and moral 
improvement.19 Sorel and his friends, however, came together under the sign of Henri 
Bergson to search for the sources of moral renewal and social regeneration in the 
spontaneity of “immediate experience.” Thus, rather than repudiating republican 
aspirations for social cohesion and moral improvement wholesale, they weaponized 
Bergson to develop an anti-statist alternative. With Sorel’s aid, French thinkers across 
the spectrum found that alternative in proletarian violence. In ways more forthright 
than earlier nineteenth century proponents of redemptive violence, Sorel argued that 
such violence could be a practice of moral transvaluation. It could bring a new “ethos” 
into a world inflicted with positivism and moral decadence. 
Although Sorel initially believed that the working class held exclusive 
possession of redemptive violence, his arguments invited other intellectuals to extend 
that violence to the nation itself. As his arguments travelled from texts to contexts, it 
offered a pivot for critics of the Republic by both the left and right during the 1900s to 
converge on the cusp of war into a nationalist defense of it, in the name of the patrie, 
the embodiment of the “real” people as opposed to its abstract substitute posited by 
French parliamentarism. It helps explain why many intellectuals who were 
traditionally the first to attack the republic and its democratic institutions became on 
the eve of war its most strident nationalist defenders. In war, the “republic” and the 
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“nation” could be reborn, not as two competing visions of the social body, but a single 
moral incarnation of the people. 
The chapter begins by first describing how intellectual tendencies on the far 
Left and far Right in France worked out a shared critique of parliamentary democracy 
in the wake of the Dreyfus Affair. These tendencies—especially Hubert Lagardelle’s 
Le Mouvement socialiste and Péguy’s Cahiers de la Quinzaine—drew on Bergson to 
formulate an irrationalist response to republican statism and moral decadence. The 
chapter then reconstructs an interpretation of Sorel’s account of violence to chart how 
he formulated a voluntarist solution to this crisis: the cunning of violence. I argue that 
Sorel endorsed violence for its own sake, because it appeared to convey the will 
beyond the sphere of utilitarian reasoning. At the same time, this “subjective” 
repudiation of instrumental reasoning fulfilled behind its back the “objective” aim of 
national moral regeneration. Into a homogenous and utilitarian political culture, 
violence for its own sake injected an ameliorating moral fervor. In the final section, I 
point to how Sorel’s arguments were adapted as a conceptual fulcrum and alibi for the 
reorganization of strands of socialist, catholic, and scientific thought into an 
irrationalist nationalism by 1914—what Zeev Sternhell has called a political synthesis 
“neither right nor left.”20 Sorel’s redefinition of the class struggle in mythic, aesthetic 
terms paved the way for the displacement of the working class as the revolutionary 
subject by the “nation” while binding the new nationalism to an irrationalist image of 
violence. As a result of its adaptations within and outside of France, Sorel’s 
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conclusion that a corrupt and decadent France could only be redeemed by either “a 
great foreign war, which might reinvigorate lost energies” or “a great extension of 
proletarian violence” that would induce “disgust with the humanitarian platitudes with 
which Jaurès lulls [the bourgeoisie] to sleep,” exemplified broader reorientations of 
French political thought at the end of the Belle Époque.21  
What is at stake is showing how neither Sorel nor the claims to irrational 
violence that his Reflections helped shape should be dismissed as aberrations from the 
consolidation of a democratic political culture during the Third Republic.22 Rather, 
claims to irrational violence responded to a real contradiction contained within the 
latter’s republican ideology: its abstract vision of the social body could not bridge its 
conflicting commitments to political individualism and social cohesion. If the Third 
Republic sought to contain that contradiction through a modernizing state and a 
positivistic belief in progress, it nevertheless opened up the conceptual space for its 
supposed opposite, a militant nationalism based on a return to “concrete experience,” a 
“real” non-abstract people, and eventually a one-sided particularism. In that sense, the 
turn to irrational violence was a reverse image of the republican universalism of the 
Third Republic. It sought to form the cohesive people that the latter demanded as a 
requirement for a free democratic society. Rather than dismissing Sorel as an 
aberration from French republicanism then, he needs to be interpreted diagnostically. 
He helps us see why the leading lights of French political thought, like so many in 
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August 1914, found in war a means of bypassing those contradictions. 
 
The Unlikely Bergsonian Alliance 
Sorel’s Reflections appeared at an inflection point in anti-republican politics under the 
Third Republic. Up until the wake of the Dreyfus Affair—a watershed event of French 
history, dividing the country over the fate of a Jewish military captain falsely accused 
of treason—disputes over the proper form of French government typically divided 
socialists and republican political thinkers against their Catholic and royalist 
counterparts. Despite Pope Leo XIII’s 1892 encyclical calling for Catholic 
reconciliation with the republican regime, the divisions between the two continued to 
widen. Indeed, from the 1890s up until the publication of the Reflections in French in 
1908, France enjoyed a steady intensification of its workers’ movement. Waldeck-
Rousseau’s government finally repealed Le Chapelier’s Law in 1884, legalizing trade 
unionism for the first time in almost a century. Working class militancy and anarchist 
violence swept through Paris, leading to the bombing of several judges and the 
assassination of President Sadi Carnot in 1894. Workers repeatedly went on strike, 
intensifying anxieties over a revolutionary general strike. Anxieties over this working 
class militancy grew to such an extent that for May Day in 1890, forty thousand 
members of the army and police were brought into Paris to contain it.23  
 Escalating working class agitation coincided with the intensification of 
republican anticlericalism. These were the years that the Ferry Laws were passed, 
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establishing free, compulsory, and secular education in France. The Dreyfus Affair 
helped instigate the official separation of church and state in 1905, which further 
aligned republicans and socialists against royalism and Catholic reaction. By the mid 
1900s, when Sorel joined revolutionary syndicalism, working class militancy had been 
growing for almost two decades. The year that the Reflections came out in Italy—
1906—was the year that the Confederation Générale du Travail (CGT) adopted the 
Charter of Amiens, which announced the dominance of revolutionary syndicalism 
within the workers’ movement.24 During and after the days of the Dreyfus Affair, the 
affiliation between socialism and anticlerical republicanism seemed secure. 
 And yet, almost immediately after publishing Reflections, Sorel and his 
syndicalist companions on the left began to be solicited by the Catholic right. First 
George Valois (future founder of the ultra-nationalist Cercle Proudhon and then the 
Faisceau) and then Maurras (leader of France’s largest nationalist organ, Action 
Française) approached Sorel about the latent filiation they detected between 
revolutionary syndicalism and the royalist, nationalist movement. A member of Action 
Française helped introduce Sorel’s work to the broader right: Paul Bourget, a 
playwright and contributor to Andre Gide’s Nouvelle Revue Française, based his 1910 
play La Barricade on the Reflections. The acknowledgment of affinity did not go 
unreciprocated. In a letter to Maurras on 6 July 1909, Sorel thanked him for a copy of 
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his Enquête sur la Monarchie, writing, “It appears to me certain that your critique of 
contemporary experience well justifies that which you’ve wanted to establish… I have 
long been struck by the madness of our contemporary authors who ask democracy to 
do work that none but royalists, full of the sentiment of their mission, could 
approach.”25 
 The reasons for this nascent alliance were not reducible to political 
convenience. Even if by 1908 the republican left had broken with the revolutionary 
working class movement, which was beginning to stall, that was by no means an 
obvious invitation for the far right to court the latter.26 The pivot, rather, was 
substantive. It lay in a new shared idiom of anti-republicanism, one that critiqued the 
Republic, not only by calling on traditional platitudes of church and family, but also 
on contemporary work in French philosophy and psychology concerned with intuition, 
immediate experience, and the will. In particular, French intellectual life was being 
swept up in the charismatic influence of the philosopher Henri Bergson, whose 
lectures at the College de France became society events that spurred a vogue 
fascination with irrationalism and Catholic spiritualism [fig 17, 18].27 
 The intersection of anti-republicanism with this broader intellectual  
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[Fig 17: Henri Bergson (1859-1941)] 
 
[Fig 18: People lined up outside of Henri Bergson's lectures, 14 February 1914. Bergson’s lectures were 
considered society events, extending his influence well beyond the confines of institutional and 
academic French philosophy.]28 
reorientation shaped an irrationalist anti-establishment discourse that questioned 
whether a positivistic political culture could successfully reconstitute the French social 
body. Its central thrust was two-fold: the Third Republic encouraged moral decadence, 
and it was unable to secure the cohesion of the social body without an ever-expanding 
statism. It was this irrationalist vocabulary of political dissent that helped bridge the 
anarchist syndicalist movement with royalist, nationalist tendencies, both of whom 
came to see their generation as living through a crisis episode in a moral epic. Hubert 
Lagardelle’s Le Mouvement socialiste and Péguy’s Cahiers de la Quinzaine stood at 
the forefront of developing this new idiom of political dissent. Sorel was involved 
with both, and together they provided the immediate context for the Reflections. 
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* * * 
 Lagardelle’s journal was one of the central organs for elaborating 
revolutionary syndicalism’s political theory in France.29 It was in its pages that Sorel’s 
Reflections first appeared in French, serialized in its 1906 issues (after earlier 
appearing in its Italian analogue Il Divenire sociale). It thus provided the initial French 
audience for Reflections before the pieces were assembled into book form for 
publication in 1908 on his friend Daniel Halévy’s encouragement.30 Le Mouvement 
socialiste also provided a venue for Sorel’s highly original work on Marxism during 
these years, which by the early 1900s established him as one of its leading authorities. 
Sorel originally became involved with the journal in 1899 during the heyday of 
the Dreyfus Affair. Like others who answered Emile Zola’s call for intellectuals to 
defend Dreyfus and safeguard the universal value of truth—even if it meant tarnishing 
the esteem of France’s military—Sorel joined the Dreyfusard cause. He saw in it the 
sense of justice that he believed formed socialism’s essence.31 However, after the 
Dreyfusard movement succumbed to petty electoral politics and virulent anti-
clericalism, especially with “l’affair des fiches” and the separation of church and state 
in 1905, he abandoned it and parliamentary democracy generally.32 He was joined by 
other leading revolutionary socialist organizations, like Victor Griffuelhes’s CGT and 
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Hervé’s La Guerre sociale. Disaffection from parliamentary politics was for many 
revolutionary socialists cemented when the former socialist-liberal alliance for 
republican defense turned on the working class: a violent repression of a miners’ strike 
in May 1906 by Clemenceau, which left hundreds dead, was for many a point of no 
return. 
Though its readership was comparatively small, and despite the role its 
contributors would play in the rise of French fascism in the coming decades, even its 
scholarly critics admit Le Mouvement socialiste was “one of the best [journals] that 
had ever existed in Europe, and the influence of its contributors on the development of 
the syndicalist left was considerable.”33 The intellectuals who formed its core—
Lagardelle, Sorel, Halévy, Griffuelhes, Marcel Mauss, Antonio Labriola—became 
known as the “nouvelle école” or new school of socialism. Under Lagardelle’s 
editorial direction, the “new school” called for a rescue of the spirit of Marx from 
Marxism and for an autonomous workers’ movement. They also disseminated 
revisionists like Eduard Bernstein and developed a reputation as the “Bergsonian 
Left.”34  
The journal was particularly well known for its antagonistic stance towards 
Jaurès’s parliamentary socialism, which was seen as a capitulation to the Third 
Republic’s representative democracy. As Pierre Rosanvallon puts it, Lagardelle’s 
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circle endorsed a “sociological socialism, derived directly from the activities of labor 
groups” against the doctrinal socialism “founded on a philosophical theory.”35 
Lagardelle himself had debated Durkheim over the compatibility between the two. He 
insisted that working-class consciousness was incompatible with support for the 
republic. Durkheim responded by accusing Lagardelle and his colleagues of leading an 
incoherent anti-social movement that threatened to abort any gains socialism might 
gradually achieve through institutional reform.36  
These theoretical conflicts intersected with the broader “crisis of Marxism” 
during these years. This crisis—can or should we modify Marx’s arguments in light of 
present conditions?—revealed geopolitical and nationalist anxieties. “Official” 
Marxism in France was sometimes seen as German in spirit and thus un-French. In 
recovering Marx from Bernstein-style social democracy in Germany and Jules Guesde 
in France, Lagardelle and his journal participated in a search for a distinctly French 
form of Marxism. To critique official Marxism—even if in the name of the true 
Marx—became a way of defending French exceptionalism.37 It identified the spirit of 
Marx with the French revolutionary tradition and France as the true home of 
socialism. Hence why thinkers associated with both nationalism and revolutionary 
syndicalism also latched onto Pierre-Joseph Proudhon: aside from being a moralist, 
anarchist, and anti-capitalist, he was French.38 And in many ways, Sorel’s encounter 
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with Marx in the late 1890s was entwined with his encounter with Proudhon, and 
much of his return to “the spirit of Marx” during his days at Le Mouvement socialiste 
placed the accent on the latter.39  
Although the Reflections was published in Le Mouvement socialiste, many of 
its arguments were developed within the circle surrounding the poet and essayist 
Charles Péguy, editor of the Cahiers de la Quinzaine [fig 19, 20]. The Cahiers was a 
vibrant, financially precarious publication that gathered together strands of Catholic, 
irrationalist and socialist thought. Some of its members overlapped with Lagardelle’s 
journal. Péguy started the Cahiers after failing his agrégation at the École Normale 
Supérieure (ENS) and opening up a bookstore in the Latin Quarter. The intellectuals 
and writers who gathered there—Sorel, Péguy, Halévy, Julien Benda, Eduard Berth, 
Romain Rolland, and many others—helped formulate an alternative political program 
to the official parliamentary socialism of Jaurès and Lucien Herr, the influential 
librarian at the ENS. As Halévy joked, Péguy’s bookstore became known as “a haunt 
of old Normale students more or less denormalized.”40 
The trajectory of Péguy’s circle was as politically heterogeneous as it was 
morally unbending. Like Sorel, its members began as committed Dreyfusards. But 
whereas Halévy and Sorel abandoned the Dreyfusard movement after its cooptation by  
parliamentary politics, Péguy remained committed to its “mystique,” even as he 
acknowledged that corrupt politicians had degraded it.41 Further conflicts within the  
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[Fig 19: Charles Péguy, Editor of the Cahiers de la Quinzaine.] 
 
[Fig 20: La Boutique des cahiers, 8 rue de la Sorbonne, Paris (5th), March 1902] 
circle came over their attitudes towards Bergson. Sorel and Péguy adored Bergson, 
and it was with Péguy that Sorel began attending Bergson’s lectures in 1900—“the 
traditional activity of the aspiring French intellectual,” as Kaplan quips42—each Friday 
afternoon.43 Like many others, Péguy saw in Bergson “a new religious and 
philosophical inspiration for politics,” indeed “the last hope of a desperate age.”44 
Benda found the philosopher insufferable, attacking him in his unforgiving Une 
philosophie pathétique (1913).45 A final divisive issue was Péguy’s spiritual 
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conversion to Catholicism in 1908, which alienated both readers and fellow 
contributors to the Cahiers. Sorel found it peculiar himself. With that conversion, the 
Cahiers assumed an idiosyncratic place among the French right, a Bergsonian 
conservatism nudged between the integral nationalism of Maurras’s Action Française 
and the narcissistic cult of the moi promoted by Barrès in the Echo de Paris.  
For all of the ideological bickering at the Cahiers, its visitors were united by 
their common interest in a moral interpretation of socialism. Their polemics unfolded 
against the backdrop of the Cartesianism and positivism championed in places like the 
École Polytechnique, where Sorel received his engineering training. In their eyes, 
Cartesianism was antithetical to the moral and epistemic worldview of producers. It 
was cold and sterile; it knew no pain. That was why it could imagine the world as 
simply an object of contemplation and rational cognition. Because the perspective of 
the worker entailed pain and forbearance, however, it could never adopt a strictly 
contemplative stance towards the world as “intellectuals” did. Instead, the workers’ 
epistemological perspective inclined towards philosophical naturalism.46 It would 
never occur to them to wonder whether the external world “really” existed—the 
givenness of the pain of labor proved it beyond doubt. The fact that bourgeois 
                                                                                                                                       
his Note sur M. Bergson et la philosophie bergsonienne (1914). Benda took an unusual place within the 
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46 Georges Sorel, “Science and Morals,” in Georges Sorel, From Georges Sorel: Vol 2, Hermeneutics 
and the Sciences, ed. John L. Stanley, trans. John and Charlotte Stanley (New Brunswick: Transactions 
Publishers, 1990; first published 1900), 133: “pain is found in all manifestations of our activity… 
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life, the one that gives irrefutable proof (for our consciousness) of our immersion in the physical world 
and demonstrates our existence and the existence of the world simultaneously… Thus, the role of pain 
is very great in the world.” 
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intellectuals wondered aloud about such questions proved their decadence. It was the 
historical mission of the productive classes to clear this ideological clutter away, and 
to furnish a new value system for a modern industrial France. By embodying the 
virtues of men living “concretely,” rooted in industry, tradition, life and soil, 
producers provided a superior template for republican citizenship.47 
It was this insistence that socialism was as much a science of morality as a 
critique of liberal political economy that helped bring together Lagardelle, Sorel, 
Péguy and leaders of the CGT like Victor Griffuelhes and Émile Pouget. They 
believed that not only the terms of economic arrangement, but also the proper moral 
bases for a modernizing industrial society were at stake. After all, the positivism of the 
Third Republic could not provide them. “In vain are these philosophies adorned with a 
grand scientific apparatus,” Sorel wrote, “for they offer no help in constituting the 
morals of society.”48 Or, as he again acknowledged in a letter to Benedetto Croce in 
1907, “If I were to sum up the great concern of my entire life, it would be to 
investigate the historical genesis of morals.”49 
This moral interpretation of socialism bridged segments of revolutionary 
syndicalism and the royalist, nationalist movement, despite the fact that the value 
system of the former was explicitly proletarian. It could bridge them because, in 
portraying the social antagonisms of the Third Republic as above all moral struggles, 
it viewed society as a moral entity. Of course, Durkheim, Frederic Le Play, and 
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Hippolyte Taine already acknowledged that fact. But their school stressed morality’s 
conventionalism. It had in its canon, for example, Ernest Renan’s Vie de Jésus (1863), 
a text that sought to humanize, and so relativize, Christianity’s origin. Renan’s 1882 
“Qu-est-ce qu’une nation?” lecture, which famously acknowledged the nation as 
constituted by shared mores and historical amnesia, did so to construct a theory of the 
nation that was emphatically contingent and constructed. Taine’s equally famous 
claim that society was a product of the “race, milieu and moment” triptych was, 
beyond its conservatism, also an ode to a historicist and relativizing science of society. 
This moral conventionalism was unacceptable to the political thinkers 
associated with both the royalist right and revolutionary syndicalism. They thought 
that conventionalism encouraged democratic statism and social fragmentation. The 
insistence on the conventionality of moral and political association both deprived 
France of genuine moral foundations and fragmented the social body, leaving it to be 
clinched together only “mechanically” through the state’s artificial “top-down” 
instruments of integration like education and the family, civic nationalism, the 
standardization of a common language, and the creation of social security.50 Indeed, 
Charles Gide, Le Play, Durkheim and others had largely abandoned the moral 
naturalism of revolutionary republicanism. These new architects of liberal 
republicanism had reconceptualized the state, instead, as an agent of progress in the 
name of which it could “produce the social.” “Established elites, steeped in a 
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liberalism that counted Tocqueville and Guizot among its progenitors,” Philip Nord 
explains, had finally “shucked off the Jacobin legacy.”51 They forged in its place a 
republicanism that viewed “the social” as an artifact of state-sponsored instruments of 
cohesion, cementing together discrete social formations and transforming the state 
from a site of political sovereignty into an instrument of economic improvement and 
social harmony. The effect was that, as Jacques Donzelot has argued, state sovereignty 
was gradually redefined in terms of its role as guardian of social progress rather than 
an expression of popular will.52 Violence, in turn, was defined as barbaric and whose 
transcendence was a marker of a well-constituted social fabric. Indeed, the repudiation 
of violence formed a core component of national identity, one that became 
increasingly central to the self-understanding of French republican ideology. 
Thus, although Sorel and his friends agreed with Durkheim that society was a 
moral phenomenon, they also believed that, far from promoting cohesion and morality 
as it promised, this rationalist republicanism actually amplified moral relativism, 
atomization and statism. Like Tocqueville and Proudhon, Sorel complained of the 
“egoism” it unleashed: “Egoism of the basest kind shamelessly breaks the sacred 
bonds of the family and friendship in every case in which these oppose its desire” (RV, 
188). Indeed, because of that egoism, Sorel feared that “France has lost its morals” 
(RV, 216). For the implications, one had only to look to Barrès’s Les Déracinés or 
“The Uprooted” (1897), a popular novel, part of a trilogy on “national energy,” and 
which told the story of young Frenchmen from Alsace and Lorraine alienated from the 
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patrie by the pernicious influence of a Kant professor. Kant was a convenient stand-in 
for the political culture of the Third Republic: rational, cosmopolitan, universalistic, 
homogenous, an allergic-reaction—so Barrès thought—to life, instinct, immediate 
experience, individuality and everything “lived” and “concrete,” namely, la France 
profonde. Péguy was equally melodramatic. Influenced by Sorel’s early studies on the 
social origins of morality, he called in Notre jeunesse for a return to French 
republicanism “before the professors crushed it,” to recover “what a people was like 
before it was obliterated” by the scientific and statist point of view. He complained of 
“the de-republicanization of France”—the reduction of French republicanism into a 
relativist, parliamentary shell—“is essentially the same movement as the de-
Christianization of France. Both together are one and the same movement, a profound 
de-mystification.”53 The mystical Republic (Péguy), the lived experience of the patrie 
(Barrès), the “most noble sentiments” of concrete morality (Sorel): each represent 
related attempts to relate a story of national morality driven towards egoism and 
rationalism by the regime’s rationalistic republicanism. The “the new school” of 
socialism took upon itself the task of counteract these trends by “recognizing the 
necessity of the improvement of morals” in France (RV, 223).  
What brought parts of revolutionary syndicalism and royalist nationalism into 
proximity, in other words, was their shared search for a morality not through the state, 
but—like the broader turn to irrationalism in European intellectual thought—in the 
immediacy of experience, particularly as it was available in the ethos of “ordinary” 
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workers. As the Dreyfus Affair made clear, so long as the socialist left had been 
affiliated with republican anti-clericalism, there could be no rapport between the two. 
But thanks to irrationalist politics forged by Péguy, Lagardelle and others, a political 
synthesis was possible on the basis of a reassertion of naturalistic morality, grounded 
in a vision of activity, industry and the normative family—a romantic radicalism 
grounded in what they called “life.” 
Together, these tendencies downplayed the element of economic struggle in 
socialism and magnified its moral aspect, gradually recasting the class struggle as one 
between classes who were less defined by their place in the productive system than 
their moral convictions. It was out of this common ground that a shared critical 
diagnosis of parliamentary democracy was put forward. But such groundwork did not 
answer the all-important question of how the moral foundations of the social could be 
reconstructed. It did not yet offer an ameliorative practice that could enact and bring 
forth moral order from within a relativistic, skeptical, and utilitarian political culture. 
The political thinker who most vigorously worked out a solution was Sorel. His 
Reflections, which finally appeared in book form in 1908, was to make the case that 
collective violence could be a practice of freedom and an instrument of moral 
improvement precisely because it defied the constraints of the abstract. 
 
The Cunning of Violence: The Argument of Sorel’s Reflections 
Sorel’s Reflections appeared as many parliamentary socialists denounced 
revolutionary violence as irrational and “antisocial.” Despite the fact that a 
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reconceptualization of violence is the Reflections’ chief intervention, however, there is 
virtually no in-depth analysis of what Sorel meant by it. This neglect is likely the 
consequence of the Reflection’s stature. Its canonical status has led recent scholars to 
ignore it in favor of his minor writings, particularly in the philosophy of science, to 
better account for his overall intellectual portrait.54 The ironic result is that Sorel’s 
Reflections, its view on violence assumed to be familiar and settled, has received 
disproportionately little conceptual formalization. But as Alice Kaplan wryly notes, 
despite its relative neglect by recent academic scholarship, “the book least worth 
reading was the book most often cited and probably the only book the fascists knew 
much about.”55  
The neglect is evident in the way that scholars read the Reflections as 
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endorsing violence for its own sake. Shklar spoke for an entire generation of readers 
when she concluded that “what distinguishes [Sorel] from most other revolutionaries 
was that he was not at all concerned with a better future, or indeed with improving 
society in any way.” Strictly speaking, he could not even be classified as a political 
thinker.56 This view has persisted among contemporary readers, and it is not altogether 
wrong.57 Violence for Sorel is that—but only when viewed from the subjective 
perspective of the political actor. A more careful reading shows, however, that the 
Reflections builds its account of violence from two simultaneous perspectives. In 
addition to the subjective perspective on proletarian violence, Sorel describes it from a 
functionalist or Archimedean perspective. The point of the Reflections, after all, is to 
argue that we need violence to redraw lines of class conflict at a time in which 
parliamentary democracy is erasing them through “social legislation” and mixing 
everything into a “democratic morass” (RV, 78). Into that morass, proletarian violence 
injects moral and social differentiation. This is violence’s “objective” function. The 
trick is that for violence to accomplish this objective task, those who engage in it must 
do so in ignorance of this overall purpose; they cannot hold in their mind’s eye this 
“merely” instrumental goal. To do so—to engage in violence for utilitarian reasons—
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would debase their morality by falling into the same utilitarian reasoning about 
violence that characterizes raison d’état or what Sorel called “force.” Rather than 
differentiating the classes, such violence would simply remake proletarians the image 
of their bourgeois enemies. Popular accounts of Sorel attend almost exclusively to its 
subjective, irrational side,58 thus obscuring how Sorel built into his account of 
proletarian violence a distinction between its subjective and objective aspects: 
disavowing its function is how it fulfilled its function.  
Thus, like Hegel’s cunning of reason, Sorel formulates something of a 
“cunning of violence” to serve as a motor for historical and moral development: “The 
striving towards excellence, which exists in the absence of any personal, immediate or 
proportional reward, constitutes the secret virtue that assures the continued progress of 
the world” (RV, 248). This “cunning of violence” prevents his endorsement of 
violence for its own sake from succumbing to subjectivism. Conceptually, it is 
constructed upon Sorel’s own interpretation of France’s political situation, which also 
consisted in an “objective” and “subjective” aspect: it tended towards decadence, and 
it extinguished the will. Formalizing Sorel’s conception of violence helps us see why 
Sorel believed his account of irrational violence was uniquely situated to regenerating 
the moral foundations of the social. 
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In elaborating violence in its “objective” aspect, Sorel argues that proletarian 
violence counteracts the decadence brought about by parliamentary democracy’s 
pursuit of “social peace.” Traditionally, he claims, French political culture has been 
hostile to the class struggle because of the rights of man: “Judging all things from the 
abstract point of view of the Déclaration des droits de l’homme, they said that the 
legislation of 1789 had been created in order to abolish all distinction of class in law.” 
For this reason, legislation tailored to the conditions of the working class—social 
legislation—has been opposed because it “reintroduced the idea of class and 
distinguished certain groups of citizens as being unfit for the use of liberty” (RV 51). It 
enshrined in law a formal distinction that the revolution was supposed to have 
abolished.  
With the founding of the Third Republic, however, social legislation became 
palatable because it was recast as republican, i.e. a means of integrating 
disenfranchised classes into modern citizenship and resolving “the social question” in 
universal, progressive terms. Policy programs like Léon Duguit and Léon Bourgeois’s 
“solidarism” had helped create a state-run system of social security and insurance that 
could fulfill the demands of “social right,” enact a “social economics,” and secure 
cross-class solidarity in the name of progress while regulating anomie via the family 
and the workplace.59 It was this attempt to republicanize social conflict that Sorel 
disdainfully called social peace, and in the Reflections he attacks Jaurès and Bourgeois 
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as its sophists. 
According to the Reflections, solidarism’s “social peace” has made 
parliamentary socialism effete and counter-revolutionary. Rather than standing firm in 
their convictions, socialist politicians seek compromises with the ruling class and 
become opportunistic. “Parliamentary socialism,” Sorel observes with loathing, “feels 
a certain embarrassment from the fact that, at its origin, socialism took its stand on 
absolute principles” (RV, 68). Remade as realists, parliamentarians become 
hypocritical calculators and strategists. The pursuit of social peace, moreover, cannot 
help but recapitulate asymmetries of power. This point is important, for Sorel is 
arguing that what we conventionally understand to be rational deliberation aimed at 
generating consensus on questions of public good can, in practice, rarely realize the 
political freedom of the dispossessed under exploitative capitalist conditions. Liberal 
democratic politics, in a situation of unequal social relations, will stage social conflict 
as tacitly organized by the question of what concessions are needed from the 
bourgeoisie to appease the working classes: “Such a discussion presupposes that it is 
possible to ascertain the exact extent of social duty and what sacrifices an employer 
must continue to make in order to maintain his position” (RV, 56). It is thus reformist 
in essence; it rotates the seat of capitalist power without ever superseding it. 
Negotiations turn on questions of social “duty,” where fulfillment of this duty allows 
the bourgeois benefactors to feel a “supposed heroism,” one that is identified more 
accurately by its beneficiaries as barely concealed “shameful exploitation.” By making 
the class struggle a question of the proper relation between the classes, of what the 
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ruling class owes the poor and what social legislation is therefore required by the state, 
such discussions cannot but take the form of special pleading. At its worst, it 
moralizes reformist politics so that its revolutionary counterpart appears not only 
practically unfeasible but morally repugnant, a violation of one’s duty to cultivate a 
national consensus enjoyable by all democratic citizens. Hence why “parliamentary 
socialists no longer believe in insurrection…they teach that the ballot-box has replaced 
the gun,” or why “parliamentary socialism does not mingle with the main body of the 
parties of the extreme Left” (RV, 49-50). By framing class struggle around civic 
harmony and duty, such struggles entrench exploitative social relations and on those 
grounds alone are to be rejected as counter-revolutionary (RV, 55-62, 107). 
According to Sorel, this displacement of violent class warfare for the pursuit of 
social peace has ushered France into a state of decadence. On its face, this claim was 
not new. The concern with decline and decadence was a fixture of late nineteenth 
century European intellectual culture. Between conservative disciplines like crowd 
psychology60 and criminal anthropology,61 “decadence” and “degeneration” were 
concepts in widespread use, organizing an array of social ills like the declining birth 
rate, alcohol consumption, criminality and sexual pathology within a common 
framework that analogized the compulsive repetition of France’s revolutionary history 
to the intergenerational reproduction of the social body. Decadence linked biology and 
history together in a common national narrative of depletion, of vital life thwarted or 
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suppressed.62 
Sorel was intimately familiar with this discourse.63 Yet like Tocqueville, his 
understanding of decadence was psychosocial, not physiological. Drawing on his own 
studies of Vico and Proudhon, he portrayed decadence as a moral condition whose 
outstanding symptom was the substitution of intellectualism for heroism, and petty 
cleverness for physical violence (RV, 184-9, 211-2).64 Indeed, earlier in Sorel’s Le 
Procés de Socrate (1889), he had already insisted that philosophy ruined ancient 
Athens by destroying its spirit of heroism and the traditional family, replacing them 
with intellectualism and homosexuality. The former union of poetry and politics, and 
its enchanted understanding of nature, history, and the family, were supplanted by an 
enervating culture more interested in philosophical disquisition and pleasure than war 
and reproduction. Fatally, Athens had turned away from the egalitarianism of “life” 
for the hierarchies of “thought.” Ancient Greeks before their decline, Sorel extols, 
were not unlike the captains of industry in America, muscular in their pursuit of 
collective self-interest. But now there is nothing but “bourgeois cowardice” in France 
(RV, 62). The ruling classes have surrendered their historical mission as “creators of 
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productive forces” for the pacific “noble profession of educators of the proletariat.” 
The result is statism and the devaluation of heroic action. This is the objective 
situation and it is by all accounts a dim one.65 
This condition is expressed, subjectively, as a paralysis of our collective will.66 
Rationalism and its belief in progress, born in the Enlightenment and now the credo of 
the Republic, gives rise to an intellectual culture that denigrates the practical bases of 
knowledge and privileges abstract reasoning. And like Péguy’s claim in Notre 
jeunesse that all things begin as “mystique” and are debased into “politique,” Sorel 
sees in this culture a fall from intuition and feeling into abstract formalism and 
prediction. He occasionally calls this emergence of a utilitarian culture the rise of 
“probabilism.” This degeneration of the will—the subjective side of decadence—
disempowers actors because it substitutes for the unconditional will a form of 
cognitive and moral reasoning fit only for deadened workers in capitalism, not citizens 
in a free society.67 Why, after all, would people participate in a revolution if they 
predicted that their actions would likely fail, particularly if their opponent held the 
might of the state? “Theoreticians of democracy,” with their subsequent calls for 
reasonable and calculative action, “greatly restricted the field upon which this absolute 
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man may extend the action of his free will” (RV 262). 
According to Sorel, Marx is the thinker who best grasps the consequences of 
orienting our wills towards prediction and calculation. A collection of free individuals 
maximizing self-interest will produce, in the aggregate, laws of social tendency, 
thereby dialectically transforming the sum of free actions into a determinate system 
governed by social compulsion. As Marx teaches us, 
When we reach the last historical stage, the action of independent wills 
disappears and the whole of society resembles an organized body, working 
automatically; observers can then establish an economic science which appears 
to them as exact as the sciences of physical nature. The error of many 
economists consisted in their ignorance of the fact that this system, which 
seemed natural and primitive to them, is the result of a series of 
transformations that might not have taken place, and which always remains a 
very unstable structure, for it could be destroyed by force, as it had been 
created by the intervention of force... (RV, 168)68 
Though this phenomenon was familiar enough to nineteenth century political and 
economic thinkers, it reached a crisis point at the end of the century. At the same time 
that Sorel wrote his Reflections, for instance, Weber supplied this phenomenon its 
canonical formulation as the “iron cage” thesis. “The Puritan wanted to work in a 
calling; we are forced to do so,” he laments in 1905, for the desire for economic well-
being was “now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine 
production which today determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into 
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Books, 1987; first published 1976), 123: “We should never lose sight of the fact that it is in the 
economic order and under the regime of free competition that chance furnishes ‘average’ results, 
capable of being regularized in such a way as to draw attention to tendencies analogous to mechanical 
processes; these average results can be suitably expressed in the form of natural laws.” 
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this mechanism…with irresistible force.”69 The disenchantment of the world, Weber 
and Marx had argued, went hand-in-hand with the dialectical reversal of individual 
freedom into structural compulsion. It was a realization that alarmed an entire 
generation of European intellectuals, and many—as Sorel would—turned to vitalism 
as a metaphysical escape hatch. 
For all of his dissatisfactions with French republicanism, Sorel is at his most 
republican when he defines French decadence as a crisis of the will. Sorel’s work in 
the philosophy of science originally led him to see determinism—understood not as 
fatalism, but as a simple statement about the regularity of natural phenomenon under 
conditions held constant—as something that expanded the jurisdiction of man’s will 
since it guaranteed the natural world’s experimental manipulability by industry and 
technology.70 The more we understand the determinate regularity of natural 
phenomenon, the more we may subject the natural world to our will. But in modern 
democracies populated with atomized citizens keen on calculating rather than acting, 
humans became a part of determined nature rather than standing above it as its willful 
experimenter and producer (like, say, an engineer or a producer). Parliamentary 
democracy, where a self-interested politician jockeyed for votes as if at a Stock 
Exchange, was simply another instance of man despiritualized into determined nature. 
Party politics, like the market, resembled a machine that viewed each citizen as 
quantitatively interchangeable with any other (RV, 221-2). A remedy was thus needed 
                                                
69 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: 
Routledge, 1990; first published 1905), 123. 
70 Sorel adapts the notion of “determinism” from Claude Bernard, one of the leading philosophers of 
science in the Third Republic and an experimental physiologist. The best discussion of Bernard’s 
influence on Sorel’s early writings is Jennings, Georges Sorel, 45-9. 
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in the form of unmediated collective will, prior to both language and utilitarian reason, 
a will so primordial that it could not be captured by the mechanical reproduction of 
society. Man “must have in himself a powerful motive, a conviction which must 
dominate his whole consciousness, and act before the calculations of reflection have 
time to enter his mind” (RV, 206). Or as Sorel put it earlier in the preface to his friend 
Ferdinand Pelloutier’s Histoire des bourses du travail (1902), “Teaching the 
proletariat to will, instructing it by action—this is the whole secret of the socialist 
education of the people.”71  
* * * 
“It is here,” Sorel announces, “that the role of violence in history appears as of 
utmost importance” (RV, 77). Proletarian violence, “a very fine and heroic thing,” 
something “at the service of the immemorial interests of civilization,” appears “upon 
the scene at the very moment when the conception of social peace claims to moderate 
disputes.” That violence “confines employers to their role as producers and tends to 
restore the class structure just when they seemed on the point of intermingling in the 
democratic morass” (RV, 85, 78). Violence can undo the parliamentary rotation of 
power that cuts off revolutionary transformation. It can reverse the objective tendency 
towards decadence. “The danger which threatens the future of the world may be 
avoided,” indeed, violence “may save the world from barbarism” through an act of 
mass moral regeneration (RV, 85). 
Sorel describes his turn to violence as an empirical discovery. The structure of 
                                                
71 Sorel, “On revolution without politics,” 93. 
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exposition in the Reflections reflects this belief: the second half of the book is framed 
as a “test” of whether proletarian violence, which already exists as an accomplished 
fact, can ameliorate France’s present crisis. In reality, however, Sorel was subverting, 
by inverting, the prevailing presumption that violence was antisocial. Republican 
social theorists actually already believed that violence was irrational. But they often 
concluded from that fact that violence was therefore antisocial, because it undermined 
the conditions for social solidarity. But Sorel agreed with Durkheim and Mauss that 
society cannot be held together through reason alone. Like so many others before him 
in nineteenth century France, Sorel understood that contractualist solidarity could not 
actually form a cohesive society. But he therefore drew the proper conclusions that 
other republicans refused to own: it was precisely because violence was irrational that 
it might actually be social.  
This latter point makes it difficult to simply dismiss Sorel as straightforwardly 
antirepublican. For Sorel accepted the major conclusions of Durkheim’s social theory, 
including the irrational qualities of violence, the centrality of “the sacred” and 
morality to social cohesion, and the all-important belief that society was an organism 
distinct from the aggregate of individuals that made it up. Even more, just as 
Durkheim saw a society-constituting function in moments of irrational collective 
effervescence, Sorel believed that morality depended on sources that delved below the 
registers of rational cognition. Where he departed from Durkheim was in seeing, with 
Bergson, liberty in ineffably voluntarist terms.  
Indeed, it is the influence of Bergson that helps account for the path that the 
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Reflections takes away from Durkheim’s basic insights. Drawing on the former’s 
arguments that men returned to their free will by activating certain memories to return 
to “pure duration,” Sorel argued that if proletarian violence could draw upon a myth—
a powerful visual memory—such violence could reignite our faculty of collective 
willing, our shared powers of self-compulsion. These myths “are not descriptions of 
things but expressions of a will to act” (RV, 28). Specifically, they are “a body of 
images capable of evoking instinctively all the sentiments” of “war...against modern 
society,” a mental visualization of an “artificial world” that we hold to be irrefutable, 
not because there is no evidence against it but because it is not something to which 
epistemic procedures of refutation are relevant: “A myth cannot be refuted since it is, 
at bottom, identical to the convictions of a group…unanalysable into parts which 
could be placed on the plane of historical descriptions” (RV, 118, 29). Myths are not 
empirical descriptions, or historical and sociological theses. Thus, “people who are 
living in this world of myths are secure from all refutation.”  
 According to Sorel, the history of socialism in France has long shown the 
power of myths of revolution, especially that of 1789. Its reliance on these myths has 
“led many to assert that socialism is a kind of religion” (RV, 30). Yet simply because 
myths are “not astrological almanacs” does not mean they are religious, even as they 
remind us that what distinguishes religion from science is precisely the mythic 
element. The latter is what gives to religion its validity and binding compulsion, 
completely alien to modern positivistic reasoning and its withering skepticism. It was 
a fact neither Durkheim nor Renan could ever grasp no matter how much they sought 
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to demystify religion by writing their histories. Indeed, Marxism contained a mythic 
aspect too, and in Sorel’s view the goal of revisionism was to recover that mythic 
core—the vision of catastrophe and revolutionary deliverance—from its 
disenchantment by the “scientific” Marxists of his day (RV, 122-9). After all, the 
falsity of myths “does not prevent us from continuing to make resolutions,” to act on 
their behalf (RV, 116). In short, violence sustained by myths can call into being a will 
external to the system of law-like regularity that characterizes modern capitalist 
society. It engenders the “sublime,” the moral and aesthetic quality of action that is 
proof of our freedom. 
What is important to Sorel is not the true but banal claim that humans can be 
motivated by the irrational or the fictitious. What matters, rather, is the more 
fundamental issue of knowing whether we are free at all. When we act on mythic 
grounds, “our freedom becomes perfectly intelligible” (RV, 27). To act independently 
of rational or cognitive considerations is to come to know the deep psychology of our 
inner life, “our willing activity” and its “creative moment” that rationalist sciences 
obscure by viewing our actions instrumentally and retrospectively from the standpoint 
of completion (RV, 25-27). As he put in Humanité nouvelle around the same time, “to 
organize does not consist in placing automatons on boxes! Organization is the passage 
from order which is mechanical, blind and determined from the outside, to organic, 
intelligent and fully accepted differentiation; in a world, it is a moral development.”72 
                                                
72 Georges Sorel, “The Socialist Future of Syndicates,” republished in Georges Sorel, From Georges 
Sorel: Essays in Socialism and Philosophy, ed. John Stanley (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 
1987; first published 1976), 84. Originally appeared in Humanité nouvelle in March/April 1908. 
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The moral regeneration of society requires wrestling a politics of will out of a 
deterministic and atomized social order. While Sorel draws this redefinition of 
freedom as an inner subjective experience, as willing and invention, largely on the 
basis of his reading of Bergson,73 modeling freedom on creativity was also Sorel’s 
way of insisting on the moral superiority of the productive classes over intellectual 
ones. Because creative production was a mystery of the interior life, it made sense that 
socialism had mythic elements since it was a doctrine for producers.74 
The classic examples of myths, according to Sorel, were the myths of 
deliverance that motivated Greek soldiers, the Jews and Christians of antiquity, and 
the leaders of the Protestant reformation (RV, 115-6). In each case, images of 
imminent catastrophe and redemption motivated the will of the persecuted, and no 
amount of empirical and worldly persuasion could touch their conviction. Such myths 
exaggerated every conflict, so that every struggle bore world-historic weight (RV, 58-
63). The history of social movements teaches that all great historical transformations 
are motivated by such myths, and even if none of the myths are realized in their 
details, it does nothing to the accomplished fact that, moved by such myths, political 
actors have reshaped the world.  
It is no accident that Sorel often associates myths with the religiously 
                                                
73 “Bergson, on the contrary, invites us to consider the inner depths of the mind and what happens 
during a creative moment: ‘There are’, he says, ‘two different selves, one which is, as it were, the 
external projection of the other, its spatial and, so to speak, social representation. We reach the former 
by deep introspection, which leads us to grasp our inner states as living things, constantly in a process 
of becoming, as states not amenable to measure… But the moments when we grasp ourselves are rare, 
and this is why we are rarely free… To act freely is to recover possession of oneself, and to get back 
into pure duration.’” (RV, 26). 
74 Sorel explains, “Socialism is necessarily very obscure, since it deals with production, i.e. with the 
most mysterious part of human activity… No effort of thought, no progress of knowledge, no rational 
induction will ever dispel the mystery which envelops socialism” (RV, 139-40). 
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persecuted. After all, not any memory or motivating image becomes mythic. What 
makes a myth a myth is that action in its name produces an ethos. After all, if it were 
simply a matter of motivating men beyond their reason, fear would work just as well. 
Turning from Bergson to Nietzsche and Proudhon, Sorel puts the problem thus:75 
At the beginning of any enquiry on modern ethics this question must be asked: 
under what conditions is regeneration possible?… And if the contemporary 
world does not contain the roots of a new ethic, what will happen to it? The 
sighs of a whimpering bourgeoisie will not save it if it has forever lost its 
morality (RV, 224). 
If political actors are to regain contact with their “willing activity,” but in a way that 
ameliorates degeneration and decline, they must be guided by myths that can furnish 
to the world a new system of valuation. They need myths that can isolate men from 
worldly considerations, and which allow them to act in ways exonerated from the 
demands of strategic or instrumental necessity. In other words, they need myths that 
can inspire “sublime” action, for “When working-class circles are reasonable, as the 
professional sociologists with them to be,” Sorel scornfully remarked, “there is no 
more opportunity for the sublime than when agricultural unions discuss the subject of 
the price of guano with manure merchants” (RV, 210). Sublime violence is violence at 
once moralized and aestheticized, guided by images of catastrophe and redemption. It 
is conducted without traces of utilitarianism. It is at once voluntary and morally 
uplifting—precisely the type of behavior Sorel believes parliamentary democracy 
discourages with its emphasis on “social peace,” realism, compromise, and 
                                                
75 Approvingly leaning on Durkheim’s “La Determination du fait moral” (1906), Sorel writes, “it would 
be impossible to suppress the sacred in ethics and that what characterized the sacred was its 
incommensurability with other human values” (RV, 205). 
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“reasonable” debate. Indeed, Sorel practically chokes with rage at the prospect of 
politicians joining a social movement, as happened in the Dreyfusard movement (“no 
more heroic characters, no more sublimity, no more convictions!”) (RV, 213). 
 Until the founding of the Third Republic, Sorel believed that the most 
significant modern myth was the French Revolution’s wars of liberty. That 
revolutionary myth, a memory and image of a newly sovereign people struggling to 
survive against a jealous Europe, motivated generations of soldiers while protecting 
them from base utilitarian considerations. Like the Christians of antiquity, the 
revolutionaries fought and died independently of the outcome: win or lose, their souls 
would be saved. This was, of course, the myth that inspired both Tocqueville’s 
writings in Algeria and the Paris Communards. But, alas, the historians of the Third 
Republic—especially Jaurès and Taine—have disenchanted the French Revolution 
(RV, 90-1). By writing its history, by rendering the Revolution as if it were any other 
event, they have destroyed its mythic element, revealing the revolution for what it was 
in fact: a “superstitious cult of the State” (RV, 99). “The prestige of the revolutionary 
days” has been badly damaged. They can no longer sustain free action.76 
With the myth of the revolution’s wars of liberty disenchanted and exhausted, 
a new myth is now needed to rekindle the mythic in society. That myth is the 
catastrophic general strike, the modern heir to the mystique of the French Revolution 
                                                
76 “There can be no national epic about things which the people cannot picture to themselves as 
reproducible in the near future; popular poetry implies the future much more than the past; it is for this 
reason that the adventures of the Gauls, of Charlemagne, of the Crusades, of Joan of Arc, cannot form 
the object of a narrative capable of moving anyone but literary people. Since we have begun to believe 
that contemporary governments cannot be brought down by riots like those of 14 July and 10 August, 
we have ceased to regard these days as having an epic character” (RV, 91). 
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and thus its latest iteration.77 For democracy’s disenfranchised, “the war of conquest 
interests them no longer. Instead of thinking of battles, they now think of strikes; 
instead of setting up their ideal as a battle against the armies of Europe, they now set it 
up as the general strike in which the capitalist regime will be destroyed” (RV, 63). The 
myth of the general strike “awakens in the depth of the soul a sentiment of the 
sublime,” it inspires action undaunted by victory’s implausibility and thus “brings to 
the fore the pride of free men” (RV, 159). It brings together the need for a collective 
will with a new system of values that repudiates the intellectualism and decadence of a 
dying France.78 From its violence will arise an “ethic of the producers for the future” 
(RV, 224). 
It is important to capture the dialectical structure of this account of violence. 
This mythic, sublime violence possesses an explicit objective, instrumental aim: the 
moral improvement of France and the generation of a new ethos. It is useful, and 
necessary, because of the decadent condition the French found themselves. But that 
aim cannot be realized if those who engage in this violence do so for that reason, for it 
would make their violence an example of “force” rather than an unconditional, 
spontaneous expression of absolute moral conviction. No wonder, then, that no matter 
how hard scientists and social theorists try to engineer a new morality for modern 
                                                
77 As Sorel explains, “We might, in fact, be led to ask if our official socialists, with their passion for 
discipline and their infinite confidence in the genius of their leaders, are not the authentic heirs to the 
royal armies while the anarchists and the adherents of the general strike represent today the spirit of the 
revolutionary armies who, against all the rules of the art of war, so thoroughly thrashed the fine armies 
of the coalition” (RV, 243). 
78 Again, Bergson is Sorel’s influence. The general strike "groups them all in a coordinated picture... it 
colours with an intense life all the details of the composition presented to consciousness. We thus obtain 
that intuition of socialism which language cannot give us with perfect clearness - and we obtain it as a 
whole, perceived instantaneously” (RV, 118). 
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France, they can never succeed in regenerating its morality. For that, one needs the 
cunning of violence.  
It was Sorel’s hope that by refusing instrumental considerations, violence 
motivated by myths could produce behind its back an expressivist, spontaneous, and 
natural morality. This violence was moral, not because it was justified, but because it 
produced a morality. It took sustenance from an aesthetic ideal which, in virtue of 
being the self’s inner creation, was untouched by reason’s corrosive abstraction. It 
emancipated men from utilitarian calculations to pursue convictions as ends in 
themselves. Citing Nietzsche and Renan freely, Sorel believed his Reflections had 
effected a transvaluation of violence’s value. No longer destructive, violence was 
productive; not nihilistic, it was value creating; the opposite of selfishness, it was a 
means of suppressing egoism for collective moral improvement: “it is the birth of a 
virtue, a virtue that the Intellectuals of the bourgeoisie are incapable of understanding, 
a virtue which has the power to save civilization” (RV, 228). 
For a generation of Frenchmen in search of authentic individuality and the 
immediacy of fraternity, this intertwinement of the moral and the aesthetic became 
much more than an idiosyncratic intellectual synthesis. It provided the most 
sophisticated argument for why violence could be a fountain of “concrete” or 
communal values with which to overcome the determinism of an individualist society. 
 
Conclusion: From Proletarian Violence to the Nation’s Violence 
Sorel states that “Proletarian acts of violence” are “purely and simply acts of 
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war; they have the value of military maneuvers and serve to mark the separation of 
classes” (RV, 105). Rather than acting from jealousy or a sense of self-regard, 
proletarian violence is dispassionate and soldierly. At the same time, such individuals 
are not dissolved into a collective like the state. They retain their individuality. “In the 
wars of Liberty,” Sorel suggests, “each soldier considered himself as an individual 
having something of importance to do in battle, instead of looking upon himself as 
simply one part of the military mechanism entrusted to the supreme direction of a 
leader.” During these wars, Sorel is struck by the contrast between the “automatons of 
the royal armies,” and the revolutionary army, a “collection of heroic exploits by 
individuals who drew the motives of their conduct from their enthusiasm” (RV, 240-
1). What convinced the French revolutionary soldier of his irreducible individuality 
was the myth of the revolution, which guaranteed his vindication. He was not a 
machine following orders, interchangeable with any other as parliamentary democracy 
viewed each vote or capitalism viewed each worker. He was also not a utilitarian, a 
rational skeptic, a positivist or an intellectual. Instead, he was a qualitative individual 
who had moral conviction. His violence was perhaps the only way that the will could 
appear in the world prior to any mediation that would deaden it, making of him “an 
automaton.” The cunning of violence made this belief, not just a subjective wish, but 
an objective possibility. 
Sorel’s redefinition of violence as a mythic, war-like practice connected the 
ongoing moral revisionism of socialism to a specific political practice. It was 
frequently appropriated by several movements both within and outside of France. 
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Amid these appropriations and adaptations, there was a clear pattern of displacing the 
revolutionary role the Reflections assigned to the working class with that of “the 
nation”—by Sorel himself included. Indeed, whatever popularity the Reflections 
enjoyed appeared intertwined with its adaptation into a nationalist idiom.  
For example, members of Action Française invited Sorel and Eduard Berth—a 
regular at Péguy’s Cahiers and one of Sorel’s more dedicated followers—to found a 
magazine called La Cité Française. Its opening statement, which Sorel signed, stated 
that the group’s goal was to “liberate French intelligence” from the “ideologies which 
have taken over in Europe for the past century,” namely positivism. To that end,  
It is necessary to awaken the conscience which the classes ought to possess 
themselves and which is presently smothered by democratic ideas. It is 
necessary to awaken the proper virtues of each class, and without which each 
will not be able to accomplish its historical mission.79 
The allusion to the Reflections was unmistakable, with its call for proletarian violence 
as a means of cultivating the ethos of the working class necessary for moral 
development. Yet the manifesto was immediately followed by Sorel’s own addendum 
that added a surprising clarion call “to restore to the French a spirit of independence” 
by taking the “noble paths opened by the masters of national thought [la pensée 
nationale].”80 Nationalism, after all, had been thoroughly repudiated as chauvinistic 
self-interest in the Reflections. 
After La Cité Française failed to take off, its participants took their “Sorelian 
royalism” into several splinter tendencies.81 Berth would help found the Cercle 
                                                
79 “Déclaration de la ‘Cité Française’” reprinted in Pierre Andreu, Notre Maître, M. Sorel (Paris: 
Bernard Grasset, 1953), 327-8. 
80 “L’ ‘Indépendance Française,’” reprinted in Andreu, Notre Maître, M. Sorel, 329-31. 
81 Antliff, Avant-Garde Fascism, 65. 
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Proudhon. Founded by George Valois, a member of Action Française, the Cercle was 
an ultra-nationalist league whose 1912 manifesto declared democracy the greatest 
threat to the modern world, for democracy substituted “abstract” liberties for 
“concrete” ones. In so doing, it endangered the individual, the family, and society. The 
group was charged with “reawakening the spirit,” to defeat “the false science” 
underlying democracy and capitalism, and to resuscitate the patrie and its “laws of 
blood.”82 In its pages and in Valois’s speeches, Sorel was repeatedly referred to “our 
master.”  
Jean Variot, an artist and journalist who first met Sorel at Péguy’s Cahiers, 
subsequently founded L’Independence, an intellectual outlet for Sorel where he 
published nationalist and anti-Semitic essays that alienated many of his former allies 
on the left while winning him new followers on the right.83  In L’Independence, the 
former Dreyfusard now suggested that the affair was a Jewish conspiracy and repeated 
xenophobic platitudes long associated with the French right. In particular, his writings 
now focused on the Jew as “anti-artist,” revealing that his attempts to reinfuse politics 
with an aesthetic dimension was never neutral. Sorel’s redefinition of citizenship on 
the basis of productive labor (understood as the objectification of a mysterious, inner 
creativity of the will) served as an alibi for the political exclusion of those whose 
social ascriptions marked them as incapable of participating in this new sociality of 
instinct, intuition, and creative production. Sorel also published two essays in L’Action 
française: a review of Péguy’s book on Joan of Arc, praising it for its patriotism, and 
                                                
82 Cahiers du Cercle Proudhon, “Déclaration,” Cahiers du Cercle Proudhon 1 (1912): 1-2. 
83 Wilde, “Sorel and the French Right.” 
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an essay critiquing parliamentary socialists and their complicity in state-led repression 
of strikers.84  
This move towards a militant nationalism was shared by many participants of 
the former “Bergsonian Left.” Lagardelle, disaffected by the failures of revolutionary 
syndicalism, would abandon his anti-patriotism and eventually become the minister of 
labor under Petain’s Vichy; Hervé, for his part, abandoned antimilitarism, discovered 
in national tradition a remedy for social division and fragmentation, and became a 
Mussolini enthusiast. Péguy’s fate was short-lived. As literary types are wont to do, he 
performed his own theory. Increasingly enchanted with death as a form of spiritual 
redemption and rebirth, he enthusiastically rushed into war in August 1914 only to die 
on September 4th with a bullet to the head.   
The same adaptations occurred outside of France. In Italy especially, 
“Sorelismo” encouraged the reorganization of working class energy into nationalist 
forms of collectivism. The Italian futurist, Filippo Marinetti, published his infamous 
and widely read “The Foundation and Manifesto of Futurism” in the French literary 
magazine Le Figaro on February 20, 1909. It was a screed against history and the past, 
both deeply anti-establishment and ultra-nationalist. It exalted, among other things, the 
existential rebirth of a “new man” into the rebellious masses: “We shall sing of the 
great multitudes who are roused up by work, by pleasure, or by rebellion; of the many-
hued, many-voiced tides of revolution in our modern capitals.”85 Touched by 
                                                
84 Georges Sorel, “Le Réveil de l'âme Française,” L'Action Française, April 14, 1910; Georges Sorel, 
“Socialistes Antiparlementaires,” L'Action Française, August 22, 1909. 
85 Filippo Marinetti, “The Foundation and Manifesto of Futurism,” in Critical Writings, ed. Gunter 
Berghaus, trans. Doug Thompson (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux), 14. 
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Sorelismo, he would soon claim that war was “the sole cleanser of the world,” and that 
“I believe that a people has to pursue a continuous hygiene of heroism and every 
century take a glorious shower of blood.”86 Marinetti was, moreover, only the most 
bombastic of those influenced by Sorelismo.87 As Shlomo Sand explains, “Sorel’s 
presence in Italian culture from the end of the nineteenth century onward was too 
important to be ignored. The French friend of [leading Italian intellectuals] was known 
as an important philosopher, not only in syndicalist circles and not just on the political 
fringes, but also among an entire generation of university graduates in the second 
decade of the twentieth century.”88 Sorel’s canonization as part of fascism’s 
intellectual pantheon was assured with Mussolini’s proclamation that “Who I am, I 
owe to Georges Sorel.” Finally, despite the fact that Sorel’s engagement with the right 
actually only lasted a few years, he was nevertheless mythologized as one of the 
intellectual forebears of fascism in France, too. Sorel was included by Vichy’s 
Information Services in a 1941 list of the political thinkers who constituted its 
pedigree: Sorel and Péguy stood aside Joseph de Maistre, Barrès, and Maurras.89 
The effortless displacement of the working class by the nation helps bring into 
view how, rather than representing alternative political programs, the irrationalist anti-
republicanism of the mid-1900s and the nationalist, populist republicanism on the eve 
of war might be theoretically continuous. They shared a common way of thinking 
                                                
86 Marinetti, “Futurism: An Interview with Mr. Marinetti in Comoedia,” in Critical Writings, 19. 
87 For a study of Sorel’s influence, see Jack Roth, The Cult of Violence: Sorel and the Sorelians 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Antliff, Avant-Garde Fascism. 
88 Shlomo Sand, “Legend, Myth, and Fascism” The European Legacy 3, no. 5 (1998): 51-65, at 56. 
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about how war might inspire men to transcend their decadent, narrow self-interests 
and reach towards values as ends in themselves. Sorel himself approved of this 
“discovery” of the exchangeability between the social and the national. Originally 
enthusiastic about the rise of Mussolini, Sorel wrote that his genius consisted in 
discovering “the union of the national and the social, which I studied but which I 
never fathomed.”90 War’s reconceptualization as an answer to the social question—
because it drew out individuality, creativity, and moral uplift in ways compatible with 
social cohesion—itself transformed the meaning of the Republic. No longer the 
guardian of social harmony and economic progress that the elite social theorists of the 
Third Republic had defined it as, it was now a mythic source of authority and in the 
name of which a higher (and inward) freedom could be experienced. In obedience to 
the myth of the Nation, men would fight not for egoism or instrumental 
considerations, but civilization, morality, and “life” itself [fig 21]. 
This is not to deny that part of the broad conversion from anti-republicanism to 
enthusiastic nationalism was spurred by the weakening of syndicalism more broadly. 
After 1908, the revolutionary workers’ movement witnessed violent repression by the 
state and lost momentum. But the circumstantial reasons for this conversion also point 
to larger theoretical issues. The aestheticization of violence in this context explicitly 
invited the reorganization of working class energies into a larger politics of 
nationalism because it abandoned the economic interpretation of class struggle 
prominent elsewhere. Sorel’s notion of myths and sublime violence clearly gratified a 
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widespread urge on the eve of World War I for an intellectual orientation that could 
unite the political, the aesthetic and the moral in ways that answered the perceived 
crisis of France. Far from identifying that urge as antidemocratic and antirepublican, 
we should see that synthesis as answering a demand raised by French republicanism 
itself. For a generation searching for experiential grounds for social cohesion that were 
organic and spontaneous rather than procedural or mechanical, Sorel’s arguments 
paved the way for war to be viewed as far more than security maneuvering. To enter 
into war with Germany was to return to a myth of the people in arms and regain one’s 
political will. 
For those swayed by Sorel’s arguments, to defend mythologized authority in 
war was the condition of modern freedom. It was as if for Sorel and his generation, the 
Third Republic had suffocated the freedom of the will at the moment that democracy 
had finally triumphed over monarchism. If only the relativism and utilitarianism of 
French political culture could be overcome, we could finally have in our possession 
the proof of our freedom. That was the desire that the turn to intuition, “sublime” 
violent self-renewal intended to gratify. What violence supplied was not factual datum 
but psychological conviction in our freedom that the empirical world refused to yield 
through “rational” reflection. The regeneration of the moral foundations of the 
Republic thus depended on irrational violence. 
  250 
 
[Fig 21: In this Epinal print in 1915, Thor—“the old Germanic divinity” and avatar of barbarism—is 
crushing the emblems of “civilization”—French churches. Besides seeing Germany as the hereditary 
enemy of France, it construes the battle for civilization not in the secular terms, but of a battle against 
paganism by the Church. Paris, BNF, Estampes et Photographie, Li-59 (17)-Fol.]
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Conclusion 
Democracy and the Return of the Social 
 
 With two world wars and the waves of violence that defined the twentieth 
century, European political development unraveled. The unprecedented scale of 
violence in the first half of the century—its trenches, its firebombing, its camps—
seemed to defeat nineteenth century notions of humanism, civilization, and progress in 
irreversible ways. An estimated 1,400 people died at the height of the Jacobin Terror 
in the spring of 1794. But in the trenches of Verdun in 1916, over 70,000 soldiers were 
dying each month, with almost a million casualties by the year’s end. The violence 
was of such a scale that observers in and beyond Europe openly doubted whether the 
political thought of the preceding century could grasp it. How could thought so blind 
to this coming historical mutation explain its significance?1  
 In other words, many twentieth century observers surmised that the experience 
of world war not only introduced a break in the history of European political 
development, but also in its history of political thought. As George Kateb has recently 
put it, such are the “awful events” of the twentieth century that our inherited canon of 
political theory may not be able to “take in and comprehend” its dizzying catastrophe, 
comprised as it is of “World War I, World War II, the use twice of atomic weapons, 
their repeated threatened use by the United States, the theories of nuclear deterrence, 
the gulags, the Holocaust, induced famines, such American wars as the Korean War 
                                                
1 Élie Halévy, L’ère des tyrannies (Paris: Gallimard, 1938); Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A 
History of the World, 1914-1991 (New York: Vintage, 1996; first published 1994); Enzo Traverso, Fire 
and Blood: The European Civil War, 1914-1945 (New York: Verso, 2016; first published 2006). 
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and the Vietnam War, and numerous massive massacres.”2 Before so much death, 
what can political theory say? It was a state of confusion shared by a generation of 
European thinkers. From the Frankfurt school to cold war liberals, postwar journalists 
to newspaper critics, intellectuals everywhere cast the two world wars as a rupture in 
the nature of knowledge itself. Where there was once light and perspicacity in the Age 
of Enlightenment, after 1914, Ira Katznelson observes, there seemed to be only 
darkness and mystery.3 
 At the heart of this perceived rupture in European political thought lay 
revolutionary violence, for it, too, appeared to have evolved into something 
unrecognizable from the perspective of a St Just, a Michel, or a Péguy. For sure, 
revolutionary violence in the twentieth century continued to borrow the redemptive 
terms of its predecessors. It even continued to borrow the authority of the peuple and 
the patrie to authorize its illegality. But that all seemed to be beside the point. 
Technological transformations of violence had rendered these qualities accidental 
rather than essential. However regenerative Hitler viewed German expansion to be, it 
was its blitzkriegs and its gas chambers that made it what it was. Napoleonic France 
may have invented the theory of total war, but it was in the “bloodlands” of Eastern 
Europe where fourteen million people died between 1933 and 1945 that theory 
became practice.4 The Franco-Prussian war may have witnessed the ascendance of the 
mitrailleuse, but its gunpowder was nothing compared to the tanks, aerial strafing, and 
                                                
2 George Kateb, “The Adequacy of the Canon,” Political Theory 30, no. 4 (2002): 482-505, at 482-83. 
3 Ira Katznelson, Enlightenment and Desolation: Political Knowledge After Total War, Totalitarianism, 
and the Holocaust (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).	
4 Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010). 
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atomic bombs of World War II. It was the changed character of violence in the 
twentieth century that above all else broke the chains of tradition connecting 
nineteenth century political theory to its twentieth century successors. Confronted with 
that divide, what can a study of democratic terror in France teach us? 
 In this dissertation, I have tried to tell the story of redemptive violence’s 
recurring role in the struggle for democracy in France. My aim has been to show how 
democratization in France invited political thinkers across the spectrum to appeal, time 
and again, to popular violence as a vocabulary of social repair. To show this, I have 
described how democratization was experienced as a process of disintegration, 
because it was perceived as a series of abstraction procedures imposed upon society: 
first, the procedures which produced the individual as the bearer of the rights of man, 
and later those which underlay the market, the electorate, and representative 
parliamentary politics. These procedures of abstraction were indispensable to the 
struggle for democracy in France, because they eroded the hierarchical corporatism of 
the ancien régime and pointed the way to a national sovereignty. At the same time, 
these procedures were unable to satisfy an equally important demand of republican 
democracy: the demand for a new type of social bond capable of binding together a 
self-governing people. Without a social cohesion that transcended a modus vivendi, 
France could have a republican government, but never a republican people. Hence, 
generations of thinkers on both the right and left found themselves fretting over the 
fact that France seemed to be realizing the ideal of “the people rule” at the cost of 
dissolving the people back into a fragmented multitude of atomized individuals.  
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 Even if this dilemma had to be confronted in specific times and places, it was 
at bottom a theoretical impasse rooted in the wider historical experience of 
democratization. If the customary bases of association are no longer valid, then from 
what is the social bond made? How can a society of equals be created that transcends a 
quantitative aggregation of individuals? These questions were raised everywhere 
touched by democratic revolution, but it became most acute in postrevolutionary 
France. That was why the French struggle for democracy was never simply about 
replacing monarchy with republican government, subjects with citizens. It was also 
about rethinking the social bond. 
French political thinkers quickly discovered that not all forms of violence were 
capable of reconstituting a social body. On the contrary, violence motivated by 
instrumental calculations exacerbated social disintegration. Nineteenth century 
thinkers often perceived a tight connection between the atomized individual and 
utilitarian reasoning. Indeed, it is hard to understate how much modern French thought 
developed its concern with the social in opposition to English liberal utilitarianism. 
Because of that defining opposition, French thinkers believed that instrumental or 
“realist” perspectives on violence conformed to rather than resisted contemporary 
forces of disintegration. What could regenerate social cohesion, they believed, were 
expressivist and non-instrumental types of violence which escaped the cut and thrust 
of interest politics or means-end rationality. Unlike the superficial opportunism of 
power politics or raison d’état, redemptive violence manifested the concrete moral 
principles that bind us together in society. In contrast to the mediated agency of the 
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law, it expressed the spontaneous unity and agency of the people. With redemptive 
violence, the people entered into history, not as an abstract ground of public authority, 
but a concrete agent of moral redemption. 
 If this solution to the demise of social cohesion looks anachronistic on this side 
of the twentieth century, the problem it hoped to solve should not. Redemptive 
violence might be an outdated source of social cohesion for republican democracy, but 
the contemporary alternatives put forward by liberal political theorists have not fared 
well either. The case of “constitutional patriotism” is a case in point. Designed by 
German intellectuals as a secular and post-national basis for postwar reunification, 
constitutional patriotism has come to attract the attention of liberals everywhere 
concerned with reinventing the normative bases for European integration. It promises 
to supply an alternative to racial or religious sources of social cohesion by 
emphasizing our shared attachments to procedural and institutional principles, often 
enshrined in a constitutional document.5 It holds out, Jan-Werner Müller explains, the 
hope that “another form of social cohesion is possible,” one nourished by a minimal 
moral universalism instead of the exclusionary national or ethnic creeds which marred 
the twentieth century.6 
 It is apparent to any student of European politics that constitutional patriotism 
                                                
5 Jürgen Habermas, “Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?” 
Political Theory 29, no. 6 (2001): 766-781; Jan-Werner Müller, Constitutional Patriotism (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Frank Michelman, ‘Morality, Identity and “Constitutional 
Patriotism”’ Ratio Juris 14 (2001): 253-271; Patchen Markell, “Making Affect Safe for Democracy?: 
On ‘Constitutional Patriotism,’” Political Theory 28, no. 1 (2000): 38-63. 
6 Müller, Constitutional Patriotism, 6; the case for constitutional patriotism as a form of moral 
minimalism is made in Jan-Werner Müller, “A European Constitutional Patriotism? The Case 
Restated,” European Law Journal 14, no. 5 (2008): 542-557. 
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has not been able to provide an effective source of social cohesion for postwar 
democracy. Where its vision of integration has proven successful, it has been in 
national contexts that have enjoyed demonstrable economic prosperity. Otherwise, the 
social cohesion forged through continental constitutional democracy has shown itself 
too fragile to withstand the combined assault of demographic diversification, 
economic crisis and dispossession, and suspicions that popular sovereignty has been 
usurped by impersonal technocratic rule. The ascendance of international governance 
has not fostered a transnational attachment to core constitutional procedures, but the 
resurgence of chauvinistic nationalisms that constitutional patriotism promised to 
make obsolete. The beneficiary of the new European order has not been a minimalist 
moral universalism, but reassertions of “the people” that resemble the “blood and soil” 
of Barrèsian conservatism.7  
 The contemporary difficulties of constitutional patriotism to cement the social 
bond in times of disintegration would not have surprised the thinkers studied here. 
Indeed, it was their keen sense of its limitations that drove them towards redemptive 
violence. As Jacobins and socialist republicans in France understood, neither 
constitutionalism nor natural law theory offered persuasive answers for why 
democratic citizens ought to share a life together. They may have provided a common 
source of right, but they offered unconvincing visions of the social. For individuals 
who have never understood themselves first and foremost as citizens, and for a people 
who have never seen their social bonds as essentially civic, it is ahistorical to simply 
                                                
7 Françoise Gaspard, A Small City in France, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1995);  
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insist otherwise by normative fiat. Even liberals in nineteenth century France accepted 
that fact, despite contemporary liberal disavowals of social cohesion as a proto-
totalitarian expectation.8 Third Republic liberals devoted decades to creating social 
cohesion by inventing a new republican political culture: the creation of a national 
education system, the standardization of the French language, the construction of 
modern railway networks, the expansion of the civil service, and the implementation 
of laïcité.9 This liberal pursuit of social cohesion was no more minimalist or 
nonviolent than that of the Jacobins and their mocked Festival of the Supreme Being. 
The Mur des Fédérés in Père-Lachaise ought to remind us of that fact. Adolphe Thiers 
was deluding himself when he conceded that “the Republic is the form of government 
that divides us the least.” As Sorel and Péguy soon countered (and the enthusiasm of 
war mobilization in 1914 confirmed), the Republic could never be reduced to a 
constitutional modus vivendi. And if contemporary liberals disavow the pursuit of 
social cohesion as illiberal, that is only because historical amnesia has concealed how 
hard they themselves had to work for it in the past.  
 A study of democratic terror in France’s long nineteenth century can teach us 
about the crucial role of the social in modern republican democracy. Democratic 
politics has never been reducible to a competition between principles of right. It has 
also involved, and will continue to involve, rethinking the social bond. Agreement on 
                                                
8 Robert A. Nisbet, “Rousseau and Totalitarianism,” The Journal of Politics 5, no. 2 (1943): 93-114; 
David Ciepley, Liberalism in the Shadow of Totalitarianism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2006); Duncan Bell, “What Is Liberalism?” Political Theory 42, no. 6 (2014): 682-715. 
9 Eugen Weber, Peasants Into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1976); Philip Nord, The Republican Moment: Struggles for Democracy in 
Nineteenth-Century France (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
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that fact connected liberals, socialists, Jacobins, anarchists, and even some Catholics 
in nineteenth century France as they each searched for a path to modern republican 
democracy. Once we understand their thinking, we can better appreciate the situation 
confronting contemporary critics: the challenge is to adjudicate between different 
prescriptions for the social rather than balancing individualism and social cohesion. 
The rising tide of European nationalism will not be resisted by discrediting the desire 
for social cohesion as irredeemably illiberal, but by putting forth a convincing 
democratic and egalitarian alternative. We do not need to endorse redemptive violence 
to appreciate how its history clarifies for us this demand left by the age of democratic 
revolutions and which modern democratic politics must still answer. 
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